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3Abstract
The study compares the efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks, during the 
period 2006-2012, by employing a non-parametric approach- the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). In order to minimise the bias resulting from the inherent dependency 
in the first stage of the DEA, the DEA outcomes were replaced with the bootstrapped 
estimators and replicated them 500 times. Accordingly, confidence intervals are 
constructed for efficiency measures, which subsequently, improved further the 
accuracy of the findings and provided more reliable arguments for policy 
implications. 
The study applies a two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis. The first stage of the 
DEA compares banks based on their Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE) and its 
components (Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) and Scale Efficiency (SE)).  Although 
proven to be more resilient during the financial crisis (Farooq and Zaheer, 2015), the 
research found that Islamic banks to be normally on a par with their conventional 
counterparts in terms of PTE and that they were significantly higher in terms of OTE  
and SE . In addition, according to the study’s results, both Islamic and conventional 
banks suffered from managerial underperformance rather than a failure in operating at 
optimal production levels. In other words, Islamic and conventional banks were 
managerially inefficient in controlling their operating costs and utilising their 
resources.  
The second stage of the DEA, which accounts for the country- and bank- specific 
factors, confirms the findings that there was no significant difference in PTE between 
Islamic and conventional banks. Moreover, the findings imply that Islamic banks have
no significance on pooled PTE and show no significant difference in PTE when 
compared to conventional banks during the entire period of the study including the 
financial crisis (2007-2009). In the light of the study’s empirical findings, Islamic 
banks should explore the benefits of moving to more diversified investments and tools 
in order to make use of their liquidity. Moreover, Islamic banks have to employ more 
solid risk management techniques in order to limit the number of risks, including 
credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and operational risk, which may arise in the 
shari’ah banking industry. 
The research is extended to study the PTE determinants of four regions, namely, 
MENA, East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, and Europe and Central Asia. The 
outcomes show that PTE had a different significance for each region’s determinants 
related mainly to the levels of the indicators of governance, namely, Voice 
Accountability (VACC) and Regulation Quality (REGQ). The findings suggested that 
the more developed and democratic countries were favourable to banks having more 
operations that are efficient. In addition, these countries’ excessive regulation and 
supervision (i.e. limited financial freedom), encouraged financial institutions to create 
unclear new instruments and misjudge the risks. These resulted in the banks being less 
efficient. The study found, also, that there were different determinants for Islamic and 
conventional banks operating in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Banks are one of the most significant contributors to a modern economy and an 
integral part of the infrastructure of today’s society. They carry out some very vital 
tasks in society and, accordingly, they have a significant effect on the level of 
economic activity. According to Iqbal and Molyneux (2005), banks carry out the 
following four major tasks: firstly, it is considered that banks ar play the role of 
financial intermediary in channeling funds from depositors (lenders) to investors 
(borrowers). The financial intermediation develops the efficiency of the procedure of 
savings and investments by removing the existing mismatches in the need of an 
economy to have surplus and deficit units (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Secondly, 
banks offer a broad variety of further financial services which are not linked to the 
banks’ main role of financial intermediation. These services include payment services, 
insurance asset management etc. (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Thirdly, banks initiate a 
wide range of assets and liabilitieswhich have distinct features concerning liquidity, 
maturity, returns, and risk-sharing (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). A bank’s fourth 
essential task is the initiation of motivations for an efficient allocation of the resources 
used inside an economy and the allocation of insufficient financial and actual 
resources between rivals (Iqbal & Llewellyn, 2002). In other words, banks make 
accurate assessments and efficient valuations of risk. These are reflected in the 
interest rate (in conventional banking only) and fixed (profit-sharing) and variable 
(market-up) returns (in Islamic banking).   
The traditional banking system has existed since the 13th century and depends on 
applying interest to loans which is monitored by the commercial regulations of the 
hosting country (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). However, in the Muslim beliefs system, 
which follows Shari'ah (the legal code of Islam), interest is prohibited. Therefore, 
during the golden ages (known in Europe as the dark ages) of the Islamic civilization 
and countries, there was a quite effective system of merchandising recourses to 
finance productive activities and consumer needs was free from interest (Iqbal and 
Molyeux, 2005).
21
During the 12th and 13th centuries in the Mediterranean region, partnership and profit-
margin sharing constituted the basis of commerce and trading activities rather than 
interest-based borrowing and lending (Goitem, 1971; Igbal and Molyneux,2005). 
However, as some countries’ focus on the world’s economic activities shifted to the 
western world, western financial initiations and practices became more influential 
while Islamic practices became dormant (Igbal and Molyneux, 2005).
As a result, Muslim people have avoided dealing with interest-based commercial 
banks since this is an inherent contradiction to their values and Islamic standards. 
Therefore, they have expressed their reservations regarding the financial 
intermediation model of commercial banking (Wilson, 2007).  
Thus, this has generated a high demand for a banking system that does not oppose 
their religious beliefs and has called for an attractive mechanism to function as 
financial intermediation in Muslim societies. Such a mechanism began with 
theoretical and model discussions among Muslims economists and banks. 
Nevertheless, Islamic banks did not exist until the second half of the 20th century 
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Following the Second World War and the independence 
of most Muslim countries from colonial rule, Shari'ah-compliant financing began to 
be practiced on a small scale before expanding into formal banking institutions in 
many countries in the Middle East and Asia regions (Wilson, 2007). 
In the early 1980s, as Islamic banks grew and required tools for managing liquidity, a 
number of banks, based in London, offered Shari'ah-compliant deposits through 
mark-ups generated from short-term trading transactions at the London Metal 
Exchange (Wilson, 2007). At the same time, European banks dealing with Gulf 
Islamic banks, which were involved in imports from Europe, started to learn Islamic 
finance in order to understand the working mechanism (Wilson, 2007). According to 
Kuwait Finance House (KFH), in terms of assets, the Islamic finance market realized 
a total of USD 2.4 trillion in 2015. Moreover, based on The Economist (2012 and 
2014), since 2006 the total value of Shari'ah–compliant assets has increased by 150% 
and will grow by an average of 19.7% a year to 2018. Globally, Islamic banks hold 
nearly 80 per cent of these assets (Economist, 2014).
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Although Islamic banks are considered sometimes to have limited options, in fact, it is 
widening the banking choice of both Muslims and non-Muslims (conventional users). 
Furthermore, Islamic banks are not regarded as a threat to the current traditional 
system. Alternatively, Islamic banks are considered to offer available opportunities 
for new investments since its tasks fall within the scope of socially responsible 
banking operations (Wilson, 2007). Therefore, multinational and domestic 
conventional banks have opened Shari'ah-compliant windows in meeting demand 
from the Muslim communities as  well as, particularly in countries with a mixed 
environment,  offering  both Muslim and non-Muslim customers an alternative to 
interest-based banking . 
1.1 Motivations 
As Islamic banks are part of a country’s banking system of a country, its performance 
may affect the soundness and stability of the banking system as well as a country’s   
economic development. Moreover, for conventional banks with Islamic windows, the 
performance of these windows has a certain influence on the performance of 
conventional banks. Consequently, the assessment of the performance of Islamic 
banks, relative to their conventional counterparts, will help policy makers in 
formulating strategies. These strategies may improve the performance of a country’s 
banking system and may minimize any future failure leading to financial crisis. 
Additionally, the information, which is obtained from the evaluation of bank 
performance, may help to ameliorate managerial performance by determining “best” 
and “worst” practice banks (Berger and Humphry, 1997).
The increasing number of Islamic banks - 145 full-fledged Islamic banks operating 
globally including banks in Iran (Bankscope, 2013) – has also heightened the 
competition between fully-fledged Islamic banks and conventional banks. Thus, the 
determination of the relative performance will encourage both fully-fledged Islamic 
and conventional bank managers to improve their respective bank performances in 
order to compete with each other. Performance is measured through efficiency and 
productivity and Chapter 3 explains this in detail.    
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Furthermore, since modern Islamic banks have been in operation for over 30 years, 
the performance of its operations needs further evaluation. Moreover, as an alternative 
to the well- established interest-based banking, it is rational to compare the 
performance of Islamic banks with their conventional counterparts. Although, the 
nature of mechanism, i.e. Shari'ah-compliance, involved in Islamic bank is different 
from interest-based banking, it would be significant to find a mutual ground to 
compare their respective performances. Given the above reasons, the evaluation of 
how Islamic banks perform globally, when compared to conventional banks, is 
significant and requires further investigation in order to provide the latest empirical 
evidence on the relative performance of Islamic banks. 
1.2 Contribution and objectives
This study is unique and differs from others in the literature review for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the study covers all Islamic banks in the world, as found in 
BankScope database, including those operating in countries that have both Islamic 
and conventional banks. During the period of the data collection (i.e. late 2013), the 
BankScope indicates that 28 countries host fully-fledged Islamic banks in the world.
However, we exclude the following countries Brunei, Cayman Island, Gambia, Iran, 
Mauritania, Palestine, and Russia from the study. Based on BankScope database, 
Islamic banks operating in Brunei, Gambia, Mauritania and Russia either were
withdrawn or were marked as Inactive by BankScope, or covered less than 4 years of 
the study’s timeline (2006-2012), or had more than 4 years of not available data. 
Cayman Island and Palestine were removed too since no economic and governance 
indicators existed for both countries, mainly in the World Bank databases. Moreover, 
Iran did not take part of this study as its banking system consists only of banks that 
comply with Islamic laws (i.e. Shari’ah principles). Consequently, the study includes
21 countries worldwide and, in particular, four different regions.
Secondly, the study observe the potential determinants of   Islamic and conventional 
banks’ efficiency in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Finally, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, none of the pervious researchers examined the existence of 
association between the WGIs and the efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks. 
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Consequently, our study is the first to use the WGIs for this purpose.    In summary, 
this study seeks to address the following questions:
1. Do the scale efficiency and the overall and pure technical efficiency vary across 
the two different bank types over 2006-2012?  
2. How efficient are Islamic banks at the global level when compared to 
conventional banks during 2006-2012, particularly during the financial crisis (i.e. 
2007-2009)? In other words, is there any significance between both types of 
banks?  
3. What are the determinants of efficiency for Islamic and conventional banks, at the 
pooled level?
4. Do the determinants of bank efficiency differ across regions and in Muslim 
countries when compared to non-Muslim countries? Do the determinants of 
Islamic and conventional banks vary in Muslim countries and in non-Muslim 
ones?  
5. Do the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) have any influence on the pure 
technical efficiency of banks?
Given the above research questions, the study aims to compare the efficiency of 
Islamic banks relative to conventional banks over 2006-2012. The study’s objectives 
are to:
 Measure the efficiency of Islamic banks compared to their conventional 
counterparts in countries operating Islamic banking.
 Assess the efficiency of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks prior to 
the financial crisis (up to 2006), during the crisis (2007-2009) and after the crisis 
(2010-2012).
 Determine the factors that influenced the efficiency of Islamic and conventional 
banks. Although extensive literature had examined bank efficiency, mainly in the 
U.S and European banking sectors, there were few empirical researches which had 
evaluated the global performance of Islamic banks compared to conventional 
banks and these produced contradictory results. 
 Examine whether World Governance Indicators (WGI) affect bank efficiency.  
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 Investigate whether there are different determinants of bank efficiency for Islamic 
and conventional banks operating in Muslim countries1 and non-Muslim 
countries. This is done by dividing our sample into Muslim countries and non-
Muslim countries, and conducting many regression models to capture any 
significance on PTE. Some authors concluded that there were no significant
efficiency differences between the Islamic and conventional banks (e.g. Abdul-
Majid et al., 2005b; El-Gamal and Inanoglu, 2005; Mokhtar et al., 2006; Bader, 
2008; Hassan et al., 2009; Shahid et al., 2010) and others found that Islamic 
banks were significantly less efficient than conventional banks (e.g. Mokhtar et 
al., 2007, 2008; Srairi, 2010). On the other hand, Al Al-Muharrami (2008) stated
that  Islamic banks were significantly more efficient than conventional banks
 Investigate possible regional influences on the PTE determinants. The study 
classifies the 21 countries2  into four regions: Middle and North Africa, East Asia 
& Pacific, South Asia, and Europe & Central Asia. We captured potential 
influence by conducting regression models with dummy variables (as explanatory 
variables) for the four regions.  
 Examine any potential effect from the WGIs on the banks’ PTE. Previous research 
used different bank efficiency determinants.  However, for the first time, a study 
investigates the influence of the World Bank governance indicators on the 
efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks-at the global level.
Moreover, the study aims to integrate more than one approach and statistical 
techniques in order to generate robust results for policy makers to regulate effectively 
the productivity of the banking industry; for bankers to improve their bank 
performance; and for the investors to maximizing their benefits. For the first stage, we 
used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to calculate various efficiency scores -
Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE), Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) and Scale 
Efficiency (SE). For the second stage, we used an appropriate regression model, i.e. 
the random effects model. 
                                                     
1The researcher refers to Muslim countries as those countries where Islam is the main religion (at least 
60% of the total population).
2 The 21 countries are countries that cover all Islamic banks in the world up to year 2012, and in which 
Islamic and conventional banks operate. Iran is excluded as it only operates Islamic banking. 
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1.3 Research approach
In this study, we tackled the research objectives by implementing distinct data sets 
and methodologies. The research methodology starts with employing a literature 
review of theories concerning the determinants of bank performance.  In order to 
address the first research objective, the research conducts the DEA to evaluate the 
efficiency of Islamic banks relative to conventional banks. Three distinct types of 
efficiency scores (OTE, PTE and SE) are obtained, and the overall measure of each 
efficiency type are analysed over the research period (2006-2012).  The research 
period is divided into three stages: prior to crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis.  The 
study measures the efficiency scores by selecting appropriate inputs and outputs, and 
uses the intermediate approach rather than the production approach for the variables 
included in the DEA. The intermediate approach sees a bank as a financial go between 
which employ inputs (e.g. deposits) to produce outputs (e.g. loans).
Afterwards, the bootstrapped technical efficiency scores, extracted from the Data 
Envelopment Analysis, is regressed on environmental (i.e. bank and country- specific) 
variables. The PTE is selected as the only dependent variable since, unlike OTE, this 
type of efficiency computes each bank’s efficiency relative to other banks of a similar 
size. On the other hand, normally the OTE measures the efficiency of a particular 
bank against all banks. The Constant Return to Scale (CRS) specification given by 
Charnes et al. (1978) provides misrepresenting estimates of technical efficiency. In 
other words, the OTE scores, extracted from the CRS model, are biased by the scale 
efficiency. Another reason for selecting PTE, derived from Variable Return to Scale 
(VRS), as the dependent variable is that the CRS assumption is used in DEA when 
banks are operating at an optimal scale.  However, frequently in real life, this optimal 
performance is rejected by a diversity of conditions such as different level of market 
power, monopoly, diseconomies of scale, different regulations and supervisions, 
imperfect competition etc. 
The following two types of environmental variables are included in the regression 
analysis: (I) the Bank-specific variables, namely, Net Loans to Total Assets (NL/TA), 
the ratio of Equity over Total Assets (EQ/TA), Bank Size (SIZERT), and Loan Loss 
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Provision to Gross Loans (LLP/TA). (II) the country-specific variables which are 
Inflation (INFL), Growth In Real GDP (YGR), Per Capita GDP (YPCRAT), the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) (or market concentration), and Market 
Capitalization (MKTCY), Voice and Accountability index (VACC) and Regulation 
Quality (REGQ). 
The dataset covers 104 Islamic banks and 95 conventional banks in 21 countries (i.e. 
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Bangladesh,  Egypt, Great Britain, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen) hosting Islamic banking between 2006 
and 2012. This provides a sample of 1125-year observations. The inputs and outputs, 
used in the computation of efficiency scores, are extracted from the banks’ financial 
statements held on the BankScope database while macroeconomic data are obtained
from the World Bank International Financial Statistics. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis: 
This thesis is divided into 7 chapters including the introductory chapter outlining the 
motivation and aims of the study. Chapter 2 provides detailed background of Islamic 
banking and discusses the issue of Riba (interest) and other prohibitions and the 
various modes of Islamic financing. The background focuses particularly on the 
Islamic rationale for the prohibition of interest, the legal basis of Islamic banking and 
its origin and development. Moreover, Chapter 2 lists the main principles of the 
Islamic jurisprudence concerning financial contracts and presents the alternative 
financial instruments and finances on which Islamic banks depend. In addition, it 
includes a brief comparison of Islamic and conventional banks. Consequently, this 
provides the necessary religions and pragmatic framework to understand the Islamic 
banks and allows the reader to appreciate the primary differences with conventional 
banks. The final section tries to depict the diverse socio-economic backgrounds of the 
countries included in the study.
Chapter 3 presents the reader with a critical review of the existing conventional and 
Islamic bank efficiency literature. Within the area of relative efficiency of Islamic 
banks compared with conventional banking, by using various techniques,  this 
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Chapter presents a wider review of previous research to provide a basic understanding 
of how we measured this relative efficiency . Moreover, there is a review of research 
on how environmental factors were considered in single and cross-country bank 
efficiency studies with the objective of modelling a function in order to measure the 
efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks.
Chapter 4 focuses on the introduction and description of the frontier technique,
namely the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), implemented in several studies in 
order to evaluate the performance of different countries’ conventional and Islamic 
banks between 2006 and 2012 (This period is dependent on the age of the required 
financial data on Islamic banks  held by BankScope).
Chapter 5 concentrates in conducting the mathematical approach, DEA, and reporting 
and analyzing the generated results of the calculations for the efficiency scores for 
both Islamic and conventional banks at the global level.  We analyzed empirically 
over the period from 2006 to 2012 the output efficiency of banks in 21 countries 
operating Islamic banking. 
Chapter 6 examines banking environment and bank-level characteristic, through 
employing generalized least squares- random effects models, in order to understand 
the determinants of pure technical efficiency (PTE) and control for environmental 
factors which influence the bank’s efficiency. We based our analysis of the 
regressions on pooled model, regional models, and Muslim versus non-Muslim 
countries models. The chapter ends by outlining the major findings.
Finally, the concluding Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings of the thesis with 
related policies and makes suggestions and directions for future areas of research. 
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Chapter 2 Origin and Development of Islamic Banking
2.1 Introduction
The chapter aims to provide the basic concept of Islamic banking and the background 
of countries involved in this research. It defines Islamic banking and its objectives;
explains the legal basis of Islamic banking; discusses its origin and traces its 
development; and describes the modes of operation of Islamic banking. Moreover, 
this chapter assesses the importance of Islamic banking and compares it with the 
conventional banking system. Furthermore, it briefly discusses the socio-economic 
background of countries under study.
2.2 Shari'ah (Legal Code of Islam)
A Muslim is expected to lead their life according to the Shari'ah extracted from the 
Quran and the Sunnah (the sayings and practices of the Prophet Mohammed).
Although often assigned as Islamic Law, Shari'ah can be described as either moral 
guidance or a series of principles monitoring all aspects of the day-to-day activities of 
Muslims (Kashyap, 2014). It has been more than 1400 years since the Quran was 
revealed; in the Muslim belief system, the message from the Quran is applicable to all 
people and times. Besides the above two main sources of Shari'ah, there are Ijmaa
(the consensus among Islamic scholars) and Qiyas (reasoning by taking analogy). 
Islam does not distinguish spiritual from worldly affairs, hence business is considered 
as ethics and is subject to Shari'ah. Hence, Shari'ah governs Islamic banking  in 
addition to the regulations set up by the host country (Karim, 2001).
The most significant values on which the modern Islamic financial structure depends 
on are:
 Prohibition of the payment or receipt of interest (Riba):
Money itself is assumed to have no essential value. It is considered to be only a store 
of wealth and a medium of exchange (Kashyap, 2014). Interest, which is the pre-
determined return on financial transaction required by the lender from the borrower 
over and above principal amount being lent, is forbidden but not the uncertain rate of 
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return on the transaction represented by profit. The Shari’ah defines riba as a 
premium that is obliged to be paid by the borrower to the lender together with the face 
value of the borrowed sum as a condition for the loan or for extending  date of 
repayment (i.e. maturity date) (Abu Umar Faruq & Hassan, 2007).
 Prohibition of uncertainty or speculation (Gharar): 
Any participant engaged in financial transactions must be sufficiently informed and 
not cheated or deceived (Kashyap, 2014).
 Prohibition of funding particular  businesses:
Investments, which are not permitted in activities,  are believed to be socially 
damaging and that are not compliant with Islamic principles. These businesses 
comprise gambling, pornography, alcohol trading and production, and armaments
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).
 Significance of profit and loss sharing:
The entrpreneur (borrower) and capital provider (lender) are obliged to share the risk 
of all financial transactions (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The principle of profit and 
loss sharing (PLS) is considered as one of the most significant characteristics of 
Islamic finance (Khediri et al., 2015). The lenders (funders) and borrowers (investors)
share risk arisen from given investment in exchange for sharing profits and losses
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). This PLS principle opposes the principles of 
conventional banks which depend on defining a pre-agreed fixed rate prior to any 
financial transaction (Khediri et al., 2015).
 Assets-banking principle: 
Any financial transaction has to be given security by a known and tangible asset.
It is the responsibility of Shari'ah scholars to evaluate whether a financial instrument
or service complies with the Shari'ah codes (Kashyap, 2014). The explanation of 
Shari’ah is recognized to be  either Fiqh, or Islamic Jurisprudence, and is performed
by Islamic scholars (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Although there are many areas of 
consensus, the opinions of scholars vary occasionally based on their ways of analysis. 
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In other words, this means that some scholars may regard some contractual terms of
Islamic finance as being permissible under Shari'ah, whereas others may consider 
them to be inappropriate (Kashyap, 2014).
2.3 Definition of Islamic banking
An Islamic bank is described as a financial institution with the objectives to employ
the economics and financial principles of Islamic banking (Hassan, 1999). The 
financial transactions of an Islamic bank are in compliance with the principles 
Shari'ah (i.e. Islamic laws). As a financial business, the primary objective of an 
Islamic bank is seeking to maximize profit in order to increase shareholders’ value. 
As a development financial institution, an Islamic bank helps economic development 
as well as ensure justice and fairness in the society including mobilizing savings,  
maintain sectoral balance of the economy, developing labor skills through training, 
mobilizing non-human resources  such as Sadaqah ( Islamic voluntary contribution) 
and Zakat (Islamic wealth tax), maintaining equitable income  and wealth distribution, 
and providing efficient banking services. An example that an Islamic bank tries to 
establish an equitable income distribution is the availability of interest-free loans for 
the needy, in which the consumer has to pay only the principal amount and the 
administrative costs. Although the contribution of interest-free loans to total financing 
of the Islamic banking operation is very minimal, still the reason behind the 
establishment of an Islamic bank is not solely to maximize profit or revenue – the 
major features of Islamic banking are to avoid interest in all transactions and avoid 
unethical activities such as prostitution, gambling ,alcoholism etc. Accordingly, 
Muslims should certainly invest their funds in businesses that comply with Shari'ah, 
and they must obtain Halal earnings on their investments (Iqbal and Molyneux, 
2005). Therefore, the two major aims of an Islamic bank are to maximize profit for 
shareholders and depositors and to achieve their social obligations.
32
2.4 principles of Islamic finance: The basis
Two sorts of rulings, or “ahkam”, are present in the Islamic jurisprudence. The first 
type is known as “Ibadat” (worship) which monitors the relationship of a human 
towards God (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). A traditional principle of “ibadat” is that 
nothing is permissible unless backed by clear or analogical permission from Shari’ah
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The second type of “ahkam”, also known as 
“mu’amalat” (or mutual dealings), rules overs, also, the relationship   of mankind . 
Two major principles rule the Islamic theory of contracts including: “Ibaha”
(permissibility) which states that all is allowed unless clearly forbidden by God. This 
is referred as the “doctrine of universal permissibility” (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).   
“The Golden Principle of free choice” allows the parties, participating in transactions 
or contracts, to consent to any circumstances since they do not breach any rule of
Shari'ah (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).
Islam forbids few activities and the reason for such prohibition is to protect the 
interest of weaker parties and to ensure justice and fairness among participants in 
transactions or investments.  Moreover, this also ensures joint interests for all parties 
and promotes social harmony (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).  The next paragraph 
examines the restrictions, imposed by Shari’ah, that are applicable when initiating 
financial transactions and contracts between participants. 
a) Prohibition of interest (Usury)
Islam forbids all types of interest, also called "riba". Literally, the term "riba" means
an increase, or the act of increasing (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). This term is used in 
the Quran to reflect the modern theory of interest. According to Quran, "Zulum" 
which is arisen from the practice of applying interest is the main reason for 
prohibiting the interest. Zulum refers to the spiritual, moral, and socio-economic 
injustice brought by charging interest in society (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). 
Shari’ah does not permit any premium or reward or pre-fixing positive return, 
whether big or small, on any type of loan. According to Iqbal and Molyneux (2005),
the definition of riba is anything pecuniary or non-pecuniary in addition to the face 
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value of a loan that the borrower is obliged to pay to the lender together with the 
principal as a condition. On the other hand, any surplus is not considered as riba if 
provided by the borrower out of his own agreement without the presence of any norm
or tradition that requires him to offer such excessive amount (Iqbal and Molyneux, 
2005).
b) Reasons for Interest prohibitions
According to Siddiqi (2006), an interest-based transaction may be unfair to one of the 
engaged parties (i.e. lender or borrower). The borrower or the investor may encounter 
injustice when performing riba-based contract. For instance, the investor will always 
be entitled to pay the interest and the initial value of the loan even if the business, 
financed by this loan, ends up with losses (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). In other 
words, the lender will always obtain this money along with the interest regardless the 
financial position of the underlying business. Accordingly, generally this transaction
is  considered to be unjust and unfair. On the other hand, the interest-based transaction 
may also be unfair to the lender. For instance, if the inflation rate increases and 
becomes greater that the initial return rate of loan, the real rate of interest turns into
negative. Moreover, the borrower or the investor, who may earn large profit from an 
investment financed by the loan, is only entitled to pay back smaller amount reflected 
by interest rate cost (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). However, if these invested funds 
were based on the profit and loss sharing ratio, which is an essential principle in
Islamic banking, the depositor would have earned a better return.
Riba, which is used as broad term, can be divided into two subsidiaries that are 
included in the category of riba of al-baye' (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Riba of al-
baye' refers to the interest that is associated with sales transactions.  The type of riba
discussed previously is known as riba al-qurud or riba al-nassiah or riba al-quran.
The first type of riba is riba al-nassiah which is discussed in previous paragraphs. It 
refers to the increase in place of delay or postponement of payment of outstanding 
charges (Ariff et al., 2012). In other words, it stands for the pre-fixed excess or 
premium that the borrower should pay on a loan as a reward for waiting (Chapra, 
1985).
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The second type of riba is called riba al-fadl which results in barter exchange of 
commodities. It represents the excess obtained by one of the trading parties when 
dealing in commodities of similar or equal kind (Iqbal and Molyenux, 2005).
Riba al-nassiah and riba al-fadl are considered to be crucial counterparts of the verse 
of Quran: “Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden riba” (2:275), where riba al-
fadl is linked to trade while riba al-nassiah is linked to loans (Ariff et al., 2012). 
c) Prohibition of Gharar
The second major prohibition in contractual deals is gharar trading. The literal 
meaning of gharar is to make oneself or a party’s property vulnerable to hazard 
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Nevertheless, gharar may be regarded as the acts and 
conditions that are engaged in exchange contracts but are unclear and uncertain to 
other participants (Ariff et al., 2012). This is considered to be very equivalent to 
asymmetric information (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). According to Shari’ah, the 
principle of voluntary consent of all participants is violated if any party possesses
inferior information about a transaction relative to other involved parties (Ariff et al., 
2012). In other words, any party has the right not to  engage in a contract if full 
knowledge about the implications of this contractual transaction is acquired. Gharar 
can be divided into two types: gharar fahish (extensive) and gharar yassir (minor)
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The first is forbidden in Islam whereas the latter is 
permitted since this may be inevitable without substantially harming one of the parties 
(Iqbal and Molynenux, 2005).
Frequently, it is difficult to disclose all information concerning a contractual 
transaction since it is in the nature of the subject (Ariff et al., 2012). Gharar has
always been a hard term to comprehend among Islamic scholars. Nevertheless, 
Islamic jurisprudence counts on the general conditions of honesty and transparency of 
participants in a contract to manage this (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).
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d) Prohibition of Mayssir
Islam forbids all sorts of gambling and games of chance. This is illustrated in the 
following clear  text in the Quran (5:90): 
"O, you who believe! Intoxicants (Alcohols) (Arabic: Khamr), and gambling, and Al-
Anssab (animals that are sacrificed in the name of idols on their altars) and Al-Azlam 
(arrows thrown for seeking luck on decisions) are on abomination of Satan’s 
handiwork. So avoid that (abomination) in order that you may be successful”
On the other hand, it is significant to distinguish between pure games of chance, and 
tasks and businesses that are associated with life uncertainty and include element of 
chance and risk-taking (Ariff et al., 2012). For instance, one of the major principles of 
Islamic banking is the risk-sharing aspect which implemented between fund providers 
(lenders) and investors or entrepreneurs (borrowers).
2.5 Islamic banking: modes of operation
The Islamic economic model depends on judgment of Shari'ah. Two of the major
features, which  manage modern Islamic finance, are presented as follows:
a) Financial instruments or contracts have to be collateralized always by physical 
(i.e. tangible) assets in order to avoid speculation. 
b) As discussed earlier, Shari'ah strictly and clearly forbids riba ; this includes the 
interest payments and the exchanging of any positive fixed return.
These fundamental rules have made Islamic financial instruments to be mainly assets-
backed and to be dependent on the performance of the underlying assets (Iqbal and 
Molyneux, 2005). 
2.5.1 Sources of funds
Modern Islamic finance has initiated many methods to substitute interest return for 
cash flows (incomes) generated from investments and business activities (DTZ, 
2008). These include returns from trading in real assets and rental income obtained 
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from leasing of assets, etc. There are three main modes of Islamic financing which 
include:
1. Debt-based: refers to the loans initiated through a repurchase agreement transaction or 
back-to-back trades of borrower or third parttheld assets (DTZ, 2008). The most 
famous type of debt-based financing is Al-Murabahah produced from the acquisition 
and resale of a current or future asset at a mark-up (i.e. initial price plus a margin) 
instead of interest payments (Jobst, 2007). 
Al-Murabahah
Often called the ‘mark-up’ or ‘cost-plus’ sale, Al-Murabahah is analogous to buy –
sell back or back-to-back sales arrangements. It is a contract where a customer willing 
to buy an asset (such as apartment, equipment, etc.) request from an Islamic bank to
buy it for him. Afterwards, the bank sells this asset to the borrower at a price that 
include the face value of this given asset, any charges or expenses applied for the 
asset’s acquisition and an additional pre-agreed reasonable profit. The total price is  
made usually through a series of installments
The basic features of Al-Murabahah are outlined below (Shinger, 1994): 
(i) The buyer should know about all associated costs and the initial price of the 
asset. The profit (or markup) should be displayed as a percentage of the total 
price plus costs.
(ii) The subject of the sale should be tangible assets or goods against money; 
(iii) The seller should hold and own the asset, which  underpins the contract. 
Moreover, the seller should be able to deliver the asset to the buyer.
(iv) The repayment should be delayed postponed. 
2. Asset-based: also referred to as lease contract where a sale-leaseback (i.e. operating 
lease) agreement is put in place . It also includes the lease of a third party asset with 
option of purchase it. Such a type of lease contract is known as financing lease. The 
most common type of asset-based financing is Al-Ijarah. Based on Al-Ijarah contract,
credit is received in exchange for rental fees during the temporary use of an asset 
(Jobst, 2007). The borrower (or entrepreneur) also has an option to purchase this asset 
at maturity (Jobst, 2007).
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Al-Ijarah
This Islamic method of financing is equivalent to operating leases (sale-
leaseback/lease-buyback) or financing leases (lease-purchase). The investor rents a 
given project or asset for a definite amount and over a specific period of time. The
investor retains ownership of the asset during the transaction where he sustains all the 
expenses related to the asset’s ownership. On the other hand, the lessee has to cover 
all the costs resulting from utilizing the asset. In the case of a lease-purchase, each 
payment presents a portion of the final price of purchase and transfer of ownership of 
the asset. Two types of leasing finances are promoted by Shari’ah:
1) Ijarah (simple leasing)
2) Ijarah Wa Iqtinaa (purchase lease)
 Ijarah depends on a contract between the lesser (Investor) and the lessee (client)
(DTZ, 2008). The investor, represented by the Islamic bank in our case, buys a capital
asset and rents it to a client.  In return, the client should pay the bank a pre-agreed 
regular rental fees during the period of the transaction. The maturity of the contract 
depends on the requirement of the lessee, the lifetime of the capital asset, and the 
agreement between the investor (i.e. Islamic bank) and the customer (i.e. lessee). 
During the period of the transaction, the ownership of the asset remains with the 
Islamic bank but the customer has the limited right to utilize this asset in return for 
rental fees. At the maturity of the contract, the asset is returned to the bank.
 Ijarah Wa Iqtinaa is equivalent to hire-purchase arrangement. The rental payments 
are recovered by the lesser throughout the contract period in series of periodical 
installments. At maturity, the lessee obtains ownership of the given asset after the 
amount of the contract is paid in full (Chapra, 1985). In our case, the Islamic bank 
purchases equipment and leases it to the customer. The latter makes a yearly payment 
that represents a portion of the total price of the equipment owned by the lessee when 
the entire amount of the contract is paid.
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The advantages of finance leasing
In a leasing contract, there is a chance that the lessee misuses the leased asset as the 
lessor takes the total risk (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). However, the Islamic financial 
leasing, known by Al-Ijarah, has many features that may tackle this problem (Iqbal 
and Molyneux, 2005):
(I) The period of a leasing contract is sufficiently long to permit the lessor to 
amortize the cost of the asset with additional profit. The length of Al-Ijarah
generally covers the complete service life of a leased asset (Ariff et al., 2012).
(II) At maturity of a leasing contract (Al-Ijarah), the lessee has the option to buy
the leased asset from the lessor at fair market value (Iqbal and Molyneux, 
2005). 
(III) The contract cannot be before the expiry date without the agreement of both 
participants.
(IV) In a case of default, the lessor is able to repossess the equipment without the 
need to a court order.
(V) The high level of depreciation associated with the equipment helps the lessor 
to decrease his tax obligations towards authorities.
(VI) The lessor has the right to sell the equipment during the term of a contract. 
Consequently, the new owner collects any leasing fees. This enables the 
lessor to get cash liquidity. Shari’ah allows only the trading of physical assets 
and, exceptionally, any monetary debts can be sold at their nominal values.
3. Equity-based: this is regarded as profit and loss sharing contract where investors 
(i.e. financers) and entrepreneurs make an agreement to distribute any gain or loss
resulting from the underlying project or business (DTZ, 2008). The profit or loss is
shared based on the level of participants’ ownership or the portions of capital
provided by each party (DTZ, 2008). The two most frequently exercised equity-based 
contracts are Al-Mudarabah and Al-Musharakah.
39
Al-Mudarabah
This method of Islamic financing is treated as a contract between two parties.  In this 
transaction, the investor, known as rabb-al-mal, provides money to expertise, referred 
to as Mudareb, for the purpose of business and trading management (Iqbal and 
Molyneux, 2005). One of the major features of this contract is that any potential profit 
is split between the investor and the Mudareb according to a pre-agreed ratio (DTZ, 
2008). However, uniquely the investor absorbs any resulted loss. (Saeed, 1996)
In Al-Mudarabah financing, the bank does not play a part in the management of the 
investment being financed. However, it sufficiently regulates the underlying business 
to assure that funds are used in compliance with Al-Mudarabah agreement. This is 
what has come to be termed two tiers Mudarabah in current Islamic literature. Out of 
the total funds assigned to the financed business, a share might be given for the 
complete agreed term, whereas another share might be available for a short period as 
an overdraft to counterbalance the funds being in route to Mudareb and to manage 
any potential or seasonal deficiency in liquidity (Chapra, 1985).
Al-Musharakah (partnership)
It is the second Islamic financing method and is based on profit and loss sharing 
(PLS) concept (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). In Arabic Literality, Al-Musharakah
means sharing, and its financial term is extracted from the Islamic legal word shirkah. 
In fiqh, shirkah consist of two types: (i) shirkat al-mulk refers to joint ownership of 
two or more participants in a specific property. This kind of partnership may arise  
through either inheritance or joint purchase. (ii) Shirkah al 'aqd stands for a 
partnership and is originated through a contract. This contractual PLS generally exists
for commercial reason and takes several forms such as partnership in the capital of the 
enterprise, partnership in labor and management, mutual goodwill or a combination of 
these elements. (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005)
Al-Mudarabah differs from Al-Musharakah in at least one aspect. In the latter, the 
financier is allowed to engage in the management of the business in which he invested 
i. On the other hand, in Al-Mudarabah, the investor is unable to participate in
managing the business or project that he is funding (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). 
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These two types of partnership have a common feature that is the provider of funds 
share the profits and tolerates any possible losses resulting from his investment. Based 
on this fact, these two methods of financing are referred as to profit and loss sharing 
method (Khan, 1995).
The fundamental principles regulating Al-Musharakah are as follows:
(i) Profits, generated from the underlying business, are shared based on a pre-agreed 
proportion. However, no party is allowed to receive any fixed lump amount of 
profit .
(ii) Any possible loss should be shared in accordance with each party’s capital 
contribution.
(iii) All partners should generally contribute capital and management in the business. 
However, a partner may be exempt from participating in the management, but the 
profit should be distributed always according to the capital contribution of each 
partner.
(iv) All partners are unlimitedly liable. 
2.5.2 Origin and development of Islamic Banks
Major experiments of exercising the Islamic principles into financial transactions have
started with the setting-up of the Mit-Ghamr Saving Association in a small Egyptian 
village called Mit-Ghamr from 1963 to 1967 (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Moreover,
in 1962, another Islamic implication was a saving organization, called Tabung Haji,
located in Malaysia for Muslims who are willing to perform pilgrimage to Mecca
(IFSB, 2007).
The Mit-Ghamr Saving Association derived the concept from German saving banks. 
It used to hold small savings, mainly through interest-free saving accounts, from the 
rural areas (Ariff et al., 2012). Nevertheless, depositors willing to invest in productive 
sectors were entitled to small, short-term, and interest-free loans as incentives (Iqbal 
and Molyneux, 2005). They were allowed, also, to withdraw their savings on demand. 
Moreover, investment accounts, based on the profit and loss sharing concept, began 
to finance particular projects of entrepreneurs (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).
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In 1976, Mit-Ghamr Association was succeeded by the first interest- free bank, called
Nasser Social Bank. The main purposes of the public-owned Nasser Social Bank were 
social including providing interest-free loans to the poor and needy borrowers, 
scholarships to students, and micro-credits to small projects based on the profit and 
loss sharing model (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). In 1975, a group of businessmen 
founded the world’s first Islamic commercial bank, the Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB), in 
Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).
The major significant development in the history of Islamic banking occurred when 
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was founded in 1975. The IDB is a multilateral 
development financing organization originated to promote the economic and social 
development of the member countries and Muslim communities in compliance with 
the principles of Shari'ah (Islamic Development Bank, 2013). The IDB was initiated
as an international financial foundation following the announcement of purpose
resulted from a conference of Islamic countries’ ministers of treasury held in Jeddah-
Saudi Arabia, in December 1973 (IDB, 2013). The announcement was approved by 
the representatives of twenty-three countries which were members of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (Hassan and Lewis, 2009). The IDB 
started to operate in 20th of October 1975 following an opening meeting of the Board 
of Governors of the IDB that occurred in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (Iqbal and Molyneux, 
2005).
The industry grew progressively over the 1980s, but it is not until the early 1990s that 
the demand for the investments and loans that are in compliance with the Shari'ah
principles began to rise drastically. Over this term, Islamic banking developed into a 
feasible financial intermediary. Also, numerous Shari’ah-compliant financial 
instruments were issued. The period was distinguishable by the opening of a vast
number of privately owned Islamic banks operating under different socio-economic 
circumstances. Moreover, three countries including Pakistan, Iran and Sudan, 
expressed their intention to remove interest from their total banking system to comply 
with Shari’ah principles (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Currently, Iran has a banking 
system that is entirely Islamic and Shari’ah complied.   Several global banks like 
HSBC, Citibank and more have also opened Islamic windows and started to offer 
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Islamic financial instruments. This was considered clear recognition and acceptance 
of the Islamic financial intermediation by international organizations, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The amount of 
assets managed under Islamic finance has been estimated increasing from US$ 150 
billion in the mid-1990’s to around US$ 2 trillion in 2014 (The Economist, 2014). On 
the other hand, Islamic banking is still considered to be a growing industry and needs 
more time to be corresponding to the well- developed conventional financial 
intermediary in spite of significant growth and solid performance (Ariff et al., 2012).
It has made considerable progress towards that end, but there are still several 
challenges that it has to confront. Numerous unresolved theoretical issues and 
operational problems, mainly related to the poor regulation and corporate governance 
of Islamic banking system, may constrain further growth and effectiveness of the 
industry. Hence, the Islamic banking industry is still at an evolutionary stage, it has 
scored a number of successes, but a lot more needs to be achieved.
Table2.1 Difference between Islamic & conventional banks' financial instruments
Deposit Mechanism
Al Wadiah Current Deposit
Bank promises to return the deposits in full and 
the depositors do not receive any payment from 
the profit or other return
Current Deposit
It is equivalent to Al Wadiah current deposit
Mudarabah Savings Deposit
Bank invests the savings at its own risk, but 
ensures to return the entire deposits full return 
and to share any profit.
Savings Deposit
Bank safeguards deposits provided by customers 
in return for interest payment. The depositors are 
capable to withdraw the held amount.
Mudarabah Term Deposit
Savers share the profit and loss resulting from 
the projects financed by the bank. Consequently, 
they are not eligible to deposit’s withdrawal and 
do not receive any interest. The return is based 
on the actual profits generated from the 
investments operated by the bank.
Fixed or Term Deposit
This account is opened frequently for a definite
term. Depositors obtain different interest rates for 
different terms of fixed deposits. Usually, the 
savers cannot withdraw the funds from these 
accounts. However, withdrawals might be 
allowed in special situations.
Investment Mechanism
Murabahah
The customer requests the bank to provide funds 
to his specific requirement or project. The bank
then notifies the particular customer about the 
markup the bank would like to receive. Then, the
final cost is paid through installments. The
ownership of the asset remains with the bank 
before selling it to the customer.
Cash Credits
The bank permits the borrower to request cash
beyond the limit of the credit by issuing cheque. 
Interest charges are based on the day-to-day 
balance of the account.
Overdrafts
The bank lets the borrower  overdraw amounts of 
money greater than his credit balance but  defined 
to a specific limit.
Source: extracted from different sources, i.e.; Noman (2002), Alam (2003), Hussein (2004), Kamali 
(2007), and Ahmad and Hassan (2007), modified.
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Table 2.1: Difference between Islamic & conventional banks' financial instruments continued
Deposit Mechanism
Bai'-Salam
It is a sale of commodity to  bedelivered  on a 
future date for cash price. Payment is made in 
advance to the seller who makes in return  the 
delivery of commodity of defined specification 
on a precise due date. Usually, the items traded 
under this mode consist of agricultural products.
Purchase or Discount of Bills
A customer makes an agreement with the bank by 
initiating a Letter of Credit which assures that the 
bank will pay the customer’s bill  on a particular 
date and beyond in return for pre-determined 
interest return.  If the bill found to reach well 
prior the mentioned, the bank might buy the bill, 
if requested, on discount.
Qard al Hassan
It is an interest-free  loan that contributes 
socially in financing profitable activities. 
Loans
A loan is a requested amount of funds   paid in 
advance to a borrower. The sum can be re-paid in 
full at a definite time or by pre-agreed installment. 
Interest is applied usually on such type of 
transactions.
Musharakah
In this type of Islamic financial contract, one or 
more entrepreneurs seek financing of a project 
from an Islamic bank. The latter provides the 
funds and is able  to participate in the 
management of the given project. The profits or 
losses are shared among parties corresponding to 
a pre-agreed ratio or as per the capital 
contribution.
Mudarabah
It represents a contractual agreement between 
two parties. One party provides the necessary 
funds whereas the second party offers the 
expertise and management. The profits are 
distributed based ion pre-agreed proportion, 
whereas only the financier absorbs the losses.
Ijarah
It is equivalent to operating leases (Sale-
leaseback/Lease-buyback) or financing leases 
(lease-purchase). The investor rents a given 
project or asset for a definite amount and over a  
specific period of time. The ownership of the 
asset is kept with the investor during the 
transaction where he sustains all the expenses 
which are related to the asset’s ownership. On 
the other hand, the lessee has to cover fully the 
costs resulting from utilizing the asset. In the 
case of a lease-purchase, each payment presents 
a portion of the final price of purchase and 
transfer of ownership of the asset.
The bank is not permitted to apply any 
additional charges on the client in case of delay 
in payment of the rentals since it is assumed to 
be a Riba. However, Islamic jurists have reached 
a solution that is the defaulted customer could be 
requested to make a payment to charity
Conventional Leasing
It is a contractual agreement between  landlord 
and tenant for leasing a specific asset. The lessor 
maintains the ownership of the given asset which  
the lessee uses for a definite term in return for a 
series of rental fees. During the period of the 
transaction, the ownership of the leased property 
goes to the lessee. In case of default,  the lessee 
incurs charges as penalties. Buying the given asset 
at a discounted price at maturity should not be an 
option included in the contract. At the expiry of a 
contract, the underlying asset should have a 
different value from the initial value of lease. The 
lease rate is based on market rate of interest. 
Source: extracted from different sources, i.e.; Noman (2002), Alam (2003), Hussein (2004), Kamali 
(2007), and Ahmad and Hassan (2007), modified.
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2.6 Comparison of Islamic and conventional banks
Islamic Banks (IBs) perform alongside conventional banks (CBs) and play all the 
roles which banks are supposed to play (Mejía et al., 2014).  They are considered to 
be the main contributor in the issuance of information and, consequently, help to 
address the problem arise from asymmetric information problem (adverse selection 
and moral hazard) (Hasan and Dridi, 2010). Moreover, IBs reduce the costs of the 
transaction and facilitate the diversification for small savers and investors (Mejía et 
al., 2014). They also handle risks resulting from their operational projects, liquidity, 
market risk and other types of risks (Hasan and Dridi, 2010). Additionally, they are 
contributing in the economy by providing alternative methods of financing to the
business and entrepreneurs. However, Islamic banks differ from conventional 
counterparts in terms of philosophy and operations. The major difference between 
conventional banks (CBs) and Islamic counterparts is that the latter functions in 
compliance with the principles of Shari'ah. The principal concept in Islamic banking 
and finance is fairness and justice. This could  be achieved primarily through interest 
depending on interest-free financial contracts or transactions and on the profit/loss and 
risk sharing models 
Unlike conventional banks, which are largely debt-based and are permitted to transfer
risk , Islamic banks promote risk sharing and are asset-based (Hassan and Dridi, 
2010).  IBs vary in terms of the level of risk sharing (Hassan and Dridi, 2010). The 
Capital Adequacy and Risk Management standards released by the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) recommend that the type and size of financial risks in Shari'ah-
compliant instruments do not drastically differ from those issued by conventional 
banks. For instance, most methods of financing in Islamic banking are in the form of 
Murabahah contracts (markup financing) or Ijarah (Installments sales) As a result, 
the credit risk is the major type of risk that encounters the IBs, and this is similar to 
CBs (Hassan and Dridi, 2010). A main difference between CBs and IBs is that the 
latter does not allow investing in or funding any types of instruments or contracts 
which had initiated the financial turmoil (2007-2009) and consequently damaged 
directly the conventional banks (Hassan and Dridi, 2010). These financial products 
include toxic assets, derivatives, and securities of conventional financial institutions. 
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Similar to CBs, IBs encounter credit and market risks, and, also, their dealings  
develop liquidity, operational, strategic, and other types of risks. Handling liquidity is
considered a more significant challenge for IBs than it is for CBs.  The reason behind 
that is the limited capability of numerous IBs to attract investors for projects based on 
profit sharing concept as the return on these investments is uncertain. Moreover, the
liquidity risk management in Islamic banks is still in growing stage and lack effective 
jurisdictions (Hassan and Dridi, 2010).  
Table 2.2 Differences between Islamic & Conventional Banks
Source: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (2015), modified
The Islamic banks also suffer from a low dependency on deposits since the Islamic 
financial market is immature and the interbank rate unavailable except under the 
reverse Murabahah contract (Hasan and Dridi, 2010). Islamic banks tackle this kind 
Islamic Banking System Conventional Banking System
All activities comply with Shari’ah 
principles. Islamic scholars give advice and 
guidance, and assure consistency of 
transactions to Islamic laws.
Secular banking rules monitor transactions 
performed by the conventional bank. 
The contractual transactions are backed by  
tangible assets. The Islamic bank maintains 
the ownership of this financed asset before 
the resale.
Extreme dependency on credit and indebtedness 
can cause financial hardship.
This enables several parties, including the 
Islamic bank to provide equity capital to a 
project or venture. Losses are shared on the 
basis of equity participation while profits are 
shared on a pre-agreed ratio. Management of 
the enterprise can be in one of several forms 
depending on whether the financing is 
through Mudarabah, Musharakah, etc.
Equity financing with risk to capital is not 
generally available through commercial banks, but 
through venture capital companies and investment 
banks which typically take equity stakes and 
management control of an enterprise for providing 
start-up finance.
Transactions, which include speculation 
(Gharar), are forbidden. For instance, It is 
not allowed to deal in and trade derivatives 
since it consists of factor of Gharar.
It is permissible to trade and deal in securities and 
derivatives.  
All transactions are based on the profit and 
loss sharing concept. Profits are not 
guaranteed and vary based on the 
performance of the given Islamic bank. 
Therefore, customers may have  a share in  
the profits generated by the Islamic bank. 
The model of Profit and loss sharing is not 
employed in transactions. The depositor is eligible 
to a pre-agreed fixed return regardless the 
performance of a given bank. In other words, The 
depositor only gets a predetermined interest rate, 
and does not get a portion of the profits made by 
the bank Unlike the customer of an Islamic bank, 
the depositor cannot theoretically benefit from the 
improvement of a bank’s performance. 
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of risk by holding high level of liquidity as a buffer. On the other hand, limited 
investing tools prevent Islamic banks from efficiently using excessive liquidity and, 
consequently, becoming a major player in the financial market alongside CBs.
2.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter indicates the meaning of Islamic banking, the history of its origin and its 
development. It also shows the features of this type of sector and the differences from 
conventional counterparts. Moreover, this chapter presents the different sources of 
funds in Islamic and conventional banks, and the financial services and instruments 
provided by each of them. Additionally, it examines the significant relationship
between Islamic banks and the principles of Shari’ah, and shows how the latter
govern the different activities as well as the financial instruments and services 
provided by Islamic banks.
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Chapter 3 Literature review: Efficiency of Islamic and Conventional 
Banks
3.1 Introduction
This chapter begins with the review of studies on the performance of Islamic banks as
compared to their conventional counterparts; this review ranges from financial ratios 
to techiques which are more sophisticated. Particularly, it addresses the theoretical 
approaches to the assessment of efficiency. Moreover, it defines efficiency and returns 
to scale, parametric and non-parametric models and their methods to measure 
efficiency, and it summarizes each model’s strengths and weaknesses.  The chapter 
provides, also, recommendations which might minimize the limitation of the approach 
used in the study, namely Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This is done by 
extending it into more a flexible and developed model, i.e. by means of a re-sampling 
technique, such as bootstrapping, to obtain an empirical approximation of  the 
underlying sampling distribution of DEA efficiency estimates.
Furthermore, the chapter discusses the recent empirical evidences on the efficiency of 
Islamic and conventional banks. Moreover, it shows numerous reviews on techniques 
implemented to evaluate existing efficiency. The chapter ends with the discussion on 
the approaches to define bank input and output variables.
3.2 Measurement of performance
Performance is examined from two different angles (Olson and Zoubi, 2011).  Firstly, 
the accounting-based perspective computes the performance of an institution by 
relying on comprehensive information from financial statements, financial indicators 
like debt to equity ratio, net profit margin, Return on Equity (ROE), and Return on 
Assets (ROA) where the last two are the ones used most frequently. Secondly, an 
economic-based perspective computes the distance of each Decision Making Unit 
(DMU) in a sample of observation from the efficient frontier with respect to the 
maximization of output or minimization of inputs and the maximization of profits or 
minimization of costs (Olson and Zoubi, 2011). The economic-based perspective, 
used in the literature, was referred to as “efficiency” (Olson and Zoubi, 2011). 
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Efficiency is calculated by means of analysis of the relationship between outputs and 
inputs of a DMU (production unit) (Olson and Zoubi, 2011). 
3.3 Theoretical Literature: Efficiency and Productivity
Bank performance is measured through efficiency and productivity. Both 
measurements inform interested parties, such as bank managers, on the different 
aspects of bank performance and inform governments for policy purposes. The 
increased competition in the banking industry, particularly between Islamic and 
conventional banks, domestic and foreign banks and between banks and non-banks, 
requires them to be efficient. In order to run an analysis and provide theoretical 
evidence, there is a need to understand the concept of efficiency (Ellahi et al., 2011). 
The efficiency analysis of a DMU refers to the outputs and inputs used in the
production process of services or products (Hamim et al., 2008). Efficiency can be 
divided into two components (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003): namely, allocative 
efficiency; and technical efficiency. Allocative efficiency refers to the ability to obtain 
the optimal combination of inputs and outputs at a given price (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 
2003).  Technical efficiency is determined when the firm maximizes output from a 
given input or minimizes input for the production of output (Murillo-Zamorano, 
2004). Based on Berger and Mester (1997), I used two two economic concepts to 
measure efficiency. These are cost efficiency and profit efficiency. 
Cost efficiency means how effectively a firm uses its resources in producing services 
and products. Profit efficiency examines either how effectively a firm generates 
income from these services and products or Technical efficiency which measures how 
much of a firm’s actual/or minimum input approaches its maximum/or actual 
production.   In this thesis, the concept of efficiency is important because it allows 
particularly the comparison of performance between Islamic and conventional banks.
Efficient banks are able to increase profitability, intermediate more funds, offer better 
prices and service quality and enhance bank soundness and safety if efficiency 
improves the capital buffer to absorb risks (Berger, Allen, Hunter and Timme 1993).
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Figure 3.1: Methods of evaluating performance
Source: Porcelli (2009), modified
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According to Lovell (1993), the productivity of a production unit is computed by the 
ratio of its output to its input. However, productivity differs according to variations in 
production technology, in the production process and dissimilarities in the 
environment in which production occurs (Porcelli, 2009).  In such circumstances, the 
major concern is in examining the efficiency component in order to determine its 
contribution to productivity. Units are considered efficient if they produce as much as 
possible from the outputs with the actual level of inputs at minimum cost (Greene, 
1997).  As reported in Figure 3.1, it is important to be aware that efficiency is only 
one component of the overall performance.
3.3.1 The Brief Theory of Production Efficiency
Farrell (1957) defines the overall efficiency as Economic Efficiency (EE); this 
includes both Technical Efficiency (TE) and Allocative Efficiency (AE) (Murillo-
Zamorano, 2004). This measure comes from the multiplicative interaction of both 
technical and allocative components, EE= TE × AE (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004).
1. AE refers to the capability to group inputs and outputs in optimal proportions 
taking into consideration existing prices. AE is measured in terms of the production 
unit’s functioning objective, for instance, this is observed vs. optimum cost or 
observed profit vs. optimum profit (Porcelli, 2009).
2. On the assumption that the inputs are fixed, TE is the ratio between the observed 
output and the maximum output, assuming that the inputs are fixed. This is under the 
output- oriented approach. On the other hand, on the assumption that the outputs are 
fixed, under the input-oriented approach, TE is measured as the ratio between the 
observed input and the minimum input (Porcelli, 2009). In the literature, TE is defined 
as: 
(a) Based on Koopmans (1951) "a DMU is technically efficient if increasing an output 
necessitates decreasing in at least one other output or rising in at least one input. 
Alternatively, a drop in any input necessitates an increase in at least one other input or 
a decrease in at least one output".
(b) Distinctly, Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) described the following measure of 
TE referred to as the Debreu-Farrell measure: "one minus the maximum equi-
proportionate decrease in all inputs that still permit the production of given outputs. A 
51
value of one indicates that a unit is technical efficient, whereas a score of less than 
value of one shows that the unit is significantly technical inefficiency".
Technical efficiency does not need necessarily a use of price data or other weights.  If 
product costs and prices are available, the perceptions of AE and Overall Technical 
Efficiency (OTE) are introduced and related to TE t in a way first introduced by
Farrell (1957) (Cooper et al., 2004).
In the bank efficiency analysis, it was assumed that banks had the same production 
technology and, hence, differences between banks were in their managerial abilities. 
Under the parametric model, it was assumed that the shape of production frontier was 
characterized by an explicit functional form such as cost or profit function. However, 
under the non-parametric model, the frontier is created as the piecewise linear 
combinations which connect the set of this best-practice yielding convex production 
possibilities set (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Furthermore, the sample data could 
predict an efficient production frontier and the banks with superior managerial 
abilities, known as the best-practice banks, were located on this frontier. Hence, EE is 
the discrepancy between the "optimal" level and the observed level of a bank’s 
productive inputs and outputs of a lies on the production frontier.
Estimating the outcomes of a production frontier can be categorized as either 
deterministic or stochastic. An error term in  a deterministic frontier, as in DEA which 
assumes an exact maximum possible output, is comprised of only inefficiency and 
given input level (e.g., English, Grosskopf, Hayes, and Yaisawamg 1993; Iqbal,  
Ramaswamy, and Akhigbe 1999). On the other hand, the error term in the stochastic 
frontier is as in the SFA which assumes random maximum output, contains random 
noise and inefficiency components and the given input level. 
3.3.2 Efficiency Measurement in Banking Industry Literature
Methods used in the literature to measure banking performance range from financial 
ratios, which are based on certain financial indicators, to more sophisticated 
techniques such as DEA and SFA (Iqbal & Molyneux, 2005). As shown below, 
existing studies in this area were split into two categories. The first category 
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comprises accounting-based studies which evaluate the performance of banks using 
financial ratios (e.g. Samad, 1999; Bashir, 1999; Hassan and Bashir 2003; Bader, et 
al., 2007). The second category of researches examines bank efficiency and runs the 
frontier analysis approach rather than traditional financial ratios. This group’s 
economic-based studies  were divided into the following   three categories: i) studies 
evaluating Islamic banks’ efficiency (e.g. Yudistria, 2004; Brown and Skully, 2005; 
Hassan, 2005; Bader et al., 2007); ii) studies investigating conventional banks’ 
efficiency (e.g. Weill, 2004; Bos and Kool, 2006; and Bader, 2007); and iii) studies 
comparing the efficiency of Islamic banks with the conventional banks (e.g. Al-
Shammari, 2003; Hussein, 2004; Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 2005; Bader, Shamsher 
and Taufiq, 2007). Based on the above-mentioned techniques, this section discusses 
the studies.
3.3.2.1 Financial Ratios
Using financial ratios, accounting-based studies (see for example, Nienhaus (1988); 
Samad and Hassan (1999); Hassan and Bashir (2003); Samad (2004); Olson and 
Zoubi, 2011), show that the relative performance of Islamic and conventional banks 
varies according to the measured financial indication. Accounting- based studies of 
banks performance  use generally comprehensive information and financial indexes 
from financial statements to identify the factors, as measured by debt to equity ratio, 
ROI (Return on Investments), Return on Assets (ROA), and Return on Equity (ROE) 
(Olson and Zoubi, 2011). Accounting-based studies, investigating factors of bank 
profitability, examined the bank-specific, industry-specific, and macroeconomic 
factors affecting individual bank performance. The majority of researchers assessed 
performance using either ROE or ROA (Olson and Zoubi, 2011).
Samad and Hassan (1999) conducted a financial ratio analysis to examine the 
performance of a leading Malaysian Islamic bank (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
(BIMB)) during 1984-1997. Their findings recommend that the Islamic bank 
management’s lack of knowledge was generally the major cause of slow growth of 
loans under profit sharing. However, the Islamic bank was found to perform better 
relative its conventional counterparts in term of liquidity and risk management (lower 
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risks). Samad and Hassan (1999) found that the given Islamic bank faced less risk 
because of its high equity-to-assets ratio and greater investment in government 
securities. However, as measured  by both ROA and ROE, they did not find any 
statistically significant difference in managerial performance. The Malaysian Islamic 
bank’s profitability performance was found to be significantly lower than 
conventional banks because of a smaller opportunity set for Islamic bank in stocks 
and securities due to religions constraints. Similarly, Samad (2004) found that 
Bahraini Islamic banks were found to be exposed less to liquidity risks due to their
high liquidity arising from restricted Shari'ah compliant investments opportunities 
which have short term loans and investments as well as more conservative lending. 
Furthermore, on average, I found that six Islamic banks were doing as well as their 
fifteen conventional counterparts in terms of profitability and liquidity, and, by using 
financial ratios over the period from 1991 to 2001 after the Gulf War, even exhibited 
better credit performance. 
Hassan and Bashir (2003) also found that Islamic banks performed better in terms of 
assets quality and capital adequacy but that Islamic banks held less liquidity when 
compared to conventional banks. Using financial ratio, the author compared for the 
period between 1994 and 2001 Islamic banks and conventional banks which had 
similar deposits and total assets. Likewise, Iqbal (2001) found that Islamic banks did 
not suffer from excess liquidity but they were  not cost effective (cost to income 
ratio).  By using financial ratios, the study compared twelve private Islamic banks 
from various countries with conventional banks from the same countries. It concluded 
that Islamic banks had comparatively higher rates of growth rate in terms of equity, 
deposits, investments and total assets; better use of resources; and higher profitability 
in terms of Return on Investment and ROE. In another study, by using financial ratios, 
Hamid (1999) evaluated an Islamic bank relative to two conventional private banks in 
Bangladesh. In line with the previous studies, Islamic banks were found to outperform 
private banks better in term of liquidity, profitability, and overall productivity (i.e. 
total income to total expenditure). However, an Islamic bank is found to generate less 
income per unit of personal expenditure and suffer from excess liquidity due to the 
lack Shari'ah compliancy in the central bank’s investments opportunities. Moreover, 
since the Islamic banks are relatively new and hire experienced bankers from the 
54
conventional banks, they incur higher labor costs. On the other hand, by using 
financial ratios during the period from 1980 to 1986, Nienhaus (1988) compared 
seven Islamic banks with twenty six conventional banks from the same countries. The 
author found that, in terms of assets, profit and capital, Islamic banks performed 
equally, if not less well than the conventional banks. The study’s banks operated in 
four countries in the Middle East - Bahrain- Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait.
The financial ratio-based analyses or accounting-based analyses are used for 
benchmarking and present significant perceptions (Olson and Zoubi, 2011). However, 
these analyses may be restricted in scope because they take a one aspectual view of a 
service or a product or a process and they ignore any interactions, substitutions or 
trade-offs between key variables (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Furthermore, this 
simple technique does not take in consideration, also, the value of management 
actions and investment decisions might be affected by future performance rather than 
current performance. Therefore, it is considered to be a short-run indicator and may 
not be effective means of interpreting whether or not a bank is efficient in the  long-
run (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).
3.3.2.2 Regression Analysis
By using Middle Eastern bank level data, Bashir (1999) and Bashir (2001) conducted 
regression analyses to determine the underlying drivers of Islamic performance. The 
author found that, with regard to profits, the bank’s performance was influenced 
frequently by overheads, customer short term funding, and non-interest earning 
assets. Furthermore, because deposits in Islamic banks are treated as shares, according 
to Bashir (2001), reserves held by banks propagate a negative influence through such 
as reducing the amount of funds available for investment. 
Metwally (1997) concluded that there was no significant difference between Islamic 
banks and conventional banks with regard to their efficiency and profitability.  By 
investigating the structural variations between the two groups during the period from 
1992 to 1994, Metwally (1997) assessed the performance of thirty banks (fifteen 
Islamic and fifteen commercial banks) from all over the world. Although unlikely, 
Hassoune (2002) found that, by using also the linear regression technique, the ROE of 
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Islamic banks became less unstable than that of  conventional banks since the latter  
the seconds depended on interest rate movements.  During the period from 1994 to 
2001, the author compared a Saudi Arabian Islamic bank with six conventional banks 
which had homogenous balance sheet structures. Moreover, when the sample was 
extended to include Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from 2000 to 2001, Islamic 
banks’ ROE (profitability) was noted to be greater than conventional banks.
3.3.2.3 Efficiency frontier models
It is significant to summarize the techniques in which bank efficiency has been 
calculated in the literature prior to examining recent empirical evidence on the 
efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks. Various approaches were initiated in the 
banking literature to compute bank efficiency; these ranged from simple financial 
ratios, as shown earlier, to intricate econometric models (i.e. parametric models). The 
parametric approach comprises Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), the Thick Frontier 
Approach (TFA), and Distribution-Free Approach (DFA). On the other hand, the non-
parametric approach included the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Free 
Disposal Hull (FDH). Both approaches were based on Farrell’s same seminal paper 
(1957). However, unlike the non-parametric approach, the parametric method 
computes for the noise. Therefore, any divergence from the efficient frontier is 
considered noisy and inefficient while the non-parametric approach views it as 
inefficiency. Frontier approaches are considered better than standard financial ratio 
analysis because they employ programming or statistical techniques that eliminate the 
effects of variations in input prices and other exogenous market circumstances 
influencing the institutions’ regular performance (Bader, 2008). 
Thus, these approaches provide more precise measures of the underlying performance 
of the institutions and their managers. The efficiency frontier approach was used 
widely in the existing banking literature to determine the effects of capital regulation, 
deregulation of deposit rates, removal of geographic restrictions on branches and 
holding company acquisitions, mergers and acquisitions, and on financial institution 
performance generally (Bader, 2008). Furthermore, researchers prefer efficiency 
frontier models rather than other performance estimators mainly because these models 
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result in an objectively determined quantified measure of relative performance that
removes many exogenous factors (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). This allows the 
researcher to concentrate on quantified units of costs, inputs, outputs, revenues, 
profits, and so on in order to assign efficiency relative to the best practice institutions 
in the population (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Moreover, the frontier methods allow 
us, also, to see banks as multi-product firms using multiple inputs.
This study focuses on frontier efficiency, in other words, the closeness of a bank to a 
best-practice frontier of similar specification counterparts. There is a fundamental 
accord in the literature that, as far as financial institutions were concerned, variations 
in frontier efficiency are assigned to an incorrect scale or scope of output (Berger et 
al., 1993). However, there is no consensus on the favored method to evaluate the best-
practice frontier against which relative efficiencies are calculated (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997).
3.3.2.3.1 Non-parametric approach 
The non-parametric approaches, including Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
Free Disposal Hull (FDH), impose a minimal structure on the requirements for a best-
practice frontier (i.e. efficient frontier) (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). DEA is a linear 
programming technique whereby the group of best-practice or efficient frontier 
DMUs make the most of every output (given specific level of inputs) or the least of 
every inputs (given specific level of outputs) (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The DEA 
frontier is created as the piecewise linear combinations that join the group of this best-
practice (efficient), giving a convex production possibilities group (Casu and 
Molyneux, 2003). As such, DEA does not necessitate either the explicit specification 
of the form of the underlying production relationship or the distributional function 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997).
The Free Disposal Hull (FDH), developed by Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984) and 
Harkins (2012) is another non-parametric approach which was employed to determine 
bank efficiency. . FDH is a special case of DEA where the points on lines connecting 
the DEA vertices are not included in the frontier (Iqbal & Molyneux, 2005). 
Alternatively, the FDH production possibilities set is formed only of the DEA vertices 
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and the free disposal hull points interior to theses vertices (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997). From the perspective of input requirements to create a given output, DEA 
assumes that linear change is probable between observed input combinations on an 
isoquant (which is created from the observations in piecewise linear forms) (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997). Conversely, FDH presumes that there is no potential for a  
replacement and so the isoquant looks like a step function created by the intersection 
of lines drawn from observed (local) Leontief-type input combinations (Harker and 
Zenios, 2000). The FDH frontier covers the data more tightly than by using the DEA 
frontier and has a staircase shape (Gulati and Kumar, 2012). In other words, the FDH 
frontier is either congruent with or interior to the DEA frontier (Tulkens, 1993). 
Therefore, the FDH approach produces typically produce greater measures of the 
efficiency score than by using the DEA approach Also, slackness is a much more 
serious problem in FDH than in DEA (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Both models, 
DEA and FDH, allow efficiency to differ over time and make no prior presumptions 
concerning the form of the distribution of inefficiency across DMUs unless non-
dominated observations are 100% efficient (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).
The non-parametric models set less structure on the frontier; however, there is a 
drawback with them since they presume that there is no random error. In other words, 
given the absence of random error, any deviations from the efficient frontier are 
considered to be in efficient (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  If random error exists, 
computed efficiency scores may be contradicted by these random deviations from the 
true efficiency frontier (Harker and Zenios, 2000).  Moreover, the non-parametric 
approach encounters, also, difficulty in drawing statistical inferences due to the lack 
of a definite functional form encapsulating the production technology (Iqbal and 
Molyneux, 2005).
3.3.2.3.2 Parametric Approach
There are three main parametric frontier approaches. Although they all specify an 
efficient frontier form, they differ in their distributional assumptions of the 
inefficiency and random components (see Cummins and Weiss, 2011) (Eling and 
Luhnen, 2010).  Translog is usual form of efficient frontier that is employed 
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commonly in these approaches. However,  there are, also, different forms such as 
generalized translog, Fourier flexible or composite cost. The Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA) is the first parametric approach; this defines a functional form for the 
cost, profit, or production relationship among inputs, outputs, and environmental 
factors, and counts for random error (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). SFA postulates a 
composed error model where inefficiencies are presumed to follow an asymmetric 
distribution- usually the half-normal distribution- whereas random errors follow a 
symmetric distribution- usually the standard normal distribution (Harker and Zenios, 
2000). The half-normal assumption for the distribution of inefficiencies is relatively 
inflexible and assumes that most firms are clustered near to full efficiency.  However, 
in practice, other distributions may be more appropriate (Greene, 1990). The 
inefficiency must have a truncated distribution since it cannot be negative (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). Some financial institution studies  have concluded that defining the 
more general truncated normal distribution for inefficiency produces minor different 
results which, at the statistic level, are significant from the special case of the half-
normal (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
Furthermore, given the observation of the composed error term, the estimated 
inefficiency for any institution is taken to be  the conditional mean or mode of the 
distribution of the inefficiency term (Burger and Humphrey, 1997). Both 
inefficiencies and errors are assumed to be orthogonal in relation to inputs, outputs, or 
environmental variables specified in the estimating equation (Burger and Humphrey, 
1997). According to Eling and Luhnen (2010), two outline decisions have to be made
when employing SFA. These are, firstly, the selection of the functional form to 
evaluate the real fundamental production, cost, revenue, or profit function and, 
secondly, the distributional assumption for the inefficiency term (Eling and Luhnen, 
2010). The Translog form is the frequently used functional form (Eling and Luhnen, 
2010). However, there are a diversity of other functional forms, such as the Cobb-
Douglas, Fuss normalized quadratic (see Morrison and Berndt, 1982), and generalized 
translog (see Caves et al., 1980) (Eling and Luhnen, 2010). The Fourier flexible form 
(see Gallant, 1982) and composite cost (see Pulley and Braunstein, 1992, Pulley and 
Humphrey, 1993) were employed, also, in the studies of the financial institutions. 
According to Eling and Luhnen (2010), the commonly used flexible functional forms 
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are the Cobb-Douglas, Fourier Flexible and Translog Functional Fuss normalized 
quadratic (see Morrison and Berndt, 1982), and generalized Translog (see Caves et 
al., 1980).  Amomg the previously mentioned forms, the Translog specification is the 
most commonly and widely used functional form (Iqbal & Molyneux, 2005; Eling and 
Luhnen, 2010). However, recent studies tended to employ the more flexible Fourier 
functional form (Iqbal & Molyneux, 2005) since, in one case, it reduced the amount of 
calculated inefficiency by about half - from 10% to 5% of costs - and it was able to be 
closer to more of the data (Berger and DeYoung, 1996). 
The Distribution Free Approach (DFA) is the second parametric approach. DFA 
defines, also, a functional form for the frontier, but using a distinct method, separates 
the inefficiencies from random error (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). However, unlike 
the SFA, DFA does not make strong assumptions concerning the specific distributions 
of the inefficiencies or random errors. Alternatively, DFA presumes that the 
efficiency of each institution (DMU) is constant over time, while random error tends 
to average out to zero over time (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The difference 
between the inefficiency average residual and the DMU’s average residual, referred to  
as the estimate of inefficiency for each unit in a panel data group, is computed then 
with some truncation performed to consider  the possible failure of the random error 
to average out to zero fully (Harker and Zenios, 2000). By employing DFA, 
inefficiencies, even if fairly close to symmetric, can follow almost any distribution 
since their values are positive (Harker and Zenios, 2000). 
However, DFA tends to describe the average deviation of each DMU from the best 
average-practice frontier (i.e. efficient frontier) rather than the efficiency at any one 
point in time. This is particularly so  if the efficiency is varying over time because of 
technical change, regulatory reform, the interest rate cycle, or other influences, 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Since no restrictive presumptions are set on the 
distribution of either inefficiency or the random error, it is considered easier to use the 
DFA than the SFA. This is because it does not require the use of maximum likelihood 
methods to determine the cost or profit function (Cummins  and Weiss, 2011). One 
disadvantage of DFA is that it may provide misleading outcomes if the period selected 
is too long or if the inefficiency component of the error term is unstable over time or 
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if the number of available data years is insufficient to average out the random error 
term (Cummins and Weiss, 2011). Therefore, the accuracy of the efficiency results 
may depend on the length of the period of the study. De Young (1997) shows that a 
six year time period is long enough to tackle all these issues.
The Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) is the third parametric approach.  This defines a 
functional form and does not set any distributional assumptions (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). This approach measures the cost function for both the lowest 
average cost quartile and the highest average cost quartile of banks. Banks, within the 
lowest average cost quartile, are considered to be of higher than average efficiency 
and to create a thick frontier (Bauer and Hancock, 1993). Similarly, banks, within the 
highest performance quartiles, are assumed to have less efficiency than average 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). TFA considers that divergences from forecasted 
performance values within the highest and lowest performance quartiles of 
observations correspond to random error, while deviations in predicted performance 
between the highest and lowest quartiles correspond to inefficiencies (Harker and 
Zenios, 2000). 
The major disadvantage of the previously discussed frontier approach is that there is a 
somewhat random option between inefficiencies and errors  due to the following
factors (Burger and Humphrey, 1997): (i) DEA ignores the random selection; (ii) SFA 
outcomes depend on pre-considered distributional assumptions; (iii) DFA imposes 
strong suppositions on the evolution of X-efficiency over time; and (iv) TFA 
classifies the data of a randomly chosen set of firms, i.e. there is the possibility to 
select other quartiles (Wagenvoort & Schure, 1999). 
The parametric approaches suffer from the drawback of imposing functional form and 
behavioural assumptions about the shape of frontier (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
Computed efficiency can be contradicted by the specification error and, if the 
functional form is unspecified, can be divergent from its initial approximate estimate 
(Harker and Zenios, 2000). However, processes of addressing this main limitation 
have begun by designating a Fourier-flexible functional form which provides a 
standard translog function with Fourier trigonometric terms (Berger and Mester, 1997; 
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Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The Fourier flexible form may ameliorate considerably 
the flexibility of the frontier (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). This is by allowing for 
many inflection points and by including essentially orthogonal trigonometric terms 
which ease installing the frontier to the data wherever it is most required (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). 
3.3.4 The Empirical Literature on the Efficiency Studies
Mokhtar et al. (2006) investigated the efficiency of fully-fledged Islamic Banks, 
conventional banks, and Islamic windows in Malaysia. They concluded that Islamic 
banks were the most cost and profit efficient when compared to both conventional and
investment banks. They employed SFA in order to calculate the technical and cost 
efficiencies of 288 observations from the annual reports of 20 Islamic windows, two 
full-fledged Islamic Banks and 20 conventional banks over the period from 1997 to 
2003. The findings state that, in terms of assets, deposits and financial base, the 
Malaysian Islamic banking sector developed significantly between 1997 and 2003 
relative to the conventional banking counterpart.  Islamic banking technical and cost 
efficiencies were expected to provide major perceptions to management and policy 
makers with reference to the optimal utilization of capacities and the allocation of 
scarce resources in different banks (Mokhtar et al., 2006).  By running SFA, Al-
Shammari (2003) found, also, that Islamic banks were the most cost and profit 
efficient when compared to conventional commercial and investment banks in GCC 
countries. Moreover, the author concluded that Bahraini banks were the most cost 
efficient and Oman banks were the least efficient. 
Al-Shammari (2003) represented bank types and country dummy to affect 
inefficiency directly in order to limit loan quality and capital in both cost and profit 
functions. Similarly, Al-Jarrah and Molyneux (2003) employed the SFA, with the 
Fourier-flexible functional form, and found that Islamic banks were more cost and 
profit efficient than conventional banks. They computed cost and profit efficiency for 
the banks operating in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Likewise, Bader et 
al. (2008) and found that, when compared to their conventional counterparts, the 
Islamic banks were the most efficient. Moreover, Bader et al., (2008) concluded that 
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the small Islamic banks were more efficient than the conventional banks due to their 
capital structure.  Between 1990 and 2005, they studied eighty banks of which forty-
three were Islamic banks and thirty-seven were conventional banks.  The study 
demonstrated, also, that, since they had gained more experiences firstly, over time, the 
cost and profit efficiency of older Western banks were more efficient than  older 
Islamic banks (Bader et al., 2008).
On the other hand, Hussein (2004), EI-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005), Alpay and Hassan 
(2006), and Mokhtar, et al. (2006) found no significant difference in efficiency 
between Islamic banks and conventional banks. Hussein (2004) investigated the 
performance of Bahraini banks by determining their profit efficiency using the 
Fourier’s flexible functional form for the period from 1985 to2001. Afterwards, he 
compared the profit efficiency of Islamic banks with conventional banks. His findings 
showed that the profit efficiency of Bahrain banks was relatively stable and in line 
with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) banks. 
Moreover, the researcher concluded that there was not too much of a difference in 
terms of profit efficiency between Islamic and conventional banks regardless of the 
fact that many Islamic banks were small and operated as venture capital. In contrast, 
the only Islamic commercial bank in his sample outperformed the conventional 
counterparts. This was due to lack of competition whereby the Islamic commercial 
bank was able to reduce its input costs and charge a higher mark-up. In addition, 
during the period from 1997 to 2003, Mokhtar, et al. (2006) found no significance 
difference between companies or merchant banks using cost function and between 
Islamic banks and all conventional banking institutions using profit function.  
However, this Malaysian banking study does not assume any environmental factors 
either to influence the function or to influence directly the inefficiency. El-Gamal and 
Inanoglu (2005) found no significant difference in efficiency between Islamic and 
conventional banks. According to them, this is due to Islamic asset-based financing 
leading to lower non-performing loans ratios.  By employing SFA during the period 
from 1990 to 2000, El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) studied the cost efficiency of fifty-
three Turkish banks, forty-nine conventional banks relative to four Islamic Special 
Finance Houses (SFHs). The Islamic institutions represent around 3% of the Turkish 
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banking sector (El-Gamal and Inanoglu, 2005). It is significant to mention that, 
whether or not subjected to many restraints, e.g. branching and the inability to hold 
government bonds, SFHs were able to attain high levels of efficiency. Using the same 
dataset, while EI-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) employed cost function to measure 
efficiency, Alpay and Hassan (2006) applied DEA to measure the Turkish banks’ 
efficiency.  The study agreed that, on average, Islamic banks were equal, if not more 
efficient than conventional banks despite having limited Shari'ah compliant 
investment opportunities. However, unlike conventional banks, the Islamic banks’ 
productivity and technical efficiency reduced over time. 
However, studies by Omar et al., (2007), Mokhtar et al. (2007, 2008), and Srairi 
(2010) found that Islamic banks were significantly less efficient than conventional 
banks. Srairi (2010) concluded that, in terms of profit and cost during the period from 
1999 to 2007, western conventional banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries were more efficient than Islamic banks. Srairi employed the SFA to 
determine the cost and profit efficiency of seventy-one Islamic and western banks in 
GCC countries between 1999 and 2007. Omar et al. (2007) examined the efficiency of 
twenty-one privately- owned Indonesian banks (two Islamic banks versus nineteen 
conventional counterparts) between 2002 and 2004. They found that these two Islamic 
banks were more cost and profit efficient than the conventional counterparts.
On the other hand, many studies examined only the efficiency of Islamic banks (e.g. 
Hussein (2003); Yudistira (2004); Mostafa (2007); Kamaruddin et al. (2008); Sufian 
et al. (2009c)).  By employing DEA, Sufian et al. (2009c) examined the efficiency of 
Islamic banks in 16 Asian and MENA countries, between 2001 and 2006. They found 
that Islamic banks were operating at a relatively optimal scale of operations but they 
were managerially inefficient in utilizing their resources to the fullest (Sufian et al., 
2009c). The results showed that the Islamic banks’ PTE declined from 2001 to 2003, 
increased during 2004, before declining again in 2005 and 2006 (Sufian, et al. 2009c).  
During the period of study, the Islamic bank’s average PTE was 65.4%; this meant 
that these banks could save 34.6% of their inputs to produce the same current amount 
of outputs. By using DEA, Kamaruddin et al. (2008) examined the performance of 
Islamic banking operations in Malaysia in order to determine the cost and profit 
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efficiency of two fully-fledged Islamic banks and twelve Islamic windows operations 
of domestic and foreign banks between 1998 and2004. The findings indicate that the 
overall cost efficiency estimate is 0.695. This means that when compared to a best 
practice bank, an Islamic bank wasted 30.5% of its inputs in producing the same 
current outputs. Yudistira (2004) employed DEA to study the efficiency performance 
of eighteen Islamic banks between 1997 and 2000. He found that Islamic banks 
presented significant overall efficiency during the sample period. The study showed 
that 2000 was the most efficient (0.909) year when compared to 1997, 1998 and 1999 
(0.902, 0.870 and 0.897 respectively). 
Furthermore, Islamic banks, operating in the Middle East, were less efficient than 
Islamic banks operating outside the region since the latter were relatively new and 
were controlled by their respective regulators (Yudistira, 2004). Moreover, the study 
confirmed that there was a direct relationship between bank size and Variable Return 
to Scale (VRS) since the findings showed that large Islamic banks were responsible 
for scale inefficiency. It showed, also, that newer Islamic banks were less efficient 
than older Islamic banks, whereas the older banks, operating in western countries, 
were more cost and revenue efficient than their newer counterparts (Yudistra, 2004). 
The explanations of these findings could be related to the fact that older banks had 
more experience of the banking industry.  By employing SFA, Hussein (2003) 
investigated the cost efficiency of seventeen Islamic banks in Sudan where the 
banking system complies entirely with Shari’a principles-. The study covered a period 
of ten years (1990-2000). In his analysis, Hussein (2003) used the specific terms of 
Islamic financial instruments as outputs. The findings present significant differences 
in the Sudanese banks’ cost efficiency. Moreover, they demonstrate that foreign-
owned banks are the most efficient among Sudanese banks. The study a observed, 
also, the determinants of bank efficiency where Hussein (2003) concluded that 
smaller banks were more efficient than their larger counterparts. Moreover, banks, 
holding greater levels of Al-Musharakah and Al-Mudarabah in total assets, may 
benefit from a higher level of efficiency (Hussein, 2003). 
On the other hand, studies (e.g. Johnes et al., (2014), Abdul-Majid et al. (2008; 2010; 
2011) concluded that Islamic banks were less efficient  than  their conventional 
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counterparts. By employing the financial ratios analysis and DEA, Johnes et al. (2009) 
estimated the efficiency of Islamic versus western banks operating in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The study examined the performance of six 
banks between 2004 and 2007. The findings demonstrate that, when compared to 
western banks, Islamic banks have lower cost efficiency but relatively higher revenue 
and profit efficiency (Johnes et al., 2014).  By conducting SFA, Abdul-Majid et al. 
(2008; 2011) studied Malaysian banks’ gross and net efficiency. Unlike net efficiency, 
gross efficiency is computed by considering each bank’s various characteristics in   
the SFA’s function (Abdul-Majid, 2011). The findings deduced that both the gross 
and net efficiency of conventional banks are relatively higher than their Islamic 
counterparts and that the dummy variable for Islamic banks shows significant 
differences (Johnes et al., 2014). 
3.3.5 Controlling for Bank and Country-Specific Factors
A significant problem that might be encountered when determining efficiency is to 
control the influence of bank and country- specific factors (i.e. environmental factors) 
on efficiency. Since the introduction of the efficiency measurement, most researchers 
had studied a single country and very few cross-country studies had been done. 
However, the latter is gaining in importance despite difficulties in analyzing them due 
to the different countries’ banking markets. Most previous cross-country analyses 
studied banks in the European countries (e.g. Altunbas, Y. and Chakravarty (1998); as 
Cavallo and Rossi (2002); Carbo, Gardener, and Williams (2002)). However, cross-
country studies were being extended currently to cover more areas, for instance,
former communist countries (i.e. former Soviet republics(e.g. Bonin, et al. (2005),
Carvallo and Kasman (2005)), Central and South American countries (e.g. Carvallo 
and Kasman (2005)), emerging countries (e.g. Boubakri, Cosset, Fischer, and 
Guedhami (2005); Clarke, Cull, and Shirley (2005)) and Asian countries (e.g. Abd 
Karim (2001); Williams and Nguyen (2005)). Moreover, the significant growth of 
Islamic banking and the increasing number of countries hosting Islamic banks have 
attracted attention and promoted researches about the  determination of the 
performance of Islamic banks (e.g. Brown, 2003; Hassan, 2005; Yudistira, 2004) as 
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compared to their  conventional counterparts in one and multiple countries (e.g. AI-
Jarrah and Molyneux 2005; Alpay and Hassan 2006). 
Bank and country-specific factors (i.e. micro and macro- factors) may have significant 
influences on efficiency and, consequently, on the computed efficiency scores. Four 
approaches, provided by Coelli et al. (2005), discuss the application of environmental 
variables in DEA: 
The first approach indicates that the bank and country- specific variables, which 
influence efficiency, are sorted in descending order. In other words, they are placed 
from the ones which least affect bank efficiency to the ones with the most effect 
(Banker and Morey, 1986). Based on this ordering, the approach ensures that any 
given bank is not compared with peer firms that operate in more favorable 
environments (Banker and Morey, 1986). Alternatively, the efficiency of a given bank 
is compared with the efficiency of those banks in the samplewhich have 
environmental values lower than or similar to the given bank (Fethi and Pasiouras, 
2010).  
Based on the second approach, developed by Charnes et al. (1981), the researcher 
should undertake the various following steps:
(1) Classifying the sample into smaller sub-samples to be solved next by the DEA; 
(2) Assigning all data points under study into their prospective frontiers; 
(3) Solving a solitary DEA using the projected points; and 
(4) Assessing any differences in the mean efficiencies of the two sub-samples. 
According to Coelli et al. (2005), the two common problems arising from using the
above mentioned two methods are: firstly, dividing the sample into series of smaller 
samples reduces the comparison group and, secondly, only a single environmental 
variable can be included in each examination and, consequently, this limits the range 
of analysis for both methods (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010).
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Using the third approach, environmental variables are included directly in the DEA 
model as non-discretionary inputs (if these variables are presumed to have a positive 
impact on efficiency) or outputs (if these variables are projected to have a negative 
impact on efficiency). The drawback of this approach is that there is a need to know 
previously the direction of impact of these variables. The first method contains also 
this drawback. However, as an alternative al, the bank and country- specific variables 
are introduced as mandatory neutral variables using the equality form (Coelli et al., 
2005). Pastor (1999) and Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001, 2002) applied both approaches in 
their studies.
The “two-stage” approach is the final method to adjust for environmental factors 
(Coelli et al., 2005). According to Coelli et al. (2005), the first stage requires the 
employment of the DEA including traditional inputs and outputs. In the second stage, 
the computed efficiency scores are regressed on the environment variables (Coelli et 
al., 2005). The banking literature employed frequently this specific approach which
was assumed to be more appropriate when the objective was to assess the correlations 
of efficiency with different environmental variables (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010).
With regard to the significance of environmental factors in the previous discussion,
the cross-country research, in chapter 6 of this thesis, controls for these factors by 
adopting a two-stage DEA approach.
3.3.6 Parametric versus non-Parametric approaches
A review of different literatures recommends that SFA is the most frequently 
employed parametric model for measuring bank efficiency whereas DEA is the most 
used non-parametric model (Mokhtar et al., 2006). However, the two models are 
considered to be an alternative to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Each of the three 
models - OLS, SFA and DEA- has its own advantages and drawbacks. DEA is 
relatively different from both SFA and OLS which are regression-based models and 
are characterized by being less flexible and highly dependent on specific assumptions 
(Emrouznejad and Anouze, 2010). The DEA is considered to be more feasible to 
apply since, when being employed, it does not require a functional form of the 
production frontier to be defined. Consequently, DEA can handle multiple input and 
68
output variables and, by using efficiency scores, can run a performance comparison 
(Burger and Humphrey, 1997). 
However, regression-based models employ the concept of averages (Kaffash, 2014). 
Another benefit of using DEA is that it initiates two further concepts of return to scale 
and inefficiency. A major reason, which makes DEA a preferred option for measuring 
efficiency over other models, is the unavailability of prices of both inputs and outputs 
in this study. Based on the literature review, the DEA approach was employed most 
frequently to measure bank efficiency. DEA was considered to be by far the most 
frequently used technique in assessing bank performance and measuring bank 
efficiency (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). Out of the forty-six surveyed studies, thirty-
seven studies used DEA, eight studies used SFA and one study used DFA. Despite 
Lovell (1993), Cummins & Zi (1998), and Hussels & Ward (2006) considering that no 
approach was better than the other, and considering the previously mentioned 
advantages of each model, this study used DEA to estimate the efficiency of Islamic 
and conventional banks.
3.3.7 Specification of Input-output approaches and Variables:
Defining and measuring inputs and outputs in the banking literature continues to be a 
debatable matter among researchers (Casu and Girardone, 2002; Sathye, 2003). In 
measuring efficiency, the selection of appropriate inputs and outputs for bank 
performance analysis remains the biggest challenge. The reason is that prices are 
assigned normally to a jointly produced financial services package (Casu and 
Girardone, 2002). Furthermore, there may be no harmony between banks in the 
production of outputs. In order to define the type of inputs and outputs which  might 
be employed, the nature of a bank’s production technology should be chosen initially 
(Sharma, 2008). The production and intermediation approaches are two main 
competing approaches put into practice to assign the flow of services provided by 
financial institutions (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). 
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3.3.7.1 Specification of Input-Output Approaches:  
Two major approaches are used most commonly to select the inputs and outputs for a 
DMU:  These are the production approach (or the service provision) and the 
intermediation approach (or the asset approach) (Humphrey, 1985; Hjalmarsson et al., 
2000). These two approaches employ the traditional microeconomics and vary only in 
the specification of banking operations.
In the production approach (e.g. Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Drake et al, 2003; 
Gardener et al., 2011) the banks are considered to be providing mainly services for 
account holders (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In other words, the production 
approach, developed by Benston (1965), assumes that banks are providers of services 
to customers (Kuussaari and Vesala, 1995). This approach defines the output as the 
services provided to the customers which are computed preferably  by the number and 
type of transactions or documents under the process or specialized services provided 
over a given time period, for instance credit reports, insurance policy, applications for 
loans, etc. (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Ferrier et al., 1993; Kuussaari and Vesala, 1995). 
Therefore, it ignores entirely the interest expenses but concentrates on cost of 
operations (Kumar and Gulati, 2013). However, the number of deposits and loan 
accounts replaces these items when detailed data on transaction flow are unavailable 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The input of this approach comprises physical 
variables (like labor, fixed assets, equipment) or their related cost as only tangible 
inputs are required to initiate transactions or carry out financial documents or supply 
advice  (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The production approach was applied in the 
most part when determining the efficiency of bank branches (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997).
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Table 3.1: Survey of the most common approaches used in efficiency determination
Study Country Period Approach Methods
Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 
2003
Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt 1992-2000 Intermediation SFA
Al-Muharrami, 2007 GCC countries 1993-2002 Intermediation DEA
Al-Sharkas et al., 2008 United States 1986-2002 SFA
Arrif and Can, 2008 China 1995-2004 Intermediation DEA
Ataullah & Le, 2006 India 1992-1998 Intermediation DEA
Avkiran, 2009 Australian and New Zealand 1996-2003 Intermediation DEA
Beccalli et al., 2006 Portugal 1990-1995 Intermediation DEA –
SFA
Beccalli et al., 2006 France, Germany, Italy, Spain &UK 1999-2000 Intermediation SFA
Casu & Molyneux, 2003 Italia 1996-1999 Intermediation DEA
Casu & Molyneux, 2003 USA 1990-1995 Intermediation DEA
Casu and Girardone, 2004 Italia 1996-1999 Intermediation DEA
Casu and Girardone, 2009 France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom
2000-2005 Intermediation DEA
Chen & Yeh, 2000 Taiwan 1996 Intermediation DEA
Chen et al. 2005 China 1993-2000 Intermediation DEA
Chortareas et.al., 2012 27 European countries 2001-2009 Intermediation DEA
Chortareas et.al., 2013 22 EU countries 2000-2008 Intermediation DEA
Delis et al., 2008 Greece 1990-1993 SFA
Delis, 2009 10 newly acceded EU 1994-2005 Intermediation DEA
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 
2000
France and Spain 1988-1992 Intermediation DFA
Drake et al. 2006 Hong Kong 1995-2001 Intermediation DEA
Drake et al. 2003 Japan 2001 Intermediation, 
Profit, Production
DEA
Drake et al., 2006 Hong Kong 2006 Intermediation, 
Profit
DEA
Emrouznejad and Al 
Anouze, 2010
GCC countries 2009 Intermediation DEA
Figueira et al.,2009 Latin American banks 2001 Intermediation DEA
Fiordelisi, 2008 France, Germany, Italy, and UK 1997-2002 SFA
Gardener et al., 2011 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam
1998-2004 Intermediation, 
Production
DEA
Gonzalez, 2009 69 countries 1996-2002 Intermediation DEA
Hall et al., 2012 Hong Kong 2000-2006 Intermediation 
Production
DEA
Hauner, 2005 Austria and Germany 1995-1999 Intermediation DEA
Hermes and Nhung , 2010 Ten emerging economies 1991-2000 Intermediation DEA
Isik and Hassan, 2002 Turkey 1988, 1992, 
1996
SFA
Kenjegalieva & Simper, 
2011
Central and Eastern European banks 1998-2003 Value –added DEA
Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002 10 European Banks 1993 Production DEA
Mahesh & Rajeev, 2008 India 1992-1999 Intermediation DEA
Mostafa, 2009 Arab banks in Middle East 2005 Intermediation DEA
Pancurova & Lyosca, 2013 Central and Eastern European Countries 2005-2008 Intermediation DEA
Pasiouras, 2008 95 countries 2003 Profit DEA
Pasiouras et al., 2008 Greece 2000-2005 Value –added DEA
Sufian & Abdul Majid, 
2007
Malaysia 2002-2003 Intermediation DEA
Sufian, 2009b Malaysia, Thailand 1992-2003 Value -added, 
Intermediation
DEA
Sufian, 2009a Malaysia 1997 Intermediation DEA
Thoraneenitiyan and 
Avkiran, 2009
Indonesia, SouthKorea, 
Thailand,Malaysia and Philippine
1997-2001 Intermediation DEA
Wheelock and Wilson, 
2000
United States 1984-1993 SFA
Yao et al, 2007 China 1995-2001 Intermediation DEA
Yao et al, 2008 China 1998-2005 Intermediation DEA
Source: modified from different sources (see for example, Kaffash, 2009).
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The intermediation approach (e.g. Al-Muharrami 2007; Sufian a, 2008; Mostafa, 
2009; Emrouznejad and Al-Anouze, 2010; Johnes et al., 2014) views banks as 
intermediaries channeling funds between surplus (lenders) and deficit (borrowers) 
units (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Islamic banks initiate intermediation services by 
holding deposits and other liabilities of savers and sequentially investing these funds 
in usury-free profitable sectors of the economy (Noor and Ahmad, 2011). This 
approach considers deposits, employees and fixed assets as inputs whereas loans and 
investments are seen as outputs (Agoraki et al., 2011). Under this approach, the inputs 
and outputs are presumed typically to be equivalent to the stock of the financial value 
in the bank accounts, for instance the numbers of dollars of loans, deposits, etc. 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1991). Furthermore, being the major transformed resources in 
the financial intermediation process, funds and their interest costs should be counted 
as inputs in the efficiency analysis (Harker and Zenios, 2000). 
None of these approaches is seen as better and worse because no one reflects 
sufficiently the bank’s dual roles which are as follows: (i) performing transactions and 
documents and providing services; and (ii) channeling funds from savers to investors 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). It would be most preferable to apply both approaches 
to the bank efficiency analysis but adequate data for that purpose are inaccessible 
(Harker and Zenios, 2000). However, each of these approaches still has various 
advantages. The production approach is viewed as being better in assessing the 
efficiencies of bank branches. This is because branches perform principally customer 
transactions and process transactions for the firm as one entity (i.e. as a whole). 
Moreover, branch managers have normally little control over the bank finances and 
investment decisions (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). On the other hand, the 
intermediation approach may be more convenient when assessing the entire bank 
since interest expenses, which represent one-half to two-thirds of total cost, are 
included in this approach (Harker and Zenios, 2000). Moreover, this approach stresses 
that deposits be transferred to lenders at the lowest cost and this approach complies 
with the microeconomic theory of intermediation (Berger et al., 1987; Ferrier and 
Lovell, 1990). In addition, the intermediation approach may be better when 
investigating the significance of efficiency to the bank’s profitability since reducing 
the total costs, not just the production costs, is required in order to make the most of 
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profits (Harker and Zenios, 2000). Kaparakis et al. (1994) claimed that the 
intermediation approach was more convenient to employ when the study comprised 
large banks since the greater portion of their assets were financed from non-deposit 
sources (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  An additional reason for favoring the 
intermediation approach is that details on the number of accounts are difficult to 
acquire since they are naturally confidential (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  
In addition to these approaches, different approaches to defining a bank’s inputs and 
outputs were employed less frequently in the studies of bank efficiency (Agoraki et 
al., 2011). These include the profit or user-cost approach introduced by Hancock 
(1986), the value-added approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1990), and the risk 
management approach developed by Mester (1996). The user-cost or profit approach 
underlines the level of significance that a class in the balance sheet might provide to 
the total revenues’ net contribution (Avkiran, 2006). This approach assumes a type of 
bank assets as an output if its returns surpass the interest cost of funds or, 
alternatively, it would be considered to be an input (Grigorian and Manole, 2002). 
Similarly, a class of bank liability is assumed either to be an output if its cost is lower 
than the interest cost of the funds or else it is seen an input. 
The value-added approach is assumed to be an alteration to the production approach 
claiming that any type of liabilities or assets, which are presented in the balance sheet 
should be used an output if it contributes significantly to a bank (Avkiran, 2006). 
Alternatively, bank operations, which contribute slightly to a bank, are considered 
tobe either unimportant outputs or intermediate outputs, or inputs (Avkiran, 2006). 
For instance, balance sheet items, such as loans and deposits shown on  the balance 
sheet, should be used as bank outputs since they generate significant contributions to 
almost  all banks (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). On the other hand, low value-added 
instruments, like purchased funds and government securities, are treated as inputs and 
insignificant outputs respectively (Berger and Humphrey, 1991).
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3.3.7.2 The Variables Specification 
Table 3.2: Survey of studies that used different inputs and outputs
Study Country Input Output
Parkan (1987) Canada Employees, stationery  
expenses, space, rent and 
terminals
Number of transactions, customers 
response and error corrections
Oral and Yolalan (1990) Turkey Employees, terminals, 
numbers of accounts and 
credit applications
Number of transactions
Vassiloglou and Giokas 
(1990)
Greece Employees, suppliers, space 
and computer terminals
Number of transactions
Giokas (1991) Greece Employees,  stationery  
expenses and rent
Number of transactions
Berg, Forsund & Jansen 
(1992)
Norway Labor, machine, material, 
material, buildings.
Demand deposits, time deposits, 
short- term loans, long-term loans, 
other services.
Parson, Gotlieb & Denny 
(1993)
Canada Labor and capital Index of quantities of each service 
provided i.e. checks debit and credit 
loans, deposits.
Al-Faraj et al (1993) Saudi Arabia Employees, location, 
operating expenses and 
acquired equipment
Net profit, balance of current 
accounts, savings account, loans and 
number of accounts.
Fukuyama (1993) Japan Employees, capital and 
funds from customers
Loan revenue and other revenues
Humphrey (1993) USA Labor, physical capital, 
interest on deposits, interest 
on purchased funds
Value of demand deposits, small 
time and saving deposits, real estate 
loans, installment loans, commercial 
and industrial loans.
Tulkens (1993) Belgium Labor, windows, automatic 
teller machines
Deposits, automatic teller machine 
operations, international operations( 
transactions of foreign exchange 
and on travelers checks), stocks and 
bonds, credit operations, opening of 
new accounts, special services.
Berger, Hancock, & 
Humphrey (1993)
USA Labor, capital, deposits, 
physical capital
Business loans, consumer loans.
English, Grosskopf, Hayes & 
Yaisawarng (1993)
USA Labor, capital deposits, 
borrowing
Investments income, real estate 
loans, consumer loans and 
commercial loans.
Berg, Forsund, Hjalmarsson 
& Suominen (1993)
Nordic Labor, capital (book value 
of machinery and 
equipment)
Loans, deposits and number of 
branches.
Bukh, Forsund, & Berg 
(1995)
Nordic Capital( as a book value of 
machinery and equipment)
Total deposits, total loans, number 
of branches, guarantees given to 
customers.
Pavero and Papi (1995) Italy Employees, capital, 
loanable funs and deposits
Loans, investments in securities and 
non-interest income
Athanassopoulos and Curran 
(1996)
UK ATMs, employees, counter 
transactions and potential 
market
Loans sales, liability sale, 
investments and insurance policies 
sold
Bhattacharyya, Bhattacharrya 
& Kumbhakar (1996)
India Labor and physical capital Loans and advances, fixed deposits, 
current deposits and investments.
Lang and Welzel (1996) Germany Total cost, price of labor, 
price of capital, price of 
deposits, volume of labor, 
volume of deposits
Short term loans to nonbanks, loans 
to banks, bonds, cash, real estate, 
investment, fees, and commissions, 
revenue from sales and number of 
offices.
Brockett, Charnes, Cooper, 
Huang & Sun (1997)
USA Interest expenses on 
deposits, expenses for 
federal funds purchased and 
repurchased in domestic 
offices salaries, buildings, 
furniture and equipment, 
and total deposits
Income on federal funds sold and 
repurchases in domestic offices. 
Allowances for loan losses, loans, 
net of unearned income.
DeYoung (1997) USA Price of labor, borrowed 
funds, and physical capital
Total loans, transactions deposits 
and fee-based income
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Mester (1997) USA Labor, physical capital, 
funding
Real estate loans, commercial and 
industrial loans, lease financing 
receivable, agricultural loans, other 
loans, private loans to individuals.
Athanassopoulos (1997) Greece Employees, ATMs, 
terminal, interest costs, non-
interest costs and location
Non -interest income
Resti (1997) Italy Employees and capital Loans, deposits & non-interest 
income
Battacharya et al (1997) India Interest expense and 
operating expenses
Advances, deposits and investments
Schaffnit et al (1997) Canada employees Transactions and maintenance
Ayadi et al ( 1998) Nigeria Interest on deposits, 
expenses on personnel and 
total deposits
Total loans, interest income and 
non-interest income
Al-Shammari and Salimi 
(1998)
Jordan Selected financial ratios Selected financial ratios
Seiford and Zhu (1999) USA Employees, assets and 
capital stock
Revenue and profits
Golany and Storbeck (1999) USA Employees, space and 
marketing
Loans ,deposits, accounts per 
customer and satisfaction
Drake and Howcroft (1999) UK Number of loans accounts, 
number of mortgage 
account and number of 
cheque accounts
Personal loans, new cheque account, 
mortgage loans, insurance 
commission and change in “ 
marketed balances”
Zenios et al (1999) Cyprus Employees, terminals, 
space, current accounts, 
savings accounts and credit 
applications
Number of transactions
Mukherjee et al (2002) India Net worth, borrowings, 
operating expenses, 
employees and number of 
branches
Deposits, net profit, advances, non-
interest income and interest income
Ho and Zhu (2004) Taiwan Capital stocks, assets, 
number of branches and 
employees.
Sales and deposits
Sakar (2006) Turkey Branch numbers, employees 
per branch, assets, loans and 
deposits
ROA,ROE, interest income/assets, 
interest income/operating income 
and non-interest income/assets
Wu et al (2006) Canada Employees and expenses Deposits, revenues and loans.
Huwland and Rowse(2006) Canada Non sales FTE, sales FTE, 
size and city employment 
rate
Loans, deposits, average number of 
products/customer and customer 
loyalty
Sufian (2007) Malaysia Total deposits, labor and 
fixed assets
Income and total loans
Mostafa (2007) Arab countries Assets and equity Net profits, ROA and ROE
Al-Jarrah (2007) Jordon, Egypt, 
Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia
Deposits, labor and physical 
capital
Loans,  all other earning assets and 
off-balance sheet items
Mokhtar et al (2008) Malaysia Total deposits and total 
overhead expenses
Total earning assets
Olson and Zoubi (2010) 10 MENA 
countries
Deposits, labor and physical 
capital
Loans and securities
Akmal and Saleem, 2008 Pakistan Operating expenses, interest 
expenses, fixed assets
Net loans, liquid assets, deposits
Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 
2003
Jordan, 
Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt
Deposit, labor, physical 
capital
Total costumer loans, off-balance 
sheet
Arrif and Can, 2005 China Total  loanable funds, 
number of employees and 
physical capital
Total loans and investments
Ataullah & Lee, 2006 India Interest expenses and 
operating expenses
Loans and advances, investment , 
Interest income and operating 
income
Avkiran, 2009 Australian and 
New Zealand
Interest expense and non-
interest expenses
Interest income and noninterest 
income
Barros et al. ,2012 Japan The number of full time 
employees, total deposits 
and physical capital
Total loans
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Barros et al., 2011 China Number of employees, 
deposits, and total assets
Loans, and securities
Bos et al,2009 USA & 17 
European 
countries
Labor, financial capital, 
Physical capital
Loans, Investments and Off-balance 
sheet activities
Canhoto and Dermine, 2003 Portugal Number of employees and 
physical capital
Loans, deposits, securities, 
interbank assets/liabilities
Casu & Girardone, 2009 EU-15 
countries
Deposit ,labor, physical 
capital
Total loans and other earning assets
Casu & Molyneux, 2003 Italia Labor, deposits and Capital Total loans and other earning asset
Chen & Yeh, 2000 Taiwan Assets, deposits and staff Provision of loan services, portfolio 
investment and noninterest income
Chen et al. 2005 China Interest expenses, 
noninterest expenses and 
capital
Loans, deposits and noninterest 
income
Chortareas et al. ,2012 22 EU 
countries
Personnel expenses, fixed 
assets and deposits
Total loans and other earning asset
Drake et al. 2007 Japan Total deposits, total 
operating income, total 
provision
Total other earning assets, net 
commission, fees and trading 
income and total loans
Emrouznejad and Al Anouze, 
2010
PGCC 
countries
Total assets, deposits and 
capital
Loans and net profit
Isik and Hassan, 2003 Turkey Labor, physical capital, 
loanable fund
Loans, off-balance sheet activities, 
other earning assets
J.B. Hall et al. ,2012 Hong Kong Total operating expenses, 
fixed assets, total provisions
Total  loans, other earning assets, 
net commission, fee and trading 
income, other operating income
Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002 10 European 
Banks
Personnel expenses and 
non-interest expenses
Loans, deposits and other earning 
assets
Mahesh & Rajeev, 2008 India Deposits, borrowing, labor, 
fixed assets
Interest margin, Noninterest 
income, Credits and Investments
Saeed AlMuharrami, 2007 PGCC 
countries
Fixed assets, deposits, 
equity and labor
Total loans, other operating 
incomes, other earning assets, off 
balance sheet activities
San et al ,2011 Malaysia Total deposits of domestic 
banks, total deposits of 
foreign banks, fixed assets 
of domestic banks, fixed 
assets of foreign banks
The total loans of domestic banks, 
the total loans of foreign banks, the 
total investments of domestic banks, 
the total investments of foreign 
banks
Staub et al. ,2010 Brazil interest expenses, 
operational expenses 
,personnel expenses
Total loans , net of provision loans, 
investments and deposits
Sufian & Abdul Majid 2007 Malaysia Interest Income, noninterest 
income
Personal expenses, noninterest 
Expenses
Sufian, 2009 (b) Thailand, 
Malaysia
Labor, capital, interest 
expenses
Deposits, loans, investments
Sufian, 2009(a) Malaysia Labor, capital, interest 
xpenses
Deposits, loans, investments
Tecles & Tabak, 2010 Brazil Deposits, number of 
employees, fixed assets and 
equity
investments, loans and advances 
and other noninterest fee based 
incomes
Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran, 
2009
Indonesia, 
SouthKorea, 
Thailand, 
Malaysia and 
Philippine
Deposits, labor, capital and 
physical capital
Loans, investment plus other 
earning assets, off-balance sheet 
activities and fee income
Yao et al, 2007 China Fixed assets, deposits, 
equity and labor
Pre-tax profit, loans
Zhang et al. ,2011 China interest expenses, 
noninterest expenses 
(operating expenses), and 
net value of fixed assets
Total loans, total deposits, other 
earning assets, and non-interest 
income, net interest income and 
noninterest income
Zhao and Murinde ,2011 Nigeria Interest expenses, 
noninterest expenses and 
financial capital
Loans, deposits
Source: Own Table 
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Based on the input and output-used frequency (see Appendix 4), the most-used inputs 
in previous literature were: employees; labor; physical capital; capital; and personnel 
expenses. Employees and labor are different terms with the same meaning that reflect 
the number of workers contributing to the production process.  This study uses the 
personnel expenses input as an alternative to employee/ labor since neither details on 
the total of workers nor the cost for working hours are accessible; we used both to 
extract the required monetary-value input. Various previous studies used the 
personnel expenses input (e.g. Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Drake and Hall, 2003; 
Chortareas et al., 2012) where it was claimed that they formed a large part of general 
and administration expenses (Johnes et al., 2014). Physical capital and capital have 
same meaning in describing the fixed assets that were used as input variables in our 
study. Hence, we employed fixed assets as a proxy for physical capital. While it may 
not be a perfect reflection of the labor input, it is more easily available than better 
measures (e.g. employee numbers or expenditure on wages) and was  used in previous 
studies (e.g. Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Drake and Hall, 2003; Chortareas et al., 
2012). The last input, which we used for measuring efficiency, is "deposits and short-
term funding" since it represents the majority of the funds (inputs) available for 
financing the production of a bank’s financial instruments (outputs). Moreover, we 
found it more convenient to use this input with the intermediation approach in our 
study since it assumed that financial institutions intermediated funds primarily 
between savers and investors/borrowers (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
3.4 Returns to Scale
Returns to scale illustrates the level at which output changes as the quantity of all 
factors varies by the same or different proportions (Molyneux, Altunbas, and 
Gardener 1996). It is one of the features of production technology which can be 
defined as Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) or Decreasing Returns to Scale (DRS) or 
Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS) (also known as economies of scale). IRS refers to 
the increase in inputs which leads to a greater increase in outputs (Sufian and Noor, 
2009). On the other hand, DRS mean that an increase in the level of inputs results in 
a lower increase in the level of outputs (Sufian and Noor, 2009). This concept is  
based, also, on the average cost curve in which some of the factors of production are 
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fixed in the short run but vary totally in the long run (Koutsoyiannis, 1979). Holding 
all other factors constant, the average costs of producing a good in the long run 
decline as banks get bigger in size or more outputs are being produced (Molyneux, et 
al. 1996).
The interest in returns to scale enables banks to identify potential savings which they 
have if they change the operation scale. Bank costs decline when outputs are 
increased up to the optimal scale (Kasman 2005). However, the economies of scale do 
not continue indefinitely since the increase in size above the optimal scale of 
operation increases the costs and reduces the revenue. Therefore, banks have to 
produce at the optimal scale (i.e. CRS) in order to have the lowest achievable level of 
average costs   at which any changes in output will change the costs proportionately. 
The thesis studies the scale efficiency of Islamic bank versus their conventional 
counterparts.
3.5 Regression analyses
Based on the two stages-DEA's literature review, many regression models were 
conducted to analyze the determinants of bank efficiency.  Table (3.3) presents the 
most frequently employed techniques. As presented in Table 3.3, eight out of the 
thirty-one studies implemented the Tobit regression in the second stage analysis. The 
reason for employing Tobit is that non-censored estimates are biased since efficiency 
scores are bounded between 0 and 1 (Kaffash, 2014). However, Ataullah and Le 
(2006) assumes that it is unnecessary to employ Tobit.  As an alternative, they 
transform the efficiency score by taking the natural logarithm of [efficiency score/ (1 -
efficiency score)]. Casu and Molyneux (2003) suggest a bootstrap approach in the 
first-stage of DEA since they are among the researchers who consider that the 
covariates in the second-step regression are correlated clearly with the error terms in 
the first-step. 
On the other hand, Brissimis et al. (2008) and Delis and Papanikolaou (2009) 
implement an algorithm which counts on a double bootstrap procedure to examine the 
determinants of efficiency in the new EU banking sector. A number of researchers 
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conducted different economic modeling in the regression analysis (e.g. Pastor (2002) 
and Casu & Girardone (2004) employed Logistic model, Habibullah et al. (2005) used 
Granger causality, Wang and Huang (2007) conducted Gaussian mixture model and 
Markov model, and Casu and Molyneux (2003) and Hahn (2007a) implied Bootstrap-
Tobit.  
Table 3.3: Survey of most popular econometric techniques used in second stage regression
Authors (Publication year) Country Period 2nd Stage regression
Ariff & Can (2008) China 1995-2004 Tobit
Ataullah & Le (2006) India 1992-1998 Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM)
Avkiran (2009) Australia & New 
Zealand
1996-2003 Tobit
Aysan & Ceyhan (2008) Turkey 1990-2006 Generalized Least Squares –
FEM
Brissimis et al. (2008) 10 new EU 
countries
1994-2005 Double bootstrap two-stage 
least squares truncated
Casu & Girardone (2002) Italy 1996-199 Logistic
Casu & Molyneux (2003) France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, UK
1993-1997 Bootstrap-Tobit
Chang & Chiu (2006) Taiwan 1996-2000 Tobit
Delis & Papanikolaou (2009) 10 new EU 
countries
1994-2005 Double Bootstrap
Devaney & Weber (2000) US 1990-1993 Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions (SUR)
Dogan & Fauesten (2003) Malaysia 1989-1998 General Least Squares-FEM
Drake et al. (2006) Hong Kong 1995-2001 Tobit
Fukuyama & Weber (2009) Japan 2002-2005 Tobit
Fung (2006) US 1996-2003 Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions
Habibullah et al. (2005) Malaysia 1988-1993 Granger causality
Hahn (2007a) Austria 1996-2002 Bootstrap- Tobit
Hauner (2005) Germany, Austria 1995-1999 Tobit
Isik (2007) Turkey 1981-1990 General Least Squares-FEM
Isik & Hassan (2002) Turkey 1988, 1992, 1996 General Least Squares-FEM
Kumar and Gulati (2008) India 1993-2006 Logistic regression
Kyj & Isik (2008) Ukraine 1998-2003 Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS)
Laurenceson & Qin (2008) China 2001-2006 Tobit
Maudos et al. (2002) 10 EU countries 1993-1996 Generalized Least Squares-
REM
Molyneux et al., (2013) Transition countries 1994-2002 Generalized Least Squares-
REM
Mukherjee et al. (2001) US 1984-1990 Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS)
Pastor (2002) Spain, Italy, France, 
Germany
1988-1994 Tobit, Logistic
Sanyal and Shankar (2011) India 1997-2004 General Least Squares (GLS)
Sufian (2011) Malaysia 1993-2006 General Least Squares-FEM
Tanna (2009) 75 countries 2000-2004 General Least Squares-FEM
Wang & Huang (2007) Taiwan 1982-2001 AR, GMM, Correlation, 
Markov
Weill (2004) France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland
1992-1998 Correlation
Source: Own Table
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The Generalized Least Square (GLS) estimator is one of the most commonly used 
models in the second stage of regression analysis. This is proven in Table 3.2 showing 
that eleven out of the thirty-one studies had conducted the GLS estimator. Therefore, 
we employed GLS  in the second stage analysis in order to avoid issues resulting from 
heteroscedasticity which might  exist when including computed parameters in the 
second stage as dependent variables (Isik and Hassan, 2002; Mester, 
1996; Saxonhouse, 1976). Moreover, the study conducts White's correction for 
heteroscedascity; this does not change the coefficients themselves but only their 
standard deviations (Kyj and Isik, 2008). 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter summarized a mixture of approaches employed previously in 
determining efficiency. Moreover, it presented, brought together and discussed the 
flows of literature on conventional and Islamic bank efficiency, and different types of 
efficiency. Previous studies employed two approaches to calculate the efficiency: 
nonparametric; and parametric approaches. The non-parametric approach depends on 
programming techniques such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). On the other 
hand, the parametric approach is a regression-based analysis. The non-parametric 
approach is considered be more helpful than the parametric approach because of its 
simplicity and computational ease and since it does not necessitate any particular 
functional assumptions. However, the non-parametric approach suffers from being 
exposed to biases because it does not account for any technical or allocation 
inefficiency. 
The chapter identified DEA as the most commonly conducted approach used in 
previous researches.  The chapter explained and discussed, also, the DEA process and 
its development. Furthermore, based on the summary of previous studies on bank 
efficiency, we recognized the intermediation approach to be the most appropriate 
approach for selecting this study’s inputs and outputs. For the second step of the 
analysis, we reviewed and selected the most cited regression analysis in order to 
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investigate conveniently the determinants (i.e. bank and country- specific factors) 
affecting the bank efficiency. 
The chapter verified that studies investigating the efficiency of Islamic versus 
conventional banks concentrated only on a single country or regions. However, to the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first global study to compare Islamic 
and conventional banks (i.e. all Islamic banks operating in countries where there are 
conventional banks). Moreover, reviews on the literature of previous studies identified 
only three studies which had applied the bootstrap technique in order to present 
statistical coherences for the estimated efficiency scores. A comparison of the initial 
efficiency scores to the bootstrapped ones showed the sensitivity of the efficiency 
scores of both the Islamic and conventional banks to sampling disparity. Since they 
lacked statistical precision, this drew our attention more to the accuracy and 
consistency of previous studies.
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Chapter 4 Background: Socio-Economic background of each of the 
21 countries
1. Bahrain
Bahrain is a small country located in the center of the Persian Gulf. Bahrain's first 
commercial bank, which was a branch of the British-owned Eastern Bank, opened in 
1921.  In the 1940’s, a second bank, the British bank of the Middle East, set up a 
branch in Bahrain. The first wholly owned National Bank of Bahrain was established 
in 1957. The Bahraini Dinar replaced the Indian Rupee as the country’s currency in 
1965 and, thereafter, banks began to find Bahrain a more attractive location to the 
extent that, by 1974, fourteen commercial banks operated there. Following the 
increased number of banks after the country’s independence, the Bahraini government 
established, the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) in 1973. Two years later and based 
on those operating in Singapore, the BMA promulgated regulations in order to create 
offshore banking units (OBUs).
The Lebanese civil war encouraged several International banks to create OBUs in 
Bahrain and, post 1975, they transferred their Middle East operations to Bahrain. By 
the early 1980s, there existed seventy-five Bahraini OBUs with in excess of $62 
billion. However, in 1985, the falling oil prices and a corresponding decline in oil 
revenues reduced dramatically the funds deposited in these banks OBUs which had 
increased to fifty-five by 1990.  Despite the fluctuations in the Persian Gulf financial 
markets during the 1980s, Bahrain becameestablished as the Persian Gulf’s principal 
banking and financial center.
The Kingdom of Bahrain was amongst the first countries to recognize the importance 
of the concept of Islamic banking and finance.  Consequently, Bahrain has supported 
both the development of the banking industry generally and has welcomed new 
institutions in particular. This support has led to Bahrain having a concentration of 
specialist Islamic institutions based there. In 1979, Bahrain’s first Islamic bank was 
established with the licensing of the Bahrain Islamic Bank. Ever since that date, there 
has been significant growth in the banking industry. Currently, there are thirty Islamic 
banks and financial institutions in Bahrain (Bankscope, 2013). In early 2000, the 
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BMA issued the Prudential Information and Regulations (PIRI) that is a 
comprehensive framework within which Islamic banks should conduct their business 
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). This framework includes areas such as capital adequacy, 
asset quality, management of investment accounts, corporate governance, and 
liquidity management (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).  Based on this setting, the 
Bahraini Islamic financial industry is able to benefit from sustainable growth that 
depends on solid investor and customer confidence, attractive products and growing 
markets (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).
2. Kuwait
Kuwait is located on the northeast Arabian Peninsula of the Persian Gulf.  In 1990, 
Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. This sparked the Persian Gulf War (1991) which 
ended when a coalition of Arabian and Western force drove the Iraqi troops out of the 
country. Following the discovery of its major oil reserves in 1938, Kuwait has one of 
the world’s highest per capita incomes (CIA, 2015). British investors established 
Kuwait’s first bank in 1941 and, in 1952, Kuwait’s National Bank was established. 
Thereafter, there were established several other banks such as the Credit and Savings 
bank in 1965 (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). At the 1980s, the Kuwaiti banks were 
among the biggest and mainly operating financial institutions in the region (Federal 
Research Division, 2004).  Subsequently, the Kuwaiti government introduced 
lawwhich prohibited foreign banks from operating in the country.
The 1970’s large oil revenues meant that many private individuals had substantial 
funds at their disposal. In the mid-1970’s, this resulted in a speculation boom on the 
official stock market which culminated in a small crash in 1977. Only the National 
Bank of Kuwait, the country’s largest commercial bank, survived the crash intact. The 
Kuwaiti government's response to this financial crisis was to bail out the affected 
investors and to introduce stricter regulations. Accordingly, the Kuwaiti government 
interfered and issued an intricate collection of policies, included in the Difficult Credit 
Facilities Resettlement Program (Federal Research Division, 2004). The 
implementation of this Program remained to be completed when, in 1990, the Iraqi 
invasion changed the entire financial picture (Federal Research Division, 2004).
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3. Lebanon
One of the countries that performed and fared relatively well during the recent global 
subprime crisis is Lebanon. Lebanon did not only handle to escape totally the housing 
bubble, but it had also shown overall immunity to the international downturn 
(Bergstrom, 2010). Before the civil war, Lebanon was definitely the chief banking 
center of the Middle East; Lebanon was named   "the Switzerland of the Middle East" 
for its advanced banking sector. Lebanon has since tried to regain the title and proven 
the prosperity and solidity of its banking sector. Banque du Liban (BDL), or the 
Central Bank of Lebanon, was established in 1963 in Beirut. The institution preserves 
the safety of the monetary and economic stability, and the soundness of the banking 
sector in Lebanon. It gives and supervises licenses for all financial institutions willing 
to operate in Lebanon. Moreover, the organization manages bank liquidity by altering 
interest rates, by interceding in the open market, and by regulating credit facilities to 
all financial institutions. 
The Lebanese currency is exchangeable freely with other currencies and similar to 
most countries, banks operating in the country are subject to secrecy law that prevents 
the employees disclosing information of the clients to another party. Starting in 1994, 
all revenues and interest earned on all types of accounts opened in Lebanese banks are 
exemp from income tax (Banque Du Liban 2007). It is noted, also, that most banks in 
Lebanon are owned privately (Grais and Kantur 2003). With regard to Islamic 
banking, the country initially acted as host to a subsidiary of the foreign Islamic bank 
and allowed an Islamic banking window to operate under existing regulations aimed
initially for conventional banks (Banque Du Liban 2007). Several applications to set-
up Islamic banks were at first pending because the Central bank of Lebanon took 
some time to consider several laws relating to Islamic banking (Banque Du Liban, 
2007). Only in 2004, there was passed a law to regulate Islamic banking transactions 
which allowed Islamic banks to undertake commercial and investment activities 
without being subject to limitations as in traditional banks (Banque Du Liban 2007). 
Since then, a series of guidelines on specific Islamic banking transactions have been 
released (Banque Du Liban, 2007).
84
4. Tunisia
The commercial banking system in Tunisia began to restructure in 1987 in order to 
increase competition, mobilize savings and allocate resources more efficiently. The 
reforms were done through liberalizing interest rates, credit allocation, new indirect 
monetary policy, and strengthening prudential regulation and opening the financial 
sector to foreign investors (Ben Naceur, 2003). However, labor input in Tunisian 
banks has been found to be more inefficiently used relative to capital, over 1980-1992 
(Chaffai, 1997). Amendments to the banking law were introduced in 1993 and 1994 
in order to fully integrate the development bank into the banking system hence, 
become a direct competitor to the commercial bank, as well as to improve prudential 
regulations (Cook, Hababou, and Liang 2005). 
Private-owned banks are increasingly dominating commercial banks after the 
government privatized some of the banking assets although development banks are 
still largely owned by the public (Grais and Kantur, 2003). In addition, the 
government in its Economic Development Plan (1997-2001) has given priority to 
modernize the payment system as well as customer information, improve the 
regulatory framework, and strengthen the capital base of banks because most banks 
are small in size (lMF 1998). Irrespective of the above efforts, the compliance of 
Tunisian banks to Basel capital adequacy is still not clear (Iqbal and Molyneux 2005) 
and only one foreign-owned Islamic bank has been in operation (Reille and Lyman 
2005) although European banks have been allowed to open branches in Tunisia since 
2001 (Cook, et al. 2005).
5. Sudan
Agriculture is the main activity of the Sudanese economy but only 12 percent of this 
largest country in Africa is agricultural land. The process of the Islamization of the 
Sudanese banking system and economy has been neither smooth nor consistent. 
The1984 Presidential Decree was the first attempt to Islamize Sudan’s entire banking 
system. This Decree stipulated that Sudanese commercial banks were required to 
cease interest-based dealings with immediate effect and that they had to convert their 
existing interest-bearing deposits and advances into forms which were acceptable 
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under Islamic banking.  For a short period, the banks were permitted to pay interest on 
foreign transactions. There are reports that this sudden change forced the banks to 
adopt Al-Murabahah as the most appropriate available alternative Islamic banking 
transaction method and soon such transactions constituted 90 per cent of their 
financial operations. 
Although the whole economy was transformed into being Shari'ah compliant in 1989, 
only by 1992 was the operation of all the financial sector compliant to Shari'ah 
(Hussein 2004). Hence, Islamic banking law governed the banks and each bank was 
required to have a Shari'ah committee besides a Shari'ah board at central bank level. 
In complying with local regulations, multinational banks also operate Islamic 
banking. However, the government controls most shares in the banking market 
(Hussein 2004). Iqbal and Molyneux (2005) noted that it is not very clear whether 
Sudan complies with the Basel standards of capital adequacy. Moreover, the Sudanese 
bank’s capital adequacy ratio is always below the international standard (Hussein 
2004).
Demand deposits have dominated the total deposits of Sudanese banks, which suggest 
the failure of banks to provide instruments suitable with potential depositors, 
individual preference of instant cash on hands, or that depositors have lost confidence 
in the banking institutions. The higher inflation compared to the profit rates received 
from the deposits may have diverted customers to invest in real estate (Hussein 2004). 
While the low financing is possibly due to high costs of borrowing for customers and 
less access of opportunities from abroad, the low banking profit is possibly due to low 
efficiency in asset management, high NPL, low labour productivity, absence of good 
governance, small bank size and slow access to the latest technology (Hussein 2004). 
Moreover, although unprofitable, banks were found to over-utilize their capital by 
expanding the operation through new branches because the sanctions, imposed by the 
United States of America and the United Nations prevented them from utilizing new 
technologies such as ATMs. Consequently, the banks are unable to train  and to
provide their staff with the skills to use the new technologies (Saaid, et al. 2003). 
However, banks continue to increase in size and maintain considerable profits (Saaid, 
et al. 2003)
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6. Oman
The Sultanate of Oman is located in the south-eastern quarter of the Arabian 
Peninsula. Oman is bordered by the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and Saudi 
Arabia; all these countries contribute to Oman's isolation. The Omani banking sector 
originates mainly from a November 1974 banking law which established the Central 
Bank of Oman (CBO). The law enabled an increase in the number of the Sultanate’s 
local banks and the law facilitated, also, foreign-owned banks. By September 1992, 
the Omani banking sector consisted of  twenty-one commercial banks and the three 
specialized development banks of the Oman Development bank (1977), the Oman 
Housing bank (1977) and the Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries (1981) (Iqbal 
and Molyneux, 2004). However, the Omani banking market is the smallest within the 
GCC and, of the twenty-one commercial banks, eleven are foreign owned and
concentrate on financing trade. Ten are local banks which operate in an increasingly 
competitive market.
7. Indonesia
Indonesia has the country with the largest majority – approximately 80% - of Muslim 
people in the world. Despite its seemingly demographic predisposition for Shari'ah 
banking, as at the end of 2010, only 3.2% of the total banking assets related to 
Shari'ah transactions. Some form of Islamic non-bank financial institutions were 
operating before the legal foundation for Islamic banking was passed formally  in 
1992; this reflected the need for such a form of banking by the society. Therefore, 150 
Islamic rural banks and 11 Islamic commercial banks have been in operation since 
1998 (Bank Indonesia, 2010). A new act was passed later to allow  the central bank to 
operate based on Shari'ah (Central Bank of Indonesia, 2002). Additionally at bank 
level, a Shari'ah committee exists at national level to standardize the Shari'ah
interpretations on banking (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). During the Asian financial 
crisis, the NPLs of Islamic banks were much lower and improved faster than 
conventional banks, and the loan-to-deposits ratio for the former were also higher 
(Central Bank of Indonesia 2002). This may indicate that Islamic banking, which does 
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not rely on interest rates, managed to face economic fluctuations better than 
conventional banks (Central Bank of Indonesia, 2002). 
8. United Arab Emirates (UAE)
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) consists of a federation of several emirates. In 
1971, following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Persian Gulf,  the six  
States of Abu Dhabi, 'Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ash Shariqah, Dubayy, and Umm al 
Qaywayn, joinef together to form the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  A further state -
Ra's al Khaymah - joined the UAE in 1972. The UAE’s federal system is based on 
each of the individual emirates having a high level of autonomy with their own rulers.  
The exceptions are Sharjah and Ras AlKhaymah which each has one ruling family 
(Federal Reserve Research, 2004). Abu Dhabi, which is the largest and wealthiest 
emirate, is the federation’s principal petroleum producer and financier. Dubai, which 
is the second largest emirate, thrives on wealth derived from a services-based 
economy (tourism, construction, telecommunications, and financial services). 
Together, the two emirates provide more than 80% of the UAE’s income while the 
northern emirates remain relatively undeveloped (Federal Research Division, 2004). 
Due to the unprecedented development over the last 40 years due to oil production, 
the UAE had changed completely from a small regional country to a globally 
recognized economic power. The UAE's per capita GDP is equivalent to those of 
leading Western European nations. Its high oil revenues and its moderate foreign 
policy stance have enabled the UAE to play a vital role in the region’s affairs. For 
more than three decades, oil and global finance drove the UAE's economy. However, 
due to the  global crisis in 2008-09, the combined effect of falling oil prices and real 
estate prices had a severe effect on the UAE economy.
The UAE’s Central Bank of UAE was established in 1980 with the objective of 
governing monetary, credit and banking related policies. The Central Bank maintains 
the UAE government’s reserves of gold and foreign currencies; acts as the central 
bank for banks operating in the UAE; and acts as the UAE’s financial agent with 
international financial institutions. In late 2004, the UAE Central Bank responded to 
the pressure for worldwide trading activities by stating that it would consider the 
88
establishment of new foreign banks  in the UAE to create more competition in the 
banking sector. However, as of late 2005, the UAE Central Bank  had not issued any 
new licenses.
The DIFC (Dubai International Financial Centre) was established officially in 
September 2004 to represent a financial free zone with self-regulating mechanisms. In 
addition, the DIFC’s operations are independent to those of the UAE’s Central Bank.  
Although the Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFE) was established in 
September 2005 with the primary purpose of supporting domestic markets, but it is 
supposed, also, to aid the country in opening itself to foreign investors (Federal 
Research Division, 2004)
9. Qatar
The State of Qatar is a small country which has the waters of the Arabian Gulf on its 
northern, eastern and western boundaries and which has Saudi Arabia as its southern 
neighbor.  Previously known for pearl fishing, Qatar transformed itself from a poor 
British protectorate into an independent state with significant oil and natural gas 
revenues. Qatar is one of the world’s fastest developing economies due to its exports 
of oil and gas.
Until 1959, Qatar’s principal currency was the Indian Rupee when, in an attempt to 
stop the smuggling of gold into India, the government replaced it with a special gulf 
Rupee. In 1966, Qatar and Dubai established jointly a currency board to issue a Qatar-
Dubai Riyal. However,  following Dubai’s integration into United Arab Emirates in 
1971, the  Qatari government decided  to rely no longer on the  Dubai currency.  As a 
direct result, in 1973, THE Qatari government created the Qatar Monetary Agency 
(QMA) and introduced its own Riyal; the currency was secured to the International 
Monetary Fund's (IMF) special drawing rights.  The QMA has most of the traditional 
powers and prerogatives of a central bank. According to the Federal Research 
Division (2004), the QMA dealt with issues of banking regulations, credits and 
finances. Additionally, the QMA was in charge of issuing currency and managing the 
country’s foreign currency reserves which were required to support the Qatari Riyal. 
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Unlike many central banks, the QMA shares control of the country's reserves with the 
Ministry of Finance and Petroleum (Federal Research Division, 2004)
When incorporated in 1993, the Qatar Central Bank (QCB) took over the QMA’s 
responsibilities for supervising the banking sector. Based on the Basle Accord, the 
QCB introduced regulations which applied major international standards to banking 
supervision.
10. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Arab Middle East (Wilde, 2011). The 
western Hijaz and Asir mountains form a backbone along a 14-65 km wide coastal 
plain and most other parts of the KSA are either flat or slightly undulating. Over half 
of the territory is desert, with the great sand sea of the Empty Quarter covering much 
of the south.  In a formal sense, KSA did not have  a currency or a banking system 
until the middle of the 20th century. It is worth mentioning that, by then, KSA had 
only a few banking functions including money exchange for the visitors to Mecca 
who were using international currencies.
Although the first foreign bank was established in Jeddah as early as 1926, it did not 
have any significant importance. As expected, the development of oil production had 
a significant impact in determining and shaping the banking sector (Federal Reserve 
Research, 2004). In 1927, the KSA government issued a silver Riyal in order to 
standardize the monetary units in circulation at that time. By 1950, the KSA 
government was required to introduce formal policies to regulate and to control the 
newly created private banking institutions in order to keep in check the sharp increase 
expenditure by both the government and foreign oil companies. In 1948, the French 
Banque de L’Indochine and the Arab Bank opened theit first branches in Jeddah. The 
British Bank of Middle East,  the Pakistan National Bank and Egypt’s  Misr Bank  
opened their branches in 1950 (Federal Reserve Research, 2004). Two years later, 
with technical assistance from the United States of America the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) was established with the objective of serving as the 
Central Bank within the confines of Islamic law (Federal Research Division, 2004).
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In 1966, an essential banking control law clarified and strengthened the SAMA's role 
in regulating the banking system. This law established, also, requirements concerning 
banks holding reserves against their deposits. The Council of Ministers set the 
conditions for granting licenses to foreign banks. Applications for bank licenses were 
submitted to the SAMAwhich forwarded each application along with its 
recommendations to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. Several 
limitations continued to restrain SAMA's implementation of monetary policy. It could 
neither expand credit to banks nor use a discount rate because these measures were 
forms of interest (International Monetary Fund, 2013). By the 1980s, new regulations 
were introduced which are dependent on a set of service charges instead of interest to 
circumvent Islamic restrictions (Lessambo, 2013). From the early 1990s, the country’s 
banks have been required to hold minimum reserve of non-interest-bearing deposits 
with SAMA. Moreover, banks had to maintain liquid assets (e.g. currency, deposits, 
etc.) other than the reserve accounts with SAMA (Metz, 1992).
11. Malaysia
Malaysia is a country comprising thirteen states and three federal territories with 
several ethnics and religions (BBC, 2015). The country consists of two regions 
separated by some 640 miles of the South China Sea. In 1948, with the exception of 
Singapore, the British-ruled territories on the Malay Peninsula formed the Federation 
of Malaya and gained its independence in 1957. Malaysia was established in 1954 
when the previous British colonies of Singapore and Sabah and Sarawa joined the 
Federation of Malay (USA International Business Publications, 2007). Over the last 
forty years or so, Malaysia has transformed itself from a country with a large 
population of poor people dependent on the production of raw materials to a country 
with a multi-sector economy and a population of middle- income earners. Malaysia 
has shifted from being a maker of raw materials, such as tin and rubber in the 1970s 
to, nowadays, a diversified economy and a leading exporter of electrical equipments 
and parts, palm oil, and natural gas. This economic growth resulted, also, in a 
dramatic reduction in the level of the country’s poverty from 49.3% in 1970 to 1.0% 
in 2014 (World Bank, 2015).
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Malaysia’s Central Bank, known as Bank Negara Malaysia, is a constitutional entity 
which began operating on 26 January 1959 and, according to Blomberg, has its 
headquartered in Kuala Lumpur with representative offices in New York, and 
London.  The Bank Negara Malaysia is the Central Bank for the Malaysian currency 
and is responsible for maintaining international reserves; adopting the national 
monetary policy; managing the financial system; and providing financial advice and 
central banking services to both the government and other banks. It operates, also, 
public service centers to provide financial consultancy services to public and 
businesses. Bank Negara Malaysia's (BNM, Central Bank of Malaysia) total assets 
grew from US$ 6.6 billion in 1985 to US$ 122.3 billion by December 2014. 
According to The World Bank (2015), after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, 
Malaysia continued to post solid rates of growth by averaging 5.5% annually between 
2000 and 2008. During 2007-2009, Malaysia was affected by the financial crisis, but 
it recovered promptly showing a average growth rate of 5.7 percent since 2010 
(World Bank, 2015).
12. Iraq
After the First World War and due to British influence, Iraq became a part of the 
Indian monetary system with the Rupee as the country’s main currency. In 1947 the 
National Bank of Iraq was established.  According to the Federal Research Division 
(2004), the National Bank of Iraq assumed responsibility from the London-based 
currency board in 1949 for issuing currency notes and maintaining financial reserves.  
In 1956, the National Bank of Iraq was transformed into the Central Bank of Iraq. Its 
tasks included currency management, foreign exchange control, and supervision of 
the country’s banking system (Federal Research Division, 2004).
In 1964, as the result of the massive nationalization under the first Ba’ath rule, there 
was a merger of banks  the following main groups of banks: Rafidain; Commercial; 
Baghdad Bank; and Credit Bank. A further restructuring followed in 1970 within two 
main groups- Rafidain and Commercial. Later in 1974, the Commercial group was 
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supervised under the Rafidain banner; this meant that it was the only bank that 
remained under State ownership (Federal Research Division, 2004). The second 
Persian Gulf War had devastating effects on the State owned banks. It was estimated
that Rafidain incurred losses of $300,000,000 due to the destruction of most of its 
offices and branches. Additionally, its currency losses were estimated to be 
$69,000,000 (Federal Research Division, 2004).
13. Singapore
Of the Islands situated in Southeastern Asia, Singapore is a wealthy city State located 
between Malaysia and Indonesia. The United Kingdom established Singapore as a 
trading colony in 1819.  Singapore joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963 and, two 
years later, Singapore became an independent country. Once a British colonial trading 
post, nowadays Singapore is a thriving global financial hub and was described as one 
of Asia's economic "tigers". It is renowned, also, for its conservatism and strict local 
laws and Singapore prides itself on its stability and security. Singapore experienced 
rapid industrialization during the 1960’s and, over a ten-year period, manufacturing 
became the sector most responsible for the country’s economic growth. Singapore 
achieved full employment in the early 1970’s and, by the 1980s, Singapore had joined 
Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan as one of Asia’s newly industrialized countries 
(The World Bank, 2015). At present, the vivid manufacturing and services sectors 
have become the main supports of the Singapore economy (The World Bank, 2015) 
(The World Bank, 2015).  Consequently, Singapore has become one of the world's 
most prosperous countries with strong international trading links (In terms of tonnage 
handled, its port is one of the busiest in the world.) and with per capita GDP equal to 
that of the leading nations of Western Europe.  Singapore is one of the world’s most 
competitive economies and regarded, also, as offering businesses one of the world’s 
most friendly business environments (The World Bank, 2015).
The Central Bank of Singapore, known as the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS), was established in 1971 and is based in Singapore. The MAS regulates the 
country’s monetary, banking, and financial aspects and assists in the promotion of 
non-inflationary economic; issuing currency and government securities; and 
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developing monetary policies. Moreover, the MAS is the government’s financial 
agent and develops strategies for the development of the private sector. In addition, it 
offers economic research services and assists in regulating the banking, insurance, and 
securities sectors. According to Bloomberg, the MAS focuses, also, on global free 
trade and developing economic and financial policies.
14. Syria
Syria was the home of various early civilizations including, most notably, the 
Phoenicans. At various times in history, Syria was part of the Persian, Macedonian, 
and Roman empires. From the 7th century, Syria became a center of Islamic power and 
civilization and, in 1516, it became part of the Ottoman Empire. Following the First 
World War, France acquired a mandate over Syria and the French administered Syria 
until it gained its independence in 1946. The two pillars of the Syrian economy are the 
oil sector and agriculture; each account for about a quarter of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). This varies varying from year to year depending on prices 
and climatic conditions. The economy has diversified through growth in other sectors 
such as financial services, construction, telecommunications, tourism, the  non-oil 
industry and trade.
According to Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) (2014), before the unrest (2011), the Syrian 
government was implementing redistributive reforms and liberalizing gradually  
Syria’s centrally planned economy.  Prior to 2011, Syria had reached acceptable 
levels in international rankings such as the UNDP’s Human Development Index and 
was seen as a  medium developed country.  In the 2011edition of the UNDP’s Hunan 
Development Index, Syria was ranked 119 with a value of 0.632 as compared to 118 
with a value of 0.631 in the 2010 edition (BTI, 2014).  However, there is no doubt that 
the current politico-economic situation has had a massive detrimental effect on Syria’s 
economic system.  Since the unrest began in 2011, the Syrian pound has experienced 
a devaluation of roughly 50% and, in turn, this has reduced the value of its citizens’ 
monetary assets and savings.  
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The conflict has pushed millions of people into poverty and, in 2014, i four in every 
five Syrians were estimated to be living in poverty (SCPR, 2014).  In 2014, it was 
estimated that the overall poverty rate was 82.5% and showed a significant increase 
when compared to the estimated 64.8% in 2013 (SCPR, 2014).  The Syrian Centre for 
Policy Research (SCPR) estimated that in 2014 64.7% of Syrians were living in 
extreme poverty and were unable to meet their basic food and non-food needs. While 
the current conflict continues, it is difficult to gauge the accuracy of these estimates. 
However, these estimates remain highly indicative of the degree of deprivation which 
the embattled Syrian population is experiencing.
15. Bangladesh
Bangladesh became an independent state in December 1971 after a nine-month long 
war against the Pakistani government. Bangladesh is one of the world's most densely 
populated countries with its people living on a delta between rivers flowing into the 
Bay of Bengal. While there is widespread severe poverty is deep and widespread, in 
recent years, Bangladesh has reduced the growth of its population and improved the 
country’s health and education. However, poverty remains the overarching problem 
with, in 2010, 76.5% of the population living on less than $2 a day (at 2005 
international prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity) (BTI, 2014). This means 
that at least 65 million Bangladeshi people (31.5% of the population) live below the 
poverty line.  From 1996, the annual rate of growth of Bangladesh's economy has 
been around 6%.  This is remarkable when we take into account the country’s political 
instability, poor infrastructure, corruption, insufficient power supplies, slow 
implementation of economic reforms and the impact of recession following the 2007-
09 global financial crisis. Although the service sector generates more than half of 
Bangladesh’s GDP , around 50% of Bangladeshis are employed in the agriculture 
sector with rice being the single most important product.
The Bangladesh Bank, the Central Bank and the apex regulatory body for the 
country's monetary and financial system, were established in 1971 in Dhaka. It 
performs all the core functions of a typical monetary and financial sector regulator 
and carries out,also, a number of other non-core functions. The major functional areas 
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are : formulation and implementation of monetary and credit policies; regulation and 
supervision of the banks and non-bank financial institutions; promotion and 
development of the domestic financial market; management of the country's 
international reserves; and issuance of currency notes.
Following the country’s independence, the Bangladeshi banking industry started its 
journey with six nationalized commercial banks, two state-owned specialis banks and 
three foreign banks. In the 1980s, the banking industry achieved significant expansion 
with the entry of private banks.  In 1983, alongside the country’s conventional interest 
bearing banking system, Bangladesh introduced an Islamic banking system (profit-
loss sharing). At present, out of Bangladesh’s forty-eight 48 banks, six private 
commercial banks are operating as full-fledged Islamic banks and, from a total of 
twenty-one branches, ten conventional banks are partially involved in Islamic 
banking. From its inception in 1983 to June 2007, the Islamic banking industry 
continued to show strong growth in tandem with growth in the country’s economy. 
This was reflected in the increased market share of the Islamic banking industry in 
terms of the total banking system’s assets, financing and deposits (Ahamed, 2014). 
16. Philippines 
During the 16th century, the Philippine Islands became a Spanish colony and, in 1898, 
the colony was ceded to the USA following the Spanish-American War. In 1935, the 
Philippines became a self-governing commonwealth and, in 1946, after achieving its 
independence from the United States of America and becoming a Republic, the 
Philippines adopted a democratic presidential system. The Philippines is one of East 
Asia’s most dynamic emerging markets with sound economic fundamentals and a 
globally recognized competitive workforce (The World Bank, 2015). Major credit 
rating agencies have rated the Philipines’ investment banking opportunities because of 
the sound macroeconomic fundamentals of the country’s economy characterized by 
sustained growth, low and stable inflation and a sound fiscal management. Moreover, 
robust remittances have provided a strong basis in stabilizing the Philippines’ 
currency and enabling the country to build up a healthy amount of international 
reserves.
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Pursuant to the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the New Central 
Bank Act of 1993, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) was established on 3 July 
1993 as the Philippines’ Central Bank.  Assuming the role from the Central Bank of 
Philippines, the BSP is the country’s central monetary authority is independent of the 
Philippines National Government. The BSP enjoys fiscal and administrative 
autonomy from the National Government in the pursuit of its mandated 
responsibilities.
17. Pakistan
Since the modern state of Pakistan was born out of the partition of the Indian sub-
continent in 1947, it has faced both domestic political upheavals and regional 
confrontation. Created to meet the demands of Indian Muslims for their own 
homeland, Pakistan consisted originally of East and West Pakistan.  In 1971, With the 
help if India, the Bengali speaking people of East Pakistan seceded from West 
Pakistan and became the independent country of Bangladesh. West Pakistan - the 
present-day Pakistan - stretches from the Himalayas down to the Arabian Sea.
Pakistan is classified as a country with “low human development” and is ranked 145 
of the 187 countries in the U.N. Human Development Index (HDI). In 2008, the 
World Bank stated that 60.8% of the Pakistani population lived on less than $2 per 
day (BTI, 2014). When considering in 2013 the “best place to be born” the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranked puts Pakistan 75 of the 80 countries on its index. 
Before independence in 1947, the Indian Reserve Bank was the Central Bank for both 
India and Pakistan. Nowadays, the State Bank of Pakistan, which was established in 
1948 and is based in Karachi, operates as Pakistan’s Central Bank of Pakistan. 
According to Bloomberg (2015), its primary functions include the issue of currency; 
regulation and supervision of the financial system; being the bankers’ bank; the 
country’s lender of the last resort; banker to government; and conducting monetary 
policy. The State Bank of Pakistan is responsible for the management of public debt 
and foreign exchange and its other functions include advising the Pakistani 
government on financial matters and interacting with international financial 
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institutions (Bloomberg, 2015). In addition, it offers nontraditional or promotional 
functions. These include the following: development of financial framework; 
institutionalization of savings and investment; provision of training facilities to 
bankers; and provision of credit to priority sectors
Pakistan was among the three worldwide countries that had been trying to implement 
interest free banking at a comprehensive / national level. From 1960 to 1977, the 
Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) provided the Government with a number of reports 
which examined the meaning of Riba.  During the 1970’s, efforts began to eliminate 
Riba  from economic matters and, in this regard,  most of the significant and practical 
steps were taken during the  early 1980s (AlBaraka, 2015). In 2002, the State Bank of 
Pakistan issued the first Islamic Banking License allowing Islamic Banking Products 
and Services to be offered in the Country. Currently, five fully fledged Islamic Banks 
and various conventional banks offer the Islamic Banking Products and Services.
18. Turkey
Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the modern Republic of Turkey came into 
existence in the 1920s. Straddling the continents of Europe and Asia and controlling 
the entrance to the Black Sea, Turkey's location has given it major influence and 
strategic importance in the region (BBC, 2015). Turkey is the only country with a 
majority-Muslim population that has an explicitly secular political system. As 
determined by the Turkish Constitution (BTI, 2014), its institutions are reasonably 
efficient in their operations. In comparison with other Middle Eastern countries, 
Turkey’s democratic rules function reasonably well and its elections are free and fair. 
According to The World Bank, Turkey is one of the largest middle-income partners of 
the World Bank Group (WBG). With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $786 
billion, Turkey is the 18th largest economy in the world. In less than a decade, the 
country’s per capita income has nearly tripled and now exceeds $10,000. Although 
economic growth was slowed by the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008 but, 
nonetheless, it has remained resilient and made Turkey an example from which other 
countries in the region can learn. Labor markets have recovered rapidly after the crisis 
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and both the seasonally-adjusted unemployment and employment rates   improved 
from pre-crisis levels.
Turkey’s Central Bank was established in 1931 and is based in Ankara. It regulates 
the issue of currency and operates the country’s credit system. The Central Bank 
formulates, implements, and monitors the monetary policy.  Its other functions 
include: guaranteeing deposit schemes; foreign exchange operations; holding and 
managing foreign reserves; and operating payment systems. The Central Bank 
publishes, also, CBRT bulletins, reports and statistical information on the country’s 
balance of payments stand its t international investment position, research papers and 
presentations.  In addition, it conducts surveys on the issuing of bank loans and the 
determination of the consumer confidence index.  (Bloomberg, 2015). 
19. Yemen
North Yemen obtained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1918. However, 
the South of Yemen got independent in 1967 after the withdrawal of British troops. In 
1990, the two countries were unified formally as the Republic of Yemen and, since 
the country was unified , Yemen has been modernizing slowly and opening up to the 
world. However, Yemen still retains much of its tribal character and is one of the 
poorest countries in the Arab world (The World Bank, 2015). In 1990, North and 
South Yemen were reunited  and this led to  the Central Bank of Yemen merged with 
the Bank of Yemen under the original name of “Central Bank of Yemen”.  As 
established by law, the Central Bank of Yemen is an independent body with the 
paramount objective of conducting Yemeni monetary policy. The Central Bank of 
Yemen is responsible for  keeping the country’s inflation under control; stabilizing the 
national currency’s exchange rate; and promoting investment and economic growth 
(Central Bank of Yemen, 2015).
The Yemeni financial system is small relative to the size of the country’s economy. 
The Central Bank and the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development (YBRD) 
are the dominant players. The YBRD controls some 80% of the country’s commercial 
lending and deposit gathering activities.  The Central Bank uses it, also, as a vehicle 
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to implement its policy decisions. According to USAID, Yemeni financial institutions 
and markets i are poorly developed and extremely conservative. An estimated 65% of 
the country's liquidity is kept in cash outside the banking system.  There is no clear 
definition of Yemeni Banking law and the Commercial Code actively favors the 
borrower.
20. Egypt
Egypt gained its full independence from the United Kingdom in 1952 (CIA, 2015). It 
is the largest Arab country and, in modern times, has played a central role in Middle 
Eastern politics in modern times. Overall, Egypt has a low level of economic 
development. To a large extent, Egypt  depends on volatile external sources of 
revenue, such as tourism, income from the Suez Canal  and monies sent back home 
from workers in Arab oil-producing countries (BTI, 2014). These revenues fluctuate 
with Egypt’s domestic situation (in the case of tourism), the global economic situation 
and labor politics in the oil-producing countries.  Since there are only a few domestic 
opportunities, these factors  makes it difficult for Egypt to overcome the most 
important socioeconomic barriers hindering its  transformation.  Furthermore, high 
levels of poverty and illiteracy and traditional gender relation patterns constrain 
economic performance (BTI, 2014). 
Egypt’s Banking sector was subject to various transformation and reforms over the 
years. There was a switch from a banking system, which was predominantly foreign 
in origin during the period from 1950 to 1960, to the banks coming under state 
ownership.  The banking system was regarded mainly as a "quasi fiscal" agency 
whose main function was to provide fund for various projects and assignments of the 
state owned enterprises and Egyptian government. The system, which prevails 
currently, is a result of several previous trials and tribulations.
The Central Bank of Egypt was established in 1960 and is based in Cairo. It regulates 
the issue of bank notes; maintains reserves to secure monetary stability; and operates 
the Egyptian currency and credit system.  In the mid-1970’s, the Egyptian banking 
sector expanded markedly spurred on by the country’s so-called open door policy. 
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This policy aimed to improve outward-looking growth with an active role for the 
private sector to promote economic performance. Since the 1990’s,  there have been 
major reforms of the country’s banking system and, nowadays, Egypt has a liberally 
modern banking system which is regulated and supervised according to 
internationally accepted standards.
21. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (UK) consists of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. At its peak in the 19th century, the British Empire covered 25% of the 
world’s land mass. The First and Second World Wars during the first half of the 20th 
century resulted in a severe reduction in the UK's global strength. The second half of 
the 20th century witnessed the UK rebuilding itself into a modern and prosperous 
European nation. 
The UK was the world's first industrialized country. Its economy remains one of the 
largest but, for many years, it was based on service industries rather than on 
manufacturing.  Regarded as one of the world’s leading trading powers and financial 
centres, the UK has the third largest European economy after Germany and France 
(The Telegraph, 2015). The service industries, particularly banking, insurance, and 
business services, are key drivers of British GDP growth. In 2008, due to the 
importance of its financial sector the UK economy was hit particularly hard by the 
global financial crisis. The global financial crisis, the reductions in domestic house  
prices and high consumer debts and the  compounded the UK’s economic problems 
and pushed its  economy into recession in the latter half of 2008 (CIA, 2015).
The Bank of England, founded in 1694, serves as the UK’s Central Bank.  In addition 
to managing sterling, the UK’s currency, the Bank of England provides banking 
services to the UK Government and to other banks and financial institutions 
(Bloomberg, 2015). It operates, also, the UK’s Real Time Gross Settlement system for 
payments and securities (Bloomberg, 2015). The Bank of England serves as a 
representative for the UK HM Treasury in handling the United Kingdom’s foreign 
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currency assets and liabilities, and gold (Bloomberg, 2015). The Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) is responsible for ensuring that financial markets work fairly.
A small number of very large banks including Barclays, the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), Lloyds, and HSBC, influences the UK banking sector. In term of the value of 
assets, the market is clearly oligopolistic. The British banking sector went more   
concentrated, from 1401 to 1736, following the financial turmoil 2007-2009. The 
banking H-H Index increased from 1401 in 2007 to 1736 in 2010 (OFT, 2010)
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for different regions and countries based on total assets (in USD millions)
Region/Country Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum No. Year Obs. No. of Banks
ISB CB T ISB CB T ISB CB T ISB CB T ISB CB T ISB CB T
MENA 4334.52 6783.95 5233.24 5731.73 9808.81 7085.54 12.10 44.50 12.10 71302.03 92085.36 92085.36 382 324 706 61 50 111
UAE 8616.12 8351.99 8476.58 7874.02 7815.84 7806.99 278.12 1304.21 278.12 25967.24 25765.01 25967.24 50 56 106 8 8 16
Bahrain 1724.63 4804.15 2738.62 3373.13 6935.22 5035.36 12.10 44.50 12.10 19055.10 29954.00 29954.00 110 54 164 17 8 25
Egypt 3499.65 3855.67 3677.66 1702.05 2454.31 2080.38 1287.10 706.43 706.43 6514.77 6854.90 6854.90 14 14 28 2 2 4
Iraq 323.25 361.92 343.94 213.36 303.64 263.19 55.22 59.95 55.22 884.91 1115.48 1115.48 20 23 43 4 4 8
Jordan 1592.33 1921.83 1757.08 1308.61 1024.87 1172.82 160.74 723.84 160.74 4254.23 3732.82 4254.23 21 21 42 3 3 6
Kuwait 10217.46 28892.78 15664.43 15852.43 17397.64 18268.86 482.47 10089.23 482.47 52287.70 58408.61 58408.61 34 14 48 5 2 7
Lebanon 161.11 329.02 245.06 76.08 169.59 153.76 54.91 143.01 54.91 257.49 554.35 554.35 8 8 16 2 2 4
Qatar 8418.97 11082.55 9783.24 5396.25 5475.95 5535.49 2307.12 1840.03 1840.03 20107.72 21988.41 21988.41 20 21 41 3 3 6
Saudi A. 19219.13 26113.47 22793.97 19104.48 25822.60 22889.86 3012.39 4195.70 3012.39 71302.03 92085.36 92085.36 26 28 54 4 4 8
Sudan 666.74 687.14 677.62 469.60 932.79 749.12 220.97 68.22 68.22 1870.48 3363.18 3363.18 42 48 90 7 8 15
Syria 641.67 875.39 773.77 561.72 524.50 541.45 149.68 193.76 149.68 1650.72 1998.06 1998.06 10 13 23 2 2 4
Tunisia 490.78 362.72 426.75 97.92 108.97 119.28 352.40 222.30 222.30 597.10 508.50 597.10 6 6 12 1 1 2
Yemen 776.86 552.76 673.43 636.73 265.70 507.71 86.58 208.22 86.58 2094.62 1335.33 2094.62 21 18 39 3 3 6
E. Asia &Pac 1714.93 2453.20 2112.94 1980.24 3340.60 2701.76 1.24 21.35 1.24 29896.48 27480.11 29896.48 131 155 286 22 23 45
Indonesia 1777.78 1714.43 1743.00 1683.51 1640.20 1643.41 39.56 171.74 39.56 5608.00 6110.67 6110.67 23 28 51 4 4 8
Malaysia 4473.58 7357.18 6024.20 4709.74 7510.32 6517.77 82.51 306.75 82.51 29896.48 27480.11 29896.48 98 114 212 16 17 33
Philippines 13.02 46.89 31.49 10.84 19.63 23.50 1.24 21.35 1.24 25.49 68.02 68.02 5 6 11 1 1 2
Singapore 595.36 694.29 653.07 152.71 108.31 132.19 366.40 544.86 366.40 735.20 851.25 851.25 5 7 12 1 1 2
S. Asia 829.40 1122.76 974.04 568.08 440.23 507.05 20.61 12.19 12.19 5905.57 5977.87 5977.87 91 89 180 13 13 26
Bangladesh 1231.09 1434.06 1332.57 1386.50 1444.36 1410.87 140.49 90.80 90.80 5905.57 5977.87 5977.87 42 42 84 6 6 12
Pakistan 427.71 811.47 615.50 599.43 898.17 780.61 20.61 12.19 12.19 2825.28 3203.37 3203.37 49 47 96 7 7 14
EU &C. Asia 3133.65 4290.28 3787.48 3882.37 5015.34 4548.25 11.10 12.68 11.10 1639.51 15281.33 15281.33 53 62 115 8 9 17
UK 388.40 743.90 571.38 431.67 918.98 741.35 11.10 12.68 11.10 1639.51 3575.79 3575.79 33 35 68 5 5 10
Turkey 5878.90 7836.66 7003.57 2840.50 4111.17 3720.63 1768.50 1419.69 1419.69 12107.30 15281.33 15281.33 20 27 47 3 4 7
Total 3387.36 5182.39 4095.57 5180.00 6502.28 6075.67 1.24 12.19 1.24 71302.03 92085.36 92085.36 657 630 1287 104 95 199
Note: Size is measured by total assets. The sample consists of 199 banks covering 21 countries from 4 regions. Middle East & North Africa (MENA): United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. East Asia & Pacific (E.Asia&Pac): Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. South Asia 
(S.Asia): Bangladesh and Pakistan. Europe and Central Asia (EU & C. Asia): The United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey. The data are extracted from BankScope database for 7 years from 2006 to 
2012 inclusive. Fore descriptive statistcs based on Logarithm Total Assets (Ln TA) see Appendix 4
Based on table 4.3 and Appendix 3, it can be seen that the majority of banks among 
the top ten banks are from the MENA countries, particularly from the GCC. In other 
words, nine of the ten biggest Islamic banks, in terms of assets, are from the GCC 
(UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait). These Countries are considered 
wealthy since their economies depend majorly on oil export. Bank efficiency in this 
region, MENA, is expected to have a positive association with bank size, thus, taking
advantage of economies of scale by sharing costs in the production process.
Chapter Summary 
The chapter examined the socio-economic backgrounds and the banking history of the 
21 countries covered by this research. Moreover, It presents how each country’s 
banking system developed over time and the role played by the each country’s 
government policies and regulations in the establishment of both foreign and domestic 
banks. The chapter has shown, also, the existence of diversity in Islamic banking and 
in the financial sectors of those countries that operated  Islamic banking. Countries, 
which operated Islamic banking, ranged from less developed to developed economies 
and they had different socio-economic and political backgrounds. Although most of 
these countries required sustenance for Islamic banking and, more specifically,
countries, like Malaysia, developed and promoted legal forms and financial 
institutions for both conventional and Islamic banking.
104
Chapter 5 Research Methodology and Data
This study examines a cross-sectional data assembled from the financial reports of 
199 banks in 21 countries. These countries represent all the countries that host all the 
world’s Islamic banks. The countries include Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Great Britain, Indonesia,  Iraq,  Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and 
Yemen. 
We used the Bankscope database to assemble the data for this study covering the 
entire period from 2006 to2012. We were unable to find earlier data because of the 
restructuring of the BankScope database based on the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) which were adopted from 2006 to replace the many 
different national accounting standards.  We based our selection of the sample period 
on the following two factors: (i) Collection of the greatest term of BankScope 
financial data available for Islamic banks under the IFRS; and (ii) Assessment of the 
banks’ performance during the financial turmoil (2007-2009). 
The data, which we used in this research, is mainly the banks’ balance sheets and 
income statements available from the BankScope database developed by Bureau Van 
Dijk. BankScope presents the financial details in the original currencies of the 
individual countries. It gives, also, the option to convert the financial value of the 
currency to any other currency including US Dollars. In this study, we used the US 
Dollars-based values for the given sample. 
This study employed the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and the Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) estimator with the Random Effects (RE) model. This section 
outlines the DEA approach, and it reports the input and output variables selected for 
this study.
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5.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
Efficiency is among the factors that evaluate an organization’s performance (Matias et 
al., 2009).  Normally, efficiency is measured as the ratio of outputs to inputs (Porcelli, 
2009). However, this formula usually becomes inconsistent when there are numerous 
inputs and outputs associated with different resources, activities and environmental 
factors (John, 2014). This method, which Farrel (1957) addressed and  developed 
further by Farrel and Fieldhouse (1962), is able to measure the comparative efficiency 
when there are several possible disproportionate inputs and outputs. This method 
focuses on constructing a theoretical efficient unit as a weighted average of efficient 
units in order to perform as a benchmark for an inefficient unit.  This representation is 
written as the ratio of the weighted sum of outputs to the weighted sum of inputs 
(Matias et al., 2009). Afterwards, Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) issued the 
original DEA (hereafter referred to as the CCR model), under input-oriented and 
constant returns  in order to scale (CRS) presumptions; and to compute the efficiency 
of each Decision-Making Unit (DMU) acquired as a minimum of a ratio of weighted 
inputs to weighted outputs (Input orientation) (Coelli et al., 2005). 
The DEA Input-oriented approach attempts to maximize the relative reduction in 
input variables while staying within the envelopment space (Murillo-Zamorano, 
2004). This denotes that the fewer inputs consumed to produce the given outputs, the 
higher the efficiency of the production technology (Sufian, 2004). A restriction is 
imposed on the calculation whereby the similar ratios for every DMU have to be less 
than or equal to unity (i.e. equals 1) (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004). This restriction is 
applied in order to determine the adequate weights for the DMU ratio (Murillo-
Zamorano, 2004). This representation of efficiency enables the calculation of multiple 
outputs and inputs  without the need to predefine any weights (Sufian and Abdul 
Majid, 2007). Moreover, it computes numerous inputs and outputs in a way where 
both are reduced by virtual weights to a single virtual input and a single virtual output 
(Sufian and Abdul Majid, 2007). Consequently, the estimated efficiency measure is 
represented as a a function of the multipliers of the virtual input–output combination 
(Sufian, 2007). 
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The DEA is a linear programming method that transforms several disproportionate 
inputs and outputs of each DMU into a scalar measure of operational efficiency, 
relative to its peer DMUs (Kumar and Gulati, 2008).  DEA recognizes the peer DMUs 
for an individual DMU and, then, measures the DMU’s efficiency by comparing it to 
the benchmarking DMUs (i.e. efficient DMUs) (Kumar and Gelati, 2008). Among one 
of the DEA’s common advantages is the ability to compare different sized banks with 
reference to a common frontier without requiring presumption of any specific 
functional form (Casu and Girardone, 2010). In other words, the DEA does not need 
to predefine a production technology in order to measure the DMU’s efficiency 
(Pasiouras, 2008). This is considered a significant feature since there is no need to 
deal with any potential misspecifications due to an inconvenient functional form 
(Pasiouras, 2008). 
In addition to the advantages of DEA mentioned above, the following three more 
useful features make it an effective approach when measuring efficiency (Sufian, 
2007): 
(i) Every DMU in the sample is given a single efficiency score that allows the 
DMU to be classified from the least efficient to the most efficient (Sufian and
Abdul Majid, 2008).
(ii) DEA points out the improvement, which took place for each DMU, by 
identifying any excessive use of inputs or any deficient production of outputs 
(Sufian, 2007).
(iii) DEA may provide a conclusive profile about the performance of each 
DMU. 
The DEA is based on an assessment between the efficiency of each DMU relative to 
benchmark set which is called, also, the reference set. This set includes the sample’s 
efficient banks (Sufian and Abdul Majid, 2008). One should be aware that the 
employed technique is a comparison between the production performances of each 
DMU to a set of efficient DMUs. The set of efficient DMUs is called the reference set 
(Sufian and Abdul Majid, 2008). A DMU, which is presented more than others in this 
set, is referred to as a global leader (Sufian, 2007). This may provide a significant idea 
on a particular entity position in the market (Sufian and Abdul Majid, 2008).    
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On the other hand, a major drawback of the DEA is that it does not account for 
random error (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In other words, it presumes that there is   
neither an estimation error in creating the efficient frontier or a presence of luck that 
provisionally provides a DMU with a better estimated efficiency one year from the 
next (Harker and Zenios, 2000). Additionally, DEA does not consider the 
inaccuracies, initiated by accounting rules, which would make studied outputs and 
inputs divergent from the economic outputs and inputs (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
These errors may be a serious problem if present in one of the entities that rest on the 
efficient frontier. Consequently, they may change the estimated efficiencies of all the 
DMUs; these are compared to either this particular DMU or the reference set 
containing this DMU (Harker and Zenios, 2000). Another disadvantage of the DEA is 
that it is significantly sensitive to outlying observations where one observation may 
alter the efficiency frontier (Wagenvoort and Schure, 1999).  Furthermore, unlike 
SFA, DEA does not consider the panel nature of the data used in a study (Harker and 
Zenios, 2000). 
The fundamental DEA model extends into a two-stage DEA in order to account for 
environmental variables. In this context, the term environmental variables refer to the 
conditions that can influence an entity’s efficiency (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). These 
conditions are not regarded as conventional inputs and cannot be controlled by the 
bank management (Fried et al., 1995). These variables can be employed through 
numerous methods in the DEA. In line with Coelli et al. (1998); Sufian (2011); 
Molyneux et al. (2013); Johnes et al. (2014), we adopt the two-step DEA approach in 
this study.
This approach’s first step includes measuring each DMU’s efficiency scores by 
including traditional inputs and outputs in the DEA (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). In 
the second step, the efficiency scores, computed in the first stage, are regressed 
against the environmental variables (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). The signs of the 
coefficients, associated with the explanatory variables (i.e. ban and country-specific 
variables), present the direction of their impact on bank efficiency. The second-step 
analysis, which includes categorical variables, is implemented by employing the 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator with the random effects model. 
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5.1.1 DEA- Input and Output orientation
The envelopment surface and the efficient projection path to the envelopment analysis 
form the main constructs of the DEA (Charnes et al., 1995). The output or input-
orientation models deduce the projection path to the envelope surface (Pascoe et al., 
2003). The selection of input or output-oriented models relies on the production 
process distinguishing the entity (Pascoe et al., 2003). Hence, DEA is initiated by 
using two different methods: either input-orientated DEA or output-orientated DEA 
(Mostafa, 2009). An input-orientated approach determines the proportional reduction 
of inputs needed for an inefficient bank to become DEA-efficient while keeping 
constant the current levels of outputs constant (Kumar and Gulati, 2013). On the other 
hand, an output-orientated approach shows the level of outputs which an inefficient 
bank requires to produce in order to become DEA-efficient while keeping constant the 
current amount of inputs (Kumar and Gulati, 2013). Both oriented approaches always 
have the same values under the CRS assumption whereas distinct values are present 
when the VRS model is presumed (Duygun-Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). According to 
Coelli, et al. (2005), the choice of the appropriate orientation is insignificant since it is 
in the case of econometric estimation. Consequently, the selection of the orientation 
approach has a slightly greater impact on the computed efficiency scores (Coelli and 
Perelman, 1996). We employed the input-orientation approach in this study since the 
bank manager’s main target is to control costs rather output production (Iqbal and
Molyneux, 2005). The bank’s focus on cost control and the fact that outputs tend to be 
demand-determined has resulted in making the input-oriented approach  the most 
frequently used approach in studying bank performance (Kumbhakar and Lozano 
Vivas, 2005).
5.1.2 Bootstrap technique (Re-sampling)
The definition of re-sampling is a mixture of techniques for statistical properties. The 
various main re-sampling methods, employed in the literature reviews, include the 
bootstrap, the cross-validation, and the Jackknife (Brombin and Salmaso, 2009).  The 
concepts of bootstrap, cross-validation and Jackknife are similar (Yu, 2003). 
However, bootstrap overcomes the two other mentioned techniques since it is a more 
methodical procedure in the sense that, relative to the other two, it initiates additional 
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sub-samples (Yu, 2003). According to Yu (2003), when compared to the Jackknife 
technique, the bootstrap technique yields less biased and more reliable outcomes. Xue 
and Harker (1999) raised a theoretical issue about DEA. They identified a theoretical 
problem with DEA in that it produced efficiency scores statistically dependent on 
each other. The reason behind this dependency is that efficiency scores are a relative 
index rather than an absolute index (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). The dependency, 
which exists among DEA-estimated efficiency scores, violates the principal of 
independency-within-sample presumed by regression analysis (Casu and Molyneux, 
2003). Consequently, according to Casu and Molyneux (2003), the traditional two-
stage DEA procedure, employed in previous studies, is considered to be invalid. 
Alternatively, they suggest bootstrap as a re-sampling technique to overcome this 
problem (Casu and Molyneux, 2003).
The bootstrap technique, developed by Efron (1979), is a computer-based method for 
setting statistical properties to estimated measures (Efron and Tibshirani, 1985). 
Simar (1992) was probably the first to initiate the bootstrap technique for calculating 
confidence intervals for efficiency scores resulting from a non-parametric approach 
(Casu and Molyneux, 2003). Ever since then, the bootstrap technique was used  
frequently to provide statistical inferences to efficiency scores for each observation in 
the sample (Atkinson and Wilson, 1995).  Recently, some  studies , for instance 
Tortosa-Ausina etal. (2008); Matthews etal. (2009); Lee etal. (2010); Arjomandi 
etal. (2011); Assaf etal. (2011); Moradi-Motlagh etal. (2012a); and Moradi-
Motlagh and Saleh (2014), used the bootstrap DEA method to study the productivity 
and efficiency of banks in a number of countries.
We extracted from Johnes’ (2006) study’s bootstrapping procedure which is 
summarize below. The vector of v inputs, employed by DMU i (i = 1 …, n), is 
indicated by  x?	and the vector of w outputs, used by the DMU, is represented by y?
(Johnes, 2006). The steps (Johnes, 2006) include: 
Step 1: Compute the efficiency scores for the group of DMUs and reproduce the data: 
DEA is implemented to the defined data on inputs and outputs in order to obtain an 
efficiency score for each DMU in the sample, and this is represented by D? (x?, y?) 
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(Johnes, 2006). These measures are reproduced around unity by calculating 2 −D? (x?,y?) for each D? (x?,y?), j = 1 …, n, providing 2n observations in total (Johnes, 
2006).
Step 2: Obtain bootstrap values
a) Create a bandwidth b in order to employ it in the extraction of the bootstrap values 
(refer to Simar and Wilson 1998 for additional details on initiating the bandwidth) 
(Johnes, 2006).
b) Derive n separately and similarly distributed observations (denoted by ε?		∗ ,	where 
j= 1..., n) from the probability density function employed as the kernel distribution 
(the uniform distribution in this case) (Johnes, 2006). 
c) Deduce n values (denoted by	d?,	where j =1..., n) separately and consistently from 
the group of 2n represented distance function measures (Johnes, 2006). Based on 
these, estimate the mean (Johnes, 2006):d?= ∑ d?	??? ? /n          (Eq.1)
And d?		∗ = d? + ? 1/(1 + 	b? /w? ) (	d? + bε? - d?)               (Eq.2)
Where w? is the sample variance of 	v?= d j + bε?.
d) Compute the bootstrap values (D? ?∗) as (Johnes, 2006)
D? ?∗= ? d?∗	if	d?∗ ≤ 1	2 − d?∗	or	else          (Eq.3)
Step 3: Identify the pseudo data and acquire the bootstrap measures of the efficiencies
Identify a pseudo data collection by input and output vectors (represented by (x?		∗ , y?		∗ )) 
as (Johnes, 2006):
x?		∗ = 	x?                                                (Eq.4)y?		∗ = D?∗ y? /	D? (x?? 	y?)                           (Eq.5)
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Derive a value of B (B = 500) which is employed in the analysis of section 6.1) 
bootstrap measures of the efficiency score for each DMU j (j = 1… , n) by 
implementing DEA to the pseudo data B times (Johnes, 2006). These bootstrap 
estimates can be represented for DMU l by {D? ? 		∗	 (x?, y?)}? ? ?? .
Step 4: Calculate predicted confidence intervals for the efficiency scores 
The 100  (1 −α) % confidence interval for the right efficiency for DMU l) is computed 
by deriving the valuesb? 	and a? 	as follows: 
Pb (−b? 	≤ D? (x?? 	y?) – D (x?? 	y?) ≤−a? 	) = 1 – α                                 (Eq.6)
The values	b? 	and  a? 	 are unidentified but are computed from the bootstrap measures 
{D? ? 		∗	 (x?, y?)}? ? ?? by organizing the values D? ? 		∗	 (x?, y?) − 	D	(x?? 	y?)	 in ascending order 
and removing (100α /2) % of the observations at every end of this list (Johnes, 2006). 
Therefore, the measures of	−	b? 	, −a? 	 (represented by −b?? 	and−a?? 	) are the 
endpoints of the residual collection of values such that a?? 	≤b?? 	 (Johnes, 2006). 
Consequently, the bootstrap estimate of equation (Eq.6) is:
Pb (−b?? 	≤ D? (x?? 	y?) – D (x?? 	y?) ≤−a?? 	) = 1 – α     
And, thus, the estimated 100(1 −α) % confidence interval for the efficiency score of 
DMU l is determined by calculated (Johnes, 2006):  
[	D? (x?? 	y?) +   a?? 	, D? (x?? 	y?) + b?? 	]                        
5.1.3 DEA- CRS and VRS models
The envelopment surface varies depending on the scale assumptions  supporting the 
model.  Usually, the following two scale presumptions are used: Constant Returns to 
Scale (CRS) and Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) (Pascoe et al., 2003). CRS 
considers that outputs will vary by an equivalent change in the amounts of the inputs   
(e.g. a doubling of inputs will consequently double outputs). On the other hand, VRS 
represents the fact that a firm can have production technology that may show 
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increasing, constant and declining returns to scale (Pascoe et al., 2003). The CCR 
model makes the CRS assumption which considers that there is no major correlation 
between the scale of operations (or firm size) and Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE) 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The efficiency, derived from the CCR model, 
represents the OTE (Rosman et al., 2014).  The CRS supposition is merely valid when 
the entire DMUs in the sample are working at an optimal scale (Rosman et al., 2014). 
However, in real life, this optimal performance does not happen frequently because of 
numerous conditions such as imperfect competition, dissimilarity of market power, 
restricts on finances etc. (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004). Consequently, operating DMUs 
may encounter either economies or diseconomies of scale (Rosman et al., 2014). 
Accordingly, if we presume the CRS-DEA model when the DMUs are not running 
entirely on the optimal scale, the estimated OTE scores will be biased by scale 
efficiency (Rosman et al., 2014). This significant weakness is rectified by Färe, 
Grosskopf and Lovell (1983), Byrnes, Färe and Grosskopf (1984), and Banker 
Charnes and Cooper (1984) who extended DEA to include the Variable Returns to 
Scale (VRS) model (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004).  The VRS-DEA model is employed 
by counting the convexity restriction Σµj=1 to the CRS-DEA model (Murillo-
Zamorano, 2004). Consequently, this basic constraint ensures that every DMU is 
compared with counterparts of homogenous size (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004). This 
method prevents the detrimental effect of scale efficiency on the estimated OTE 
scores (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004). 
The consequential model, called the BCC model and extended by Banker et al. 
(1984), is used to evaluate the efficiency of the DMU based on VRS. Under the VRS 
assumption, the computed efficiency represents the Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE); 
this is the measurement of technical efficiency free from the influence of scale 
efficiency (Rosman et al., 2014). Any existing difference between a specific DMU’s 
OTE and PTE scores reveals the presence of scale inefficiency (Rosman et al., 2014). 
It should be mentioned that Coelli et al. (1998) reported that, since the beginning of 
the 1990’s, BCC was the most commonly used model. 
A bank can run either under CRS or VRS assumptions.  The CRS approach means 
that an increase in inputs leads to a proportionate increase in outputs (Berger and 
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Humphrey, 1997). On the other hand, VRS signifies that an increase in inputs 
generates an unbalanced increase in outputs (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). A bank 
following VRS approach can be exhibiting additionally either IRS or DRS (Rosman et 
al., 2014). IRS denotes that an increase in inputs leads to a superior increase in 
outputs, whereas DRS states that a growth in inputs ends up in a smaller increase in 
outputs (Noor et al., 2010). Moreover, IRS implies that a DMU can become more 
efficient by increasing the production of outputs whereas DRS suggest that a 
reduction in the scale of production increases efficiency (Kumar and Gulati, 2008). 
The normal method to compute scale efficiency is by running both DEA models CRS 
and VRS. Afterwards, Scale efficiency is determined by dividing the CRS-efficiency 
scores by the VRS-efficiency scores for each DMU (Rosman et al., 2014). The 
efficiency scores derived from the VRS are normally higher since the DMU points are 
enveloped tighter (Sufian, 2006). Hence, the scale efficiency scores will range 
between 0 and 1 (Sufian, 2006). An advantageous attribute of comparing the DEA-
VRS model to the DEA-CRS model is that it reveals the operating mode of a DMU 
(i.e. IRS or CRS or DRS) (Sufian, 2006).  The constant returns to scale approach is  
used when the slope of the efficient frontier and the ratio of inputs to outputs are 
equal (Kumar and Gulati, 2008). This happens when the CRS efficient frontier is 
tangential to the VRS efficient frontier (Cooper et al., 2000). On the other hand, IRS 
is deployed when the slope of the efficient frontier is superior to the average rate of 
conversion (Rosman et al., 2014). In other words, it is used when it is below the level 
on which CRS is applicable (Sufian, 2006). Moreover, the DRS approach is exercised 
above the level at which CRS is considered applicable (Sufian, 2006). DMUs, which 
are not found on the efficient frontier, must be predicted primarily against the efficient 
frontier prior to the determination of their returns to scale mode (Rosman et al., 2014).
5.2 Measurement of Overall Technical, Pure Technical, and Scale Efficiencies
As explained earlier, we can observe from two angles Technical efficiency (TE), 
derived from DEA (Coelli, 1996b). Firstly, under the input-orientation approach, TE 
examines the feasibility of reducing inputs to generate a specified amount of outputs 
(Kumar and Gulati, 2008). Secondly, under the output orientation, TE views the 
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potential growth in outputs for a particular set of inputs (Kumar and Gulati, 2008). 
We can measure a DMU’s TE by dividing the actual amount of outputs with the 
maximum potential outputs on the assumption of the output-orientation. Alternatively, 
under the input-orientation, we can determine TE by calculating the ratio of minimum 
potential inputs to the actual inputs. In order to determine an estimate of TE, we have 
to find the variance between actual production and potential production on the 
possible production set (Kumar and Gulati, 2008). This set represents the entire 
potential production technology of converting an entity’s available inputs into outputs. 
An entity or a DMU is considered to be technically efficient if its production exists 
inside this particular technology set. A DMU is technically inefficient if production 
occurs within the interior of this production set (Kumar and Gulati, 2008). As 
mentioned previously, we can measure the Scale Efficiency (SE) by comparing the 
OTE and the PTE results from CRS and VRS approaches respectively. The OTE, 
derived from DEA-CRS approach, computes inefficiency related to the input and 
output configuration and the scale of operations (Kumar and Gulati, 2008). However, 
the PTE, derived from DEA-VRS approach, determines inefficiency related merely to 
managerial underperformance (Avkiran, 1999). SE is calculated by dividing OTE by 
PTE. 
In DEA, TE can have a value which ranges between zero and one inclusive. A value, 
which is close to zero, signifies that a DMU is more inefficient whereas a value of one 
means that DMU is entirely efficient. For instance, a value of 0.8 indicates that a bank 
is 80% efficient relative to its best-performing peers and that the same amount of 
outputs could be produced by employing a 20% smaller amount of inputs.
Under the input-oriented assumption, the DEA-VRS approach can be written in the 
linear programming equation below (see for example, Murillo-Zamorano, 2004):
Min φ, λ, φ        (Eq. 1)
subject to − φ? ? + Yλ, ≥0? ? – Xλ ≥ 0
N1' λ=1
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And λ ≥ 0  
where,
λ is an N × 1 density vector of constants and φ is a scalar (1 ≥ φ ≤ ∞). N1 is an N × 1 
vector of ones (see for example, Coelli, 1996). For N number of banks, yi represents 
the M × N output vectors and ?? represents the K × N input vectors. Y consists of the 
data for all the N banks. Given a fixed level of inputs for the ith firm, the 
corresponding growth in outputs to be attained by the bank is represented by φ − 1. 
Eq. (1), representing VRS approach, turns into a DEA-CRS model if the convexity 
constraint N1′ λ = 1 is not counted (Coelli, 1996). This restraint, imposed on DEA, 
suggests that there is an assessment of an inefficient bank  against other banks of 
similar size. As a result, the predicted point for that bank on the DEA frontier is a 
convex combination of the examined banks (Sufian, 2006). It is considred that  a 
bank operates at CRS if TE scores are the same with or without the convexity 
constraint imposed on DEA. On the other hand, a bank operates at VRS if these TE 
scores are dissimilar (Sufian, 2006). The operating mode, at which a DMU should 
follow to become efficient, needs to be defined. Therefore, one should determine 
whether the bank operates  at IRS or DRS (Sufian, 2006).This is done by presuming a 
Non-Increasing Returns to Scale (NIRS) model is applied in Eq.(1) and the convexity 
constraint N1′ λ = 1 is replaced by N1′ λ ≤ 1. This is shown in the following equation 
(Sufian, 2006):
Min φ, λ, φ                   (Eq. 2)
Subject to −? ? −Yλ, ≥0,
φ?? – Xλ ≥ 0,
N1'λ ≤ 1
λ ≥ 0.
The outcome of Eq. (2) discloses the mode of the SE (IRS or DRS). If the TE scores, 
derived from the NIRS model, are different from the PTE resulting from the VRS 
model then the particular bank is operating with IRS. On the other hand, it is 
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considered that the given bank  operates with DRS if the NIRS-efficiency scores and 
PTE are equal (Sufian, 2006; Rosman, et al., 2014). 
As discussed earlier, OTE is used to determine inefficiency resulting from pure 
technical inefficiency due to managerial deficiency and scale inefficiency as a result 
of the incorrect choice of scale size (Kumar and Gulati, 2008).   On the other hand, 
unlike OTE, the PTE, obtained from the BCC model, is not influenced by the DMU 
scale/size. Consequently, the PTE shows that entire inefficiency is only due to 
inappropriate management practices and misplaced selection of input combination 
(Kumar and Gulati, 2008). 
A non-parametric DEA is employed by applying both CCR and BCC models in order 
to derive OTE and PTE scores under CRS and VRS  assumptions respectively. These 
models are used to determine the input-oriented efficiency (OTE, PTE and SE) of the 
Islamic banks when compared to their conventional counterparts at the global level.
In line with the studies conducted by Charnes et al. (1990); Bhattacharyya, Lovell and 
Sahay (1997) and Sathye (2001); Hassan and Hussein (2003); Hassan (2005); Sufian 
(2006); Sufian et al. (2008); Mokhtar et al. (2008); Casu and Girardone, (2009);
Johnes et al. (2014); and Rosman et al. (2014), the intermediation approach was 
applied to the selection of inputs and outputs used in the DEA first-stage of this 
research study. An additional reason for adopting the intermediation approach rather 
than the production approach is that the latter is more appropriate to study the 
efficiency of branches which are involved mainly in handling customer documents 
and bank funding (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).
5.4 First stage analysis: estimation of efficiencies
We based our selection of the variables used for determining TE via DEA approach  
on previous studies and the availability of the data. Appendix 4 shows the frequency 
of the use of variables in previous researches. We assumed that the banks   performed 
as an intermediary between deficit units (borrowers) and surplus units (depositors) 
(Pasiouras, 2008) and that they used:
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i. Deposits and short-term funding
ii. Fixed assets
iii. Personnel expenses,
as inputs to produce:
i. Net loans 
ii. Net income (Net profit)
as outputs.
This study examines three inputs and two outputs in order to observe the efficiency of 
Islamic banks versus their conventional counterparts at the global level during the 
period from 2006 to 2012. The inputs include deposits and short-term funding, fixed 
assets, and personnel expenses whereas the outputs comprise net loans and net 
income. We initiated the efficiency frontier by implementing an unbalanced sample of 
104 Islamic banks and 95 conventional counterparts (= 199 Banks) operating in 21 
countries over the period. This yielded 1125 bank year observations.  We derived data 
for the seven years  from the BankScope database, and the variables, which we used 
in the study, are shown in millions of US dollars. Moreover, based on BankScope, 
these variables were deflated against the inflation rates of their own countries. We 
excluded observations with non-positive net income and partially available data (less 
than 4 years financial data). Moreover, we excluded from this study Iran – which is 
considered to be  a leading country for Islamic banking and finance and which has the 
highest number of Islamic banks in the world- because  its banking system consists 
entirely of banks that conform only to Islamic laws.
Appendix 4 shows the frequency of Inputs and Outputs, which were used in previous 
literature reviews. 
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Figure 5.1: Detailed conceptual frameworkdetermining the impact of macroeconomics variables 
(country-specific factors) and financial variables (Bank-specific factors) on pure technical 
efficiency (PTE).
       Inputs Outputs
Source: Own Figure 
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Based on the input and output-used frequency table (see Appendix 4), the most-used 
inputs in previous literature are employees, labor, physical capital, capital, and 
personnel expenses. Employees and labor are different terms with the same 
meaningwhich reflect the number of workers contributing in the production process. 
However, "personnel expenses" input is used as an alternative to employee/ labor 
since, while both are used to extract the required monetary-value inputs, there is no 
readily available data on either the number of workers or the cost for working hours. 
Physical capital and capital have the same meaning to describe the "fixed assets" input 
which we used as a variable input variable in our study.  In the study, we used fixed 
assets as a replacement for the capital input and we employed personnel expenses as a 
proxy for labor.  Although personnel expenses may not be an ideal representation of 
labor,  they are assumed to provide a better measure than others like employee 
numbers or wage expenditures since it is easy to access (Johnes et al., 2014). 
Moreover, it was used as a proxy for labor in previous literature such as Locano-
Vivas et al. (2002), Drake and Hall (2003), Staub et al. (2010), Chortareas et al. 
(2012), and Johnes et al. (2014). The last input, which we used for measuring 
efficiency, is "deposits and short-term funding". Apart of being one of the most-used 
inputs in previous researches, we selected "deposit and short-term funding" as an 
input for the DEA conducted under the intermediation approach. As stated previously, 
this approach considers the financial institutions to have an intermediary role of 
channeling funds between depositors and borrowers (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
The funds (inputs) available to finance the production of banks, i.e., financial 
instruments (outputs), are represented mostly by deposits and short-term funding.
The two selected outputs, which we included in the DEA, are "net loans" and "net 
income" (or net profit). We selected "Net loans" as one of the two outputs for 
determining the bank efficiency because it was the most frequently used output in 
previous researches under the intermediation approach (see Appendix 4). Islamic 
banks provide loans differently than conventional banks, and "net loans" is a broad 
term chosen to include the equity financing products which they initiate (Johnes et al, 
2014). Moreover, conventional and Islamic banks generate money from loans in 
different ways. While conventional banks depend on the spread between  the lending 
return rate and borrowing cost rate to earn money, Islamic banks count on the profit 
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and loss sharing ratio between the entrepreneurs or investors and the depositors 
(Johnes et al., 2014).  Another significant reason, why we selected "net loans" as an 
output for our efficiency analysis, was because loans dominated the financial 
instruments issued by banks and were the major source of earnings for banks. We did 
not select either "Number of transactions" or "deposits" because these entries were 
outputs when conducting the DEA under the production approach. 
The DEA is sensitive to the number of variables selected as inputs and outputs 
(Mostafa, 2009). The greater the number of variables included in the DEA the lower 
is the capability to differentiate between the DMUs (Mostafa, 2009). According to 
Smith (1997), the more variables used, the higher the probability of influencing a 
number of inefficient DMUs and changing them to be efficient. Therefore, the number 
of variables should remain at a rational level in order to maintain the DEA’s 
preferential advantage (Mostafa, 2009). Galagedera and Silvapulle (2003) claimed 
that no analytic examinations for model misspecification in DEA resulted from the 
wrong selection of the variables. However, as provided by Raab and Lichty (2002), 
there is a general rule that recommends that the minimum number of DMUs should 
be greater than three times the number of inputs plus outputs. Based on this principle, 
the minimum recommended set for this study should be 15 DMUs and, with 199 
DMUs, this study is consistent with this rule.  Cooper et al. (2007) suggested an 
additional rule written as follows:  n ≥ max {m × s; 3(m + s)} where n=number of 
DMUs, m=number of inputs and s=number of outputs. This rule suggests that the 
sample size should be greater than or equal to the product of inputs and outputs 
(Mostafa, 2009). Based on this rule, our study’s sample size should be at least 6 
DMUs. Therefore, this study’s sample size (n= 199 DMUs) is feasible and appropriate 
to determining the given banks’ TE scores. 
5.5 Second stage analysis: determinants of efficiency
In the second stage of this study, we assess the impact of the bank and country-
specific variables on Islamic and conventional banks' efficiency.  In our study, we 
define the dependent variable as the relative scores of PTE derived from the DEA-first 
stage. The value of the dependent variable (i.e. estimated PTE) ranges between 0 and 
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1 inclusive. Banks, with PTE values of less than 1, are seen as inefficient whereas 
banks with PTE values equal to 1 are considered to be efficient. The independent 
variables are the factors that can influence the given banks’ efficiency scores. This 
study considers two general factors: firstly, there are the bank-specific factors that 
represent a bank’s inner conditions or features that may influence its efficiency. 
Secondly, there are the country-specific factors that include the macro-environmental 
conditions over which bank managers have no control (Johnes et al., 2014).
In the first stage, we pooled together the given banks in order to determine each 
bank’s TE score.  We did this by computing the distance of each DMU’s efficiency 
from the efficient frontier. In the second stage, we employed the panel data technique 
in order to investigate the relationship between the banks’ efficiency and the 
explanatory variables of the 199 banks and the 21 countries.
Panel data or longitudinal data comprises a set of entities examined during several 
periods of time (Brooks, 2008). In other words, panel data is seen as a mixture of 
cross-sectional data and time series data (Brook, 2008). Panel data is written
econometrically as follows (see Brooks, 2008):
? ?? = α + β ? ?? + ? 	??
where,? ?? 	represents the dependent variable, α is the intercept term, β  and ? ?? 	are k × 1 
vectors of parameters, to be determined, and observations on the independent 
variables, respectively. Moreover, t= 1…,T and  i= 1,…,N (see for example, Brooks, 
2008).
The easiest method to handle such data is to determine a pooled regression. This 
involves the simultaneous evaluation of a single equation on the entire sample 
(Brooks, 2008).  Consequently, the observations assigned to the dependent variable 
and independent variables are each stacked up into a single column each in the y and 
x matrixes respectively.  Afterwards, this equation may be determined by employing 
the simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis model. However, this 
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traditional method suffers from significant shortcoming which assumes that the 
relationship between variables and their average values are stable over time and 
through the data set (Brooks, 2008).  Time series regression of each entity or unit can 
be determined individually. Nevertheless, this method is considered to be inadequate 
since it does not consider any common structure found in the desired series. On the 
other hand, panel data can be a convenient method for running regression analysis 
since the relationship between the variables and their movement over time can be 
observed simply. Panel data can reduce, also, the problem of multicollinearity that 
might arise from conducting time series analysis separately (Brooks, 2008). 
Moreover, panel data can be effective in eliminating the influence of the omitted 
variables bias that might exist in regression. 
Figure 5.3: Detailed conceptual framework determining the impact of macroeconomics variables 
(country-specific factors) and financial variables (Bank-specific factors) on pure technical 
efficiency (PTE).
Source: own figure
Bootstrapped 
DEA-PTE 
Scores
Generalized Least 
Square estimator 
(GLS)-Random 
Effect model
Bank-specific 
Variables
Country-specific 
Variables
? ? ? ? ? ? ?? = α + ? ? ? ?? + ? ? ? ?? + ? ? ISFCRIS + ? ? FCRIS + (? ?? +Ԑ??)
123
Panel data is divided into two models: balanced panel and unbalanced panel. The 
balanced panel data comprises N×T dimensions without any omitted observations. On 
the other hand, the unbalanced panel data includes N×T dimensions with few 
unavailable observations. Figure (5.3) presents the study’s theoretical framework. 
In panel analysis, the major challenge is to tackle the unobserved heterogeneity 
between individuals (Brooks, 2008). This problem is avoided by presuming that all 
units are distributed independently over time. Accordingly, the data is be pooled by 
employing OLS regression (Brooks, 2008). However, the estimators, derived from the 
OLS regression, are biased since unobserved heterogeneity may exist. Alternatively, 
panel data is effective and flexible in modeling and handling unobserved 
heterogeneity (Brooks, 2008). We used a fixed effects model and a random effects 
model as the two models of panel data estimators for this purpose. The fixed effects 
model permits the intercept in the regression analysis to be variable at cross-sectional 
level but constant over time (Brooks, 2008). This is done while maintaining all the 
estimates of slope constant at the temporal and cross-sectional levels.
The equation of fixed effects model for a variable yit is written as follows (Brooks, 
2008):
itiitit vxy   (Eq. 4.4)
i is considered to enclose the variables that affect yit cross-sectionally but do not vary 
over time (Brooks, 2008). Therefore, the heterogeneity, included in i, can be 
captured by employing a model that considers distinct intercepts for every cross-
sectional element. This model is computed by conducting the Least Squares Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) approach is be represented as follows (Brooks, 2008):
itiNiiiitit vDNDDDxy   321 321 (Eq. 4.5)
where, 
D1i is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 for the total observations of a specific 
individual- the first institution in the sample. Otherwise, it takes the value of 0 for 
others. D2i is, also, a dummy variable that has a value equal to 1 for the total 
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observations of a second particular individual- the second institution in the sample. 
Otherwise, it takes a value of zero and so on for the remaining dummy variables (D3, 
D4…DN). Equation 4.5 represents a standard regression model which can be 
determined using OLS estimators (Brooks, 2008).
In Equation 4.4, the estimation of N+K parameters would be difficult to determine if 
there were a large number of observed entities. Therefore, we applied a 
transformation, known as “the within transformation” in order to refrain from 
estimating too many dummy variable parameters (Brooks, 2008). This process 
requires the time-mean of each unit to be taken away from the values of the variable. 
Firstly, i=?? 	∑ y????? ? 	is identified as the time-mean of the observations on y for cross-
sectional unit i and the means of the given explanatory variables are computed 
(Brookes, 2008). Afterwards, the time-means from each variable are subtracted to 
derive a regression model consisting simply of demeaned variables. We should 
mention that now a regression does not necessitate an intercept term since, by 
construction, the dependent variable takes a mean value of zero. This particular model 
can be written as follows (Brooks, 2008): 
? ??− ӯ? = β (? ?? −? ̄?) + ? ?? – ū?  (Eq. 4.6)
	ӱ?? = βẍ?? + ü??   (Eq. 4.7)
where,
The variables with double dots represent the demeaned values. 
The Random Effects (RE) model is an alternative model to the fixed effects model. 
The RE model is referred to, also, as the error components model. Similar to the fixed 
effects estimator, the RE model defines several intercept terms for each individual 
which are constant over time. This is achieved by assuming that the relationships 
between the explanatory and explained variables are constant at cross-sectional and 
temporal levels. 
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Nevertheless, unlike the fixed effects model, the random effects model presumes that 
the intercepts for each cross-sectional unit derived from a common intercept  plus a 
random variable (Brooks, 2008). As mentioned previously, the common intercept ( )
is equal to all units at the cross-sectional and temporal levels. However, the random 
variable (I), which computes the random variation of every unit’s intercept term from 
the common intercept term (), is fixed over time (Brooks, 2008). The random effects 
model is presented as follows (Brooks, 2008):
itiitititit vxy   ,   (Eq. 4.8)
where,??? 	represents 1 × k vector of explanatory variables. In the RE model, the Ԑ?terms 
account for the heterogeneity (variation) at the cross-sectional level, instead of the 
dummy variables in the case of fixed effects model (Brooks, 2008). This structure 
assumes that the derived cross-sectional error term,Ԑ? has a mean equals to 0; has 
constant variance ? ?? ; and is independent of the explanatory variables (? ??) and the 
individual observation error term (? ?? ) (Brroks, 2008). If the OLS model is employed, 
the parameters (α and β) would be determined persistently but inefficiently.  
Moreover, the regular formulae would have to be altered since cross-correlations exist 
between error terms for a given unit at cross-sectional and temporal levels (Brooks, 
2008). Accordingly, as an alternative, a Generalized Least Squares model is employed 
usually. The conversion process, considered in the GLS model, includes the 
subtraction of a partial weighted mean of the	y?? over time (Brooks, 2008). The ‘quasi-
demeaned’ data is interpreted as ? ??∗ = ? ??− θ ӯ? and ? ??∗ = ? ??− θ ? ̄? , where ӯ? and ? ̄? are 
the means of the observations of ? ?? 	and ? ?? respectively (Brooks, 2008). θ represents 
a function of both variance of the observation error term (? ?? ) and the entity-specific 
error term (? ?? )
	? = 1 – ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? 	?    (Eq. 4.9)
Consequently, this conversion eliminates the serial correlation among error terms and 
permits the equation to be determined by using a feasible GLS estimator. This model 
is known as a RE model. Under the RE, the explanatory variables, which are constant 
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over time, are not be eliminated and, therefore, their effects on the function (	y??) are
calculated. Hence, the RE overcomes the fixed effects model in deriving better 
estimates when time-invariant variables exist (Greene, 2012).
On the other hand, the random effects estimator suffers from a main disadvantage that 
the RE model is invalid unless the components, resulting from the components of 
error term (? ??) and the explanatory variable, are uncorrelated (Brooks, 2008). This 
presumption is more rigorous than the one in the fixed effects model since the RE 
model necessitates that both Ԑ?	and v??, and any unobserved or omitted variables are 
uncorrelated with the entire explanatory variables(? ??) (Brooks, 2008). If this factor 
exists then the RE model is applied or else it would be better to employ the fixed 
effects model. 
Generally, the fixed effects model cannot be estimated when the data contain time 
invariant variables (Greene, 2012). The reason is that within the groups 
transformation, used to fit the coefficients, regression of (? ?? -	ӯ?) on (? ?? -	? ̄?) with no 
constant term produces a column of zeros for every time invariant variable. This is a 
problem of perfect collinearity since a time invariant variable is only a multiple of the 
individual specific dummy variable. The recent literature contains a thread of results 
on a Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) estimator; this argues the solution 
to the shortcoming of time-invariant variables in a fixed effects model (Plumper and 
Troeger, 2007 and 2011; Greene, 2012). However, the so-called FEVD estimator is 
not a solution to this multicollinearity problem since it reformulates the model so that 
it is essentially a RE model (Greene, 2012). 
Therefore, the RE model’s major benefit over a fixed-effect model is that it accounts 
for time-invariant features in the analysis. On the other hand, the RE estimator’s main 
drawback is that, unlike the fixed effects model, the entire composite error terms have 
to be independent of the explanatory variables.
Accordingly, since the regression analysis uses a time-invariant dummy variable, 
called ISMDUM which is included to reveal whether or not the bank is classified by 
127
BankScope as a fully-fledged Islamic bank, we chose RE over the fixed effects model 
as the parameters' estimator in this study.  
The core model is a random effects panel regression, with heteroscedasticity-adjusted 
standard errors, of the form:
? ? ?500?? = α + β? X?? + β? Z?? + β? ISFCRIS + β? FCRIS + (μ?? +Ԑ??)     (Eq. 4.10)
where,
i = 1, . . . N, symbolizes banks; t = 1, . . ., T corresponds to time; c = 1, . . ., C 
describes country; c ⊆ n. The dependent variable VRS500 denotes PTE. α is the 
intercept term and refers to the mean of the unobserved heterogeneity; ? ?? ∼ IID (0, ??? ) refers to the random heterogeneity specific to the nth bank and is fixed temporally 
(i.e. it represents the unobserved variables  which change across banks but not over 
time); Ԑ?? ∼ IID (0, ?Ԑ? ) is a distinctive error term and is uncorrelated overtime. ? ?? is 
an I × 7 matrix of bank-level explanatory variables (i.e. a vector of bank-specific 
control variables which  may affect the dependent variable) (See section 5.4.1). Z?? is 
an N × 5 matrix of country-level explanatory variables (i.e. a vector of variables 
capturing the macroeconomic conditions in the home country) (see Section 5.4.1). 
“FCrisis” is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the period of the financial 
crisis (2007-2009). ISFCRIS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for Islamic 
banks during the financial crisis (2007-2009).  
The next chapter describes the definition of the variables included in the regression 
analysis. Moreover, it examines the orientation of the relationship between PTE and 
the bank and country-specific variables.
5.5.1 Bank-specific and Country variables
This section introduces the set of potential determinants that are expected to affect the 
efficiency, particularly the PTE, of both Islamic and conventional banks. We consider 
two broad categories, namely, bank and country-specific factors. We used World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) as one of the added- value country-specific variables in 
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the regression models. This is the first time on which this estimate is used in a study 
of the determinants of efficiency, and this represents particular contribution to the 
literature review of efficiency. The index is a part of the six WGI which we collected 
from the World Bank’s official website. The WGI are the aggregate and individual 
governance indicators for six dimensions of governance used by 215 economies in the 
period from 1996 to2013 (World Bank, 2015).  These are:
 Voice and Accountability
 Political Stability and Absence of Violence
 Government Effectiveness
 Regulatory Quality
 Rule of Law
 Control of Corruption
1. Voice and Accountability (VACC) is a variable reflecting awareness of the degree 
to which a country's citizens are capable of taking part in choosing their government 
as well as freedom of expression (Kaufmann et. al., 2010). The specified indicator is 
presented in percentile rank terms among all countries (varying from the lowest rank 
(i.e. 0) to the highest rank (i.e. 100) (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The higher value 
indicates the better degree of voice and accountability degree. For instance, the less 
responsive that the government is to the people’s demands, the more likely that it will 
fall peacefully in a democratic society but, probably, would be more violent in a non-
democratic one (World Bank, 2015). This means that a significant level of VACC 
would help the banking industry to progress. Hence, there is expected to be a positive 
relationship with bank efficiency.
  
2. Control of Corruption (CORRUP) indicates the level of awareness of the public 
power executed to seek a private gain. This includes both small and main types of 
corruption, and "capture of the state” by private firms (World Bank, 2015).  The 
political corruption damages the economy and the financial system and reduces the 
efficiency of governmental and business operations by allowing people to acquire 
positions of power via favoritism (i.e. patronage) rather than through their skills and 
qualifications. It initiates, also, an intrinsic volatility into the political procedure 
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(Brink, 2004). Political volatility and corruption have been found to have a damaging 
impact on financial growth in low-income countries (Detragiache et al., 2005; 
Ayyagari et al., 2005). Accordingly, the restraint of corruption would have a positive 
influence on bank efficiency. On the other hand, Barth et al. (2004) claimed that 
excessive supervision might cause corruption and obstruct banking activities.  The 
most frequent type of corruption, encountered directly by a business, consists of 
financial corruption that includes requests for particular expenses and bribes 
associated with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax evaluations, police 
security, and loans (Brink, 2004). Such types of corruption can make it difficult to run 
a business adequately. It may oblige, also, the withdrawal and restraining of 
investments. A score of 0 % represents minimum control of the level of corruption 
(Worst) while 100 % indicates maximum control of the level of corruption (Best). 
3. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (POLTC) reveals insights of 
the probability that the government will be weakened or will be over-thrown by 
illegitimate or brutal methods (e.g. politically driven violence, terrorist acts etc.). The 
given indicator is shown in percentile rank terms among all countries, ranging from 
zero (worst) to 100 (best). The higher value indicates better political stability and the 
absence of the level of violence. This indicator represents those circumstances that 
threaten political stability including clashes based on social, religious, ethnic, and 
territorial backgrounds, violence related secretive political groups and external public 
security. Revolutions, political terrorism, political assassination, major urban riots, 
armed clashes, state of emergency or martial law, demonstrations, strikes, and the risk 
of a military coup and street violence represent other primary determinants of this 
indicator. Accordingly, it is expected that this indicator demonstrates a positive 
relationship between efficiency and Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism (POLTC).
4. Government Effectiveness (GOVEFF) shows awareness of the quality of the 
public and civil services and the level of their independence from political pressures. 
Moreover, GOVEFF covers the quality of policy initiation and execution and the 
government’s integrity to such policies (World Bank, 2015).
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5. Regulatory Quality (REGQ) indicates perceptions of the government’s capability 
to create and execute sound policies and regulations that enables and stimulates the 
growth of the private sector (World Bank, 2015). Accordingly, there is an 
expectation of a positive relationship between banks efficiency and Regulatory 
Quality (REGQ). In other words, banks, operating in countries with high degrees of 
financial freedom and adequate governance, show a higher level of efficiency. 
Clarke et al. (2000) and Claessens et al. (2001) concluded that more foreign 
penetration and openness in the banking market reduced bank margins and enhanced 
the efficiency of the banking system. Similarly, Chortareas et al. (2012) indicated 
that the effect of governmental supervision and intervention on bank performance 
appeared to change with the type of regulation. The findings show a positive 
correlation between the financial freedom index and bank efficiency. Moreover, they 
suggest that extreme government intervention in the activities of financial 
institutions may have a negative influence on bank efficiency. On the other hand, 
Barth et al. (2006) studied the way in which more than 150 countries regulated 
banks. They claimed that increasing capital standards or strengthening supervision 
did not stimulate bank performance. There were debates in the aftermath of the 
2007-09 global financial crisis on various issues such as governmental supervision 
and regulations of the financial sector and capital requirements (Chortareas et al., 
2012). An approach refers to the deregulation of financial services and institutions 
as the essential cause behind the financial crisis (Chortareas et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, other approaches regard a particular set of excessive regulation was 
the main cause of the crisis. Accordingly, such limited financial freedom is claimed 
to encourage financial institutions to create unclear instruments and to miscalculate 
risk (Chortareas et al., 2012).
6. Rule of Law (RLAW) indicates awareness of the degree to which individuals or 
organizations have confidence in and obey the society’s laws. The determinants of 
this indicator include, also, the quality of law enforcement, property rights, the courts, 
and the probability of crime and violence (World Bank, 2015). Previous findings (e.g. 
Beck et al., (2005); Djankov et al., (2007)) concluded that an effective civil law 
contributed to financial growth. Therefore, there is expected to be a positive 
relationship between PTE and bank efficiency.
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The WGI consist of a research dataset outlining the opinions on the quality of 
governance given by a large number of firms, individuals and specialists in developed 
and developing countries (World Bank, 2015). These pieces of data were collected 
from a set of survey done with experts, non-governmental institutions, global 
organizations, and privately owned businesses (World Bank, 2015).  All countries’ 
stated indicators are displayed in terms of percentile rank ranging from zero (worst) 
to 100 (best). Despite the fact that the measures take into account each country’s 
margin, the WGIs’ developers claim that the WGI allow significant cross-country 
comparisons and the tracking of developments over time. (Kaufmann, et al., 2009)
Five variables reflect bank-level characteristics. The following discuss the observed 
explanatory variables and their possible influences on PTE:
1. NL/TA referred to as the ratio of Net Loans to Total Assets. While banks with larger 
loans to total assets ratios might have grown immediately, they might not be well 
diversified (Ben Naceur et al., 2011). Accordingly, compared to their counterparts, 
these banks are more exposed to credit risk. Furthermore, they would incur additional 
costs (or losses) due to nonperforming loans and bad management. As a result, 
efficiency is affected negatively and the banks would become less efficient (Ben 
Naceur et al., 2011). On the other hand, given the size of their lending books, these 
banks may be better at assessing risks (i.e. good management) and better able to 
exploit economies of scale. In turn, this would have a positive impact on efficiency 
(Ben Naceur et al., 2011).
2. EQ/TA is the ratio of equity to total assets that controls for capital strength.  Within 
the regression analysis, it determines the relationship between efficiency and bank 
capitalization. Bank capitalization is known to be an attribute that enables a 
significant description of a bank’s performance (Allen, 2012).  A greater level of 
equity diminishes the risk of insolvency and, primarily, the cost of borrowed capitals 
(Ben Naceur et al., 2011). This is in line with the findings of Reda and Isik 
(2006), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), and Kosmidou (2008). Therefore, there is an 
expectation of a positive association between PTE and capitalization. However, 
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previous studies showed an ambiguous relationship between capitalization and 
performance. One might suppose a negative coefficient on the equity to total assets 
ratio since lower capitalization indicates a relatively precarious position (Berger, 
1995). 
3. We used the SIZERT variable (represented by the logarithm of Total Assets) in the 
regression analysis as a proxy measure of bank size. This is in line with the studies 
conducted by Allen and Rai (1996), Bashir (1999), Milbourn et al. (1999), Gjirja 
(2003), Altunbas et al. (2007), Olson and Zoubi (2011), and El Moussawi and Obeid 
(2011).  We found that the literature reviews presented vague theories and evidence 
on the relationship between size and efficiency. For instance, Allen and Rai (1996) 
and Olson and Zoubi (2011) found a positive relationship between the efficiency and 
a bank’s total assets. They claimed that large banks could benefit from economies of 
scale by spreading costs in the production process. Larger banks pay less for their 
inputs due to their perceived market power. In other words, they may exhibit an 
increasing return to scale model through the distribution of fixed costs over a high 
volume of goods or from gaining efficiency through a specialized workforce (Hauner, 
2005). On the other hand, Beck et al. (2013) showed that there emerged a negative 
relationship between the Islamic banks’ cost efficiency and size. Moreover, Berger 
and Hannan (1994) argued that larger banks might be relatively less efficient since 
their managements sought a “quiet life”.  Johnes et al. (2014) claimed that several 
banks (and nearly all Islamic banks) experienced an advance relationship between 
gross and net efficiency and size.
4. LLP/GL is known as the ratio of Loan Loss Provision to that of Gross Loans. This 
variable is a proxy for a credit risk measure. The greater the LLP/GL ratio, the lower 
is the credit risk.  It is argued that there is a theoretical relationship between efficiency 
and LLP arising from the fact that managers do not supervise and manage their 
operations sufficiently. According to Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Shawtari 
(2015), a low-cost efficiency can reflect a signal of bad management, inadequate 
supervision of loan activities and poor evaluation skills of resources. Accordingly, a 
bank may encounter a greater volume of non-performing loans. This is in line with  
Miller and Noulas’ (1997)  findings which state that the higher the exposure to the 
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financial institutions to credit risk, the higher is the amount of unpaid loans and, 
consequently, the lower the level of profitability. These arguments support the 
hypothesis that attributes lower efficiency to non-performing loans which should be 
buffered by a higher level of loan loss provision. Moreover, a bank may be subject to 
additional costs resulting from the management of increasing credit risk. 
Consequently, the bank may suffer from lower efficiency (Barajas et al., 1999). On 
the other hand, Miller and Noulas (1997) argued that a lower ratio might lead to a 
higher level of efficiency since it was associated with increased profit margins (Miller 
and Noulas, 1997). Thakor (1987) noted that the level of loan loss provisions was a 
sign of a bank’s asset quality and it might indicate changes in the future performance. 
However, previous results, extracted from a study conducted by Staikouras et al. 
(2008), concluded that there was no significant relationship between the ratio of loan 
loss provision and loans and efficiency (Staikouras et al., 2008).
5. ISMDUM is a binary variable to indicate whether Bankscope categorizes a bank 
Bankscope as a fully-fledged Islamic bank. It takes the value of 1 if the bank is 
Islamic or zero if it is not. We used this variable in the regression analysis to 
determine whether any differences in efficiency between the two types of banks 
persisted after we considered the bank and country-specific factors.
We included the following two other variables in order to capture the financial crisis 
dimension of the data:
1. ISFCRIS is a dummy variable introduced to catch, particularly for Islamic banks, any 
impact and interactions of the financial crisis which occurred from 2007 to 2009. This 
variable takes on the value of one for the Islamic banks during the years 2007, 2008 
and 2009.  
2. FCRIS is a dummy variable to account for the impact of the financial crisis (2007-
2009) on both Islamic and conventional banks. Moreover, it distinguishes between the 
effect of the crisis (2007-2009) and the remaining years of the study (2006, 2010, 
2011 and 2012). In other words, we included it to assess whether or not there were  
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any differences in efficiency between the years of the global crisis (2007-2009) and 
the other years  (2006, 2010, 2011 and 2012) covered by the study. 
We considered the following four variables, collected from World Bank (WB) 
databases, in order to capture the overall country characteristics:
1. The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) indicates the degree of competitiveness 
within each country’s banking sector (Johnes et al., 2014). The index is calculated by 
using all the banks operating in a particular country. Therefore, Islamic and 
conventional banks are assumed to compete against each other.  The empirical 
literature provides mixed evidence on the impact of market concentration on 
efficiency. Ben Naceur et al. (2011) argued that concentration might reduce 
competition and restrain efficiency since it enhanced a bank’s market power. 
According to Berger and Hannan (1998), a high market concentration is connected 
usually with lower deposit rates and higher loan rates; this could be an indication of 
great inefficiency. Moreover, banks with higher market power may encounter larger 
cost inefficiencies as managers chase other goals instead of maximizing efficiency. 
This behaviour is described by the “quiet life theory” (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
The theory argues that an increase in the market concentration is associated with a 
lower technical efficiency since bank managers have little incentives to improve 
efficiency when competition is weak (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
Nevertheless, if economies of scale are attributed to bank mergers and acquisitions, 
the high concentration in the banking sector may enhance efficiency (Casu and 
Girardone, 2009; Ben Naceur et al., 2011). Moreover, the efficient structure theory
argues that there is a positive relationship between concentration and efficiency
(Demsetz, 1974). Based on the efficiency structure theory, banks with higher 
efficiency benefit from lower costs this promotes profits in successive years (Chang et 
al., 2014). Accordingly, the most efficient banks are capable of increasing their 
market shares; in turn, this leads to a higher concentration (Casu and Girardone, 
2009). Studies done by Yudistira (2004) and Staikouras et al. (2008) on the efficiency 
of conventional banks promoted the “quiet life theory”. Others conducted by Dietsch 
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and Lozano-Vivas (2000) and   Koutsomanoli-Filippakiet al. (2009) supported the 
“efficiency structure theory”.
2. We used Growth in real GDP (YGR) and Inflation (INFL) variables in the 
regression analysis to account for the resilience of the economy in which the bank 
operated (Johnes et al., 2014). In general, an increase in economic growth motivates 
banks to issue more loans at a higher rate while further enhancing the quality of their 
assets (Johnes et al., 2014). On the other hand, during a recession, a bank’s profits 
drop since the GDP growth declines and the credit quality worsens (Suffian and 
Habibullah, 2012). Empirical evidence, derived from the literature (e.g. Kablan, 2007; 
Staikouras et al., 2008; Awdeh and El Moussawi, 2009; Johnes et al., 2014), showed 
that there was a positive relationship between GDP growth and bank efficiency. We 
included include the Inflation rate (INFL), also, in the regression analysis in order to 
reflect the macroeconomic risk. The degree to which the rate of inflation influences 
bank efficiency is determined by the banks’ abilities to anticipate precisely the future 
movement of inflation. Banks, which forecast accurately the rate of inflation, are 
capable of generating more revenues (Sufian, 2012). However, an unpredicted change 
could increase costs resulting from an inadequate adjustment in the interest rate 
(Perry, 1992).  The literature provides mixed evidence on the impact of inflation on 
bank efficiency. For instance, Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) found a positive relationship between 
inflation and bank performance (Flamini et al., 2009). On the other hand, Bond and 
Hughes (2013) showed that inflation had a negative effect on bank efficiency. 
3. Per capita GDP (YPCRAT) is a variable shows the general income level in a 
particular country. We used it as a proxy to determine the overall level of progress 
including the level of expertise and institutional development. Moreover, this variable 
reflects the state of demand and supply in the market in which the bank operates 
(Johnes et al., 2014).  A higher income level is more likely to be associated with a 
more developed banking sector and improvement in public institutions (Chen, 2009). 
As a result, banks might benefit from additional profit margins and a reduction in total 
costs. Also, they might offer more competitive rates of interest  (Kablan, 2010).  We 
found mixed previous findings concerning the effect of this variable on efficiency. 
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Fries and Taci (2005) did not observe any statistically significant relationship between 
GDP per capita and efficiency. Nevertheless, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), 
Grigorian and Manole (2002), and Košak and Zajc, (2006) concluded that per capita 
GDP had a positive influence on efficiency. 
4. MKTCY is the degree of market capitalization i.e. the percentage valuation of 
listed firms across all sectors relative to the country’s GDP. MKTCY is used to 
determine the importance of the banking sector to the country’s economy. The index 
of stock liquidity proxies the growth rate of the stock market; this is represented by 
the ratio of the stock exchange’s market capitalization to GDP. The empirical 
evidence shows that as countries progress, the financial structure and systems change 
and tend to be more market-oriented (Ben Naceur et al., 2011). Countries with well-
developed stock markets are likely to have more efficient financial intermediaries. 
Diamond (1991) claimed that a "life cycle" influence arose from borrowing funds 
from intermediaries. On the other hand, current borrowers may raise money through 
leverage without depending on an intermediary. Accordingly, the type of clients, who 
borrow from banks, changes as the stock markets grow (Ben Naceur et al., 2011). The 
exact effect of this variable on efficiency is theoretically ambiguous. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1996) and Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) concluded that MKTCY 
exhibited a positive relationship with efficiency, whereas Johnes et al. (2014) 
suggested that there was a negative relationship between both variables. Therefore, in 
line with the arguments provided by Ben Naceur et al., 2011), market capitalization is 
expected to have a positive relationship with bank efficiency if the banking sector and 
capital market are complementary to each other. On the other hand, there is an 
anticipated negative impact in the case of competition between them. 
5.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter summarized the methodological approaches thatwe conducted in order to 
estimate the different efficiencies of Islamic and conventional banks, in 21 countries 
over the period from 2006 to 2012. We employed the DEA methodology to derive the 
efficiency scores (OTE, PTE and SE) of Islamic and conventional banks. Afterward, 
we used the bootstrapping technique to assess the robustness of the obtained results. 
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We employed, also, the GLS regression model and efficiency scores, computed using 
the DEA models, to explore further the possible drivers of PTE. We used the 
intermediation approach to define the inputs and outputs on which we based the 
estimation of the production function for Islamic and conventional banks. This 
chapter described, also, the variables and the dataset used in our empirical analysis.   
After examining the previous literature and considering the particular features of our 
data, we employed the RE model in order to estimate the parameters of regressions.  
Furthermore, in our regression models, we used the following eleven environmental 
models as potential drivers of banking efficiency. These were: the ratio of Net Loans 
to Total Assets (NL/TA); the ratio of Equity over Total Assets (EQ/TA); Bank Size 
(SIZERT); the ratio of Loan Loss Provision to Gross Loans (LLP/GL); the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI); Growth in Real GDP (YGR); Inflation (INFL); 
Per Capita GDP (YPCRAT); Market Capitalization (MKTCY); Voice and 
Accountability (VACC); and Regulation Quality (REGQ).  We based our empirical 
analysis on a sample of 199 Banks in 21 countries over the period from 2006 to 2012. 
The following chapter reports the empirical results obtained by analyzing the 
efficiency of these banks.
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Chapter 6 Findings and Discussion
The previous chapter detailed the methodology and data used to answer the research 
questions. This chapter consists of two sections; each section shows the research 
questions and the answers to these questions. The first section shows the answers to 
the questions:
"At the global level, how efficient is Islamic banking when compared to 
conventional banking?"
"Are Islamic banks more efficient than conventional banks or vice versa?"    
The second section shows the answers to the questions: 
"In the 21 countries, what are the respective determinants of Islamic and 
conventional banking’s pure technical efficiency?" 
Are Islamic banks or conventional banks more efficient in Muslim or non-
Muslim countries?"
This chapter’s first section discusses the three different efficiency measures used to 
proxy the performance of banks operating in 21 countries over the period from 2006 
to 2012. These banks’ OTE, PTE and scale were used to identify and assess the best 
performing banks. 
The second section investigates the impact of bank and country-specific variables on 
the pure technical efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks. These variables 
include: 
 Ratio of Net Loans to Total Assets; 
 Ratio of Equity over Total Assets; 
 Bank Size; 
 Ratio of Loan Loss Provision to Gross Loans; 
 The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI); 
 Growth in Real GDP, inflation; 
 Per Capita GDP; 
 Market Capitalization (MKTCY); 
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 Voice and Accountability (VACC); and 
 Regulation Quality (REGQ). 
6.1 First stage analysis: Estimation of DEA-Efficiencies
In this section, through using the methodology explained in chapter four, we analyze 
empirically the efficiency scores of Islamic and conventional banking sectors during 
the period of study from 2006 to 2012. This section discusses and analyses the results
of the efficiency scores (PTE, OTE and SE) which we obtained by applying the DEA 
approach and the bootstrapping technique. Moreover, it reports the most efficient 
banking sector operating in the 21 countries. 
Section 6.2 investigates the impact of country-specific and bank-specific variables on 
Islamic and conventional bank performance (i.e. pure technical efficiency). In order to 
calculate each bank’s efficiency in a given year, we built a “common frontier” by 
pooling the observations of the 7 years (from 2006 to 2012) rather than building a 
“year specific” best-practice frontier. By pooling the data across these years, we   
assumed that, during the period of study, all banks operated in the same environment. 
However, one may argue that, since the banks operated in different years, the 
macroeconomic indicators, which existed in those years, could have had an effect on 
their respective performance. Consequently, in the second stage of this research, we 
analyze the impact of these environmental variables on efficiency. By creating a 
pooled frontier, it is possible to measure and compare for each of the years between 
2006 and 2012 each banking sector relative to the same frontier by treating each 
sector as a different entity in each period. Furthermore, a “common frontier” approach 
can indicate a trend in the efficiency of a banking sector (as single entity); this would 
be unavailable if we had applied a “year specific frontier” approach was applied. 
Therefore, over time, the “common frontier” approach provides variations in the 
banks’ efficiency.  We applied this comparison across time by using the same 
principle as that related to the global frontier in Portela and Thanassoulis (2010).   We 
measured the correlations between the inputs and outputs of the DEA model in order 
to certify that the inputs and outputs were isotonic. According to Avkiran (2006), a 
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high correlation is preferable. Table 6.2 shows correlation coefficients between an 
input and an output pair. 
Table 6.1a: Descriptive statistics for the first stage variables' original values (three inputs and 
two outputs)
Note: All variables are reported in US $ millions. The number of observations in each year are  104 Islamic banks 
and 95 conventional banks. The number of observations in each year varies because of data availability. DEPSTF: 
Deposits and Short-term funding, FXASSET: Fixed Assets, PEREXP: Personnel Expenses, NLOANS: Net Loans, 
NINCOME: Net Income 
Table 6.1b: Descriptive statistics for the first stage variables' adjusted positive values (three 
inputs and two outputs)
Note: A value of USD 757.3 million is added to the net income observations in order to offset negative values and 
consequently obtain values ≥ 0. 
Table 6.2: Correlation coefficient between inputs and outputs
Table 6.2 shows that, for all pairs, the correlation coefficients between an input and an 
output pair are more than 0.49. The outcomes cannot be considered to be a low 
correlation and, therefore, it can be claimed that the variables pass the isotonicity test.
Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 respectively report estimated overall and technical efficiency 
and scale efficiency. These show that, on average, the overall technical efficiency of 
Islamic Banks (referred hereinafter as IBs) is 0.4016 and ranges from 0.3540 to 
0.4460, while the pure technical efficiency averages 0.4330 and ranges from 0.3915 to 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Cases
Missing 
values
DEPSTF 3655.404 7321.008 0 79761.15 1256 137
FXASSET 62.75741 193.3967 0 2753.051 1250 143
PEREXP 44.64251 80.10163 0.1 691.49 1223 170
NLOANS 2732.374 5148.302 0 45928.96 1227 166
NINCOME 72.39466 214.5395 -757.3 2102.59 1284 109
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Cases
Missing 
values
DEPSTF 3655.404 7321.008 0 79761.15 1256 137
FXASSET 62.75741 193.3967 0 2753.051 1250 143
PEREXP 44.64251 80.10163 0.1 691.49 1223 170
NLOANS 2732.374 5148.302 0 45928.96 1227 166
NINCOME 829.6947 214.5395 0.0 2859.89 1284 109
Cor.Mat. DEPSTF FXASSET PEREXP NLOANS NINCOME
DEPSTF 1.00000 0.63515 0.91315 0.97332 0.48325
FXASSET 0.63515 1.00000 0.68412 0.65825 0.48938
PEREXP 0.91315 0.68412 1.00000 0.91796 0.96843
NLOANS 0.97332 0.65825 0.91796 1.00000 0.54528
NINCOME 0.48325 0.48938 0.50385 0.54528 1.00000
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0.4778. These estimates suggest that, if the IBs were operating on the most efficient 
frontier under the CRS and VRS models respectively, the same levels of output can be 
produced with 40.16% and 43.30% of their current inputs. On the other hand, the 
overall technical efficiency of conventional banks is, on average, 0.3073 and ranges 
from 0.2614 to 0.3549, whereas the pure technical efficiency is, on average, 0.4188 
and ranges between 0.3889 and 0.4681. These outcomes suggest that, if operating on 
the efficient frontier, the conventional banks could produce the same levels of output 
by using 30.73% and 41.88% of their current inputs under CRS and VRS respectively. 
Based on these results, the IBs show higher average overall technical efficiency 
(CRS) and pure technical efficiency (VRS) than their conventional counterparts. As 
mentioned previously, the CRS assumption is justifiable only when all the decision-
making units operate at an optimal scale. However, in the real world, often this 
optimal behaviour is unachievable due to  a variety of circumstances such as different 
types of market power, constraints on finances, externalities, imperfect competition, 
etc. 
The CRS specification, as produced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), yields 
misleading measures of technical efficiency in the sense that technical efficiency 
scores, reported under that set of constraints, are biased by scale efficiencies. 
Therefore, under the VRS assumption, we used pure technical efficiency as the major 
measure to assess the technical efficiency. However, we conducted the CCR model, 
run under the CRS assumption, to extract the scale efficiency. The difference between 
the calculated overall technical efficiency (CRS) and pure technical efficiency (VRS) 
indicates that the firm has scale inefficiency. Therefore, the calculation of scale 
efficiency is done by deconstructing overall technical efficiency into pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency; namely, CRS efficiency= VRS efficiency x Scale 
efficiency. Accordingly, the IBs’ estimated average efficiency scale would be 0.9274 
and 0.7335 for their conventional counterparts. The deconstruction of overall 
efficiency into its pure technical and scale efficiency components seem to suggest 
that, in the entire Islamic banking sector, pure technical inefficiency outweighs scale 
inefficiency in determining the overall technical inefficiency. The findings imply that, 
although  overall IBs  were operating at a relatively optimal scale of operations, they 
were managerially inefficient in controlling their operating costs and utilizing to the 
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fullest their resources in terms of deposits, capital (as Fixed asset) and labour (as 
personnel expense). Therefore, annually for both Islamic and conventional banks, we 
attributed bank inefficiency to Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) rather than to scale 
inefficiency.
Table 6.2’s results show that, during the entire period of study, the PTE values of IBs 
and conventional banks were very close. IBs demonstrated slightly higher mean in 
pure technical efficiency for each year 2006 (0.4778), 2007 (0.4540), 2008 (0.4431), 
2009 (0.4221), 2011 (0.3983) and 2012 (0.4442) when compared to conventional 
banks 2006 (0.4681), 2007 (0.4293), 2008 (0.4219), 2009 (0.3917), 2011 (0.3889) and 
2012 (0.4389). However, in 2010, the conventional banks showed a slightly higher 
PTE of 0.3926 as compared to the IBs’ 0.3915.  As noted, the IBs’ PTE scores 
followed a declining trend from 2006 to 2010. The IBs’ worst year was 2010 when 
the PTE was at lowest level scoring 39.15 % and was slightly below the conventional 
banks' average PTE of 39.26 %. During the 2008 financial crisis, the gap between the 
Islamic and conventional banks' PTE widened since  the impact of the first wave of 
the world financial crisis (2007–2008) hit  the conventional banks severely because 
they were exposed directly to subprime mortgage portfolios (Toxic assets). For 
instance, in 2007−08, the Gulf International Bank (GIB, a Bahraini wholesale CB) 
incurred losses of about US$1.3 billion in securities investments in debt-based toxic 
assets (mortgage backed collateralized debt obligations) and in  American banks such 
as Lehman Brothers. The GIB’s shareholders injected US$1 billion of new capital and 
bought toxic asset-backed securities worth $4.8 billion. 
The Arab Banking Corporation (a Bahraini wholesale CB) incurred losses of $1.2 
billion due to similar investments and its shareholders injected $1 billion of new 
capital. In addition, the Gulf Bank (a Kuwaiti CB) incurred losses of $1.4 billion due 
mainly to derivatives activities, with the bank‘s shareholders and the Kuwait 
Investment Authority injecting an equivalent amount of capital. In 2008, the National 
Commercial Bank (NCB), the largest Saudi conventional bank, lost more than one 
billion riyal on changes in fair value for financial instruments (Hassan and Dridi, 
2010). In contrast, when compared to their conventional counterparts, IBs 
wereprohibited from dealing or trading in derivatives. Therefore, this made them 
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relatively resilient to the impact of the first wave of the global crisis (2007-2008). 
Consequently, the conventional banks' PTE declined to attain a lowest level of 
39.17%.  However, these banks were able to restrain the second round effects of the 
global crisis (economic wave), and showed a stable PTE trend during 2010 (39.26%) 
and 2011 (38.89%) followed by a significant recovery with, on average, PTE 
increasing to 43.89%. However, many IBs, which are financed by way of Murabahah, 
determine their profit or mark-up on the basis of the current interest rate; they use 
mostly LIBOR (London Inter-bank offered rate) as the criterion (Usmani, 2007). 
No doubt, it cannot be considered to be desirable to use the rate of interest to 
determine a halal profit. Certainly, at least in appearance, it makes the transaction 
resemble an interest-based financial item and, keeping in view the severity of 
prohibition of interest, even this apparent resemblance should be avoided as far as 
possible. However, one should not ignore the fact that the most important requirement 
for validity of Murabahah is that it is a genuine sale with all its ingredients and 
necessary consequences. If a Murabahah transaction fulfils all the conditions of 
Sharia' compliance, merely using the interest rate as a benchmark for determining the 
profit of Murabahah does not render the transaction to be either invalid, haram or 
prohibited. This is because the deal itself does not contain interest. During the global 
crisis, the cost of funds (interest rate) increased due to liquidity's scarcity and default 
risk (vulnerability). For these reasons, Islamic banks were entitled to a higher 
payment obligation towards investors; in other words, they needed to pay a higher 
profit share ratio to fund suppliers. Consequently, the IBs’ PTE declined slightly from 
44.31% (2008) to 42.21% (2009).
IBs had shown more resilience to the direct subprime exposure (Financial wave). 
However, starting from 2009, they were subject to the second round effect of the 
global crisis, the so-called economic wave, (The Economist, 2009; El-Said and 
Ziemba, 2009). IBs were  unaffected since the global financial crisis originated from 
sub-prime mortgage portfolios that were spun off into securitized instruments and
these were offered subsequently as investments. This was because Islamic finance 
was based on a close link between financial and productive flows. However, the 
protacted duration of the financial crisis effected IBs because, rather than these 
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institutions being exposed directly to derivative instruments, Islamic banking 
contracts were based on asset-backed transactions. With the downturn in the global 
economy, there was a decline in the property markets of a number of countries where 
IBs had a significant presence. This carries negative implications for these banks since 
a large number of contracts are backed by real estate and property as collateral. In 
such a situation, there was increased credit risk due to  the erosion in the value of the 
collateral and especially in highly leveraged countries, like the UAE (Dubai) and 
Qatar, where a large share of financing was channeled to the once-booming real estate 
market (Hasan and Dridi, 2010). 
The findings imply that, when compared to conventional banks, IBs showed 
significant higher mean Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE) and Scale Efficiency 
(SE) previous to, during and post-crisis. On the other hand, the Islamic and 
conventional banks’ PTE scores demonstrated insignificant difference since their 
values were very close and showed similar trends over the years.  This is in line with 
conclusions from previous studies derived using SFA and DEA (Bader, 2008; Hassan 
et al., 2009; Grigorian and Manole, 2005; Belanes and Hassiki, 2012).
Table 6.3 shows descriptive statistics for different regions and countries based on total 
assets (in millions of USD) for 7 years from 2006 to 2012.  Please see Appendix 15 
for the number of year observations for each country and each year.
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Figure 6.1: Average Overall Technical Efficiency: Islamic versus Conventional Banks
Table 6.3: Average Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE) for Islamic and conventional banks
Average Overall Technical Efficiency
Year Islamic Banks Conventional Banks
2006 0.4460 0.3549
2007 0.4157 0.3430
2008 0.4338 0.3202
2009 0.4007 0.3048
2010 0.3726 0.2822
2011 0.3540 0.2614
2012 0.3882 0.2848
Mean 0.4016 0.3073
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Figure 6.2: Average Pure Technical Efficiency: Islamic versus Conventional Banks
Table 6.4: Average Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) for Islamic and conventional banks
Average Pure Technical Efficiency
Year Islamic Banks Conventional Banks
2006 0.4778 0.4681
2007 0.4540 0.4293
2008 0.4431 0.4219
2009 0.4221 0.3917
2010 0.3915 0.3926
2011 0.3983 0.3889
2012 0.4442 0.4389
Mean 0.4330 0.4188
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Figure 6.3: Average Scale Efficiency: Islamic versus Conventional Banks
Table 6.5: Average Scale Efficiency (SE) for Islamic and conventional banks
Average Scale Efficiency
Year Islamic Banks Conventional Banks
2006 0.9334 0.7582
2007 0.9156 0.7988
2008 0.9791 0.7590
2009 0.9492 0.7784
2010 0.9518 0.7190
2011 0.8888 0.6723
2012 0.8738 0.6488
Mean 0.9274 0.7335
0.0000
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6.2 Second-stage results: PTE Determinants
This second section investigates across 21 countries and 199 banks during the period 
of study the impact of environmental variables on the efficiency of its banks. We use 
PTE as the dependent variable. There are two popular statistical models for analysis 
of panel data: namely, the fixed-effect model and the random-effect model. Although 
these two models employ similar sets of formulas to compute statistics, these two 
models are fundamentally different. We decided on the selection of an appropriate 
model by running Hausman’s test (1978). However, we selected and used the random 
effects model because, unlike the fixed effects model, it had the advantage of 
including and enabling time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables 
(Greene, 1997). In the fixed effects model, the intercept absorbs these variables.
In this study, we replaced the estimators of the DEA estimates with bootstrapped 
estimators in order to calculate the standard errors of these estimates and to minimize 
the bias arising from the inherent dependency problem. We bootstrapped OTE and 
PTE scores, extracted from DEA, for 150, 250, 500, 750, and 1000 replicas.  We 
conducted correlation analyses in order to select the most convenient number of 
bootstrap replications. Based on the results from the correlation analyses, it is seen 
that all bootstrap replications correlated highly correlated and ranged between 0.9 and 
1.00 (These are shown in Tables 6.7 and 6.8). Hence, in the DEA’S second stage, the 
selection of any of the bootstrap replications will be sufficiently consistent to run the 
regression analysis. In this study, we chose CRS and VRS models for the DEA 
estimators and replicated them 500 times.
Table 6.6: Correlation analyses for bootstrapped PTE scores, at 150, 250, 500, 750 & 1000 
replicas
Cor. Mat. BIAS150 BIAS250 BIAS500 BIAS750 BIAS1000
BIAS150 1.00000 0.93998 0.95410 0.94595 0.96329
BIAS250 .93998 1.00000 0.96292 0.94866 0.95792
BIAS500 .95410 0.94866 0.96810 1.00000 0.96843
BIAS750 .94595 0.94866 0.96810 1.00000 0.96843
BIAS1000 .96329 0.95792 0.96978 0.96843 1.00000
Note:  Bias150, Bias250, Bias500, Bias750 and Bias1000 are pure technical efficiency scores bootstrapped for 
150, 250, 500,750 and 1000 replications respectively. 
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Table 6.7: Correlation analyses for bootstrapped OTE scores, at 150, 250, 500, 750 & 1000 
replicas
Cor.Mat. BIAS150 BIAS250 BIAS500 BIAS750 BIAS1000
BIAS150 1.00000 0.98343 0.98407 0.98754 0.98821
BIAS250 0.98343 1.00000 0.99375 0.99370 0.99390
BIAS500 0.98407 0.99375 1.00000 0.99453 0.99469
BIAS750 0.98754 0.99370 0.99453 1.00000 0.99486
BIAS1000 0.98821 0.99390 0.99469 0.99486 1.00000
Note:  Bias150, Bias250, Bias500, Bias750 and Bias1000 are overall technical efficiency scores bootstrapped for 
150, 250, 500,750 and 1000 replications respectively. 
We used the function – Tst (VRS500,Yfit) to test for equality of means and  to check 
that the estimated model (Yfit) and the observed data (VRS500) were  drawn from the 
same distributions, i.e. there were  no significant differences between the two 
populations. The standard t-statistic test was used as the basis of this test, known as 
the t-test. The findings imply that the null hypothesis is accepted at the 5% level of 
significance and confirm that there is no significant difference between the two 
models (see Table 6.8 below).
Table 6.8: T-test results (between VRS500 and YFIT)
Note:  Significant at 5% level; t test tests the null hypothesis that the means of the two samples- the estimated 
model (YFIT) and the observed  model (VRS500)- are equal (equal variances are not assumed). VRS500 refers to 
efficiency bootstrapped for 500 replications under variable return to scale (VRS). 
Based on Table 6.9, we selected Voice and Accountability (VACC) from the six 
worldwide governance indicators (WGI), as the independent variable for inclusion 
in the second stage analysis.  We based our choice on the outcomes of the 
correlation analyses conducted for these six indicators. As presented in Table 6.10, 
the results show that there is a very high correlation between the five indicators 
varying between 0.75 and 0.96. Therefore, this finding enables us to choose at 
random one of these five indicators, namely, the Regulator Quality (RQ) indicator.  
Two sample test of equality of means with unequal variances
YFit and VRS500:  Test of equal means
Group Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Sample
YFIT 0.42991 0.09565 0.00328 850
VRS500  0.42333 0.27849 0.00831 1124
Difference 0.00658 0.00893 1974
Confidence interval for difference based on standard normal:  -.01093 to .02408  
Test statistic                                      =    0 .737                    
P value                                              =    0.46149
Degrees of freedom (Satterthwaite) =     1453
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The VACC indicator proves to have a low to moderate correlation with the 
remaining indicators. Hence, we selected only the Voice and Accountability and 
Regulator Quality indicators in studying the determinants of pure technical 
efficiency. 
Table 6.9: Correlation matrix of WGI
Note: VACC: Voice & Accountability. POLTC: Political Stability. GOVEFF: Government Effectiveness. REGQ: 
Regulation Quality. RLAW: Rule of Law. CORRUP: Corruption Control. Five indicators- voice and 
accountability, political stability, regulation quality, government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption control-
show a high correlation ranging from 0.75 to 0.96.  We conducted regression analyses for each of the former five 
WGI with the potential to be determinants of pure technical efficiency. The findings imply that regulatory quality 
has a more significant influence on the pure technical efficiency. Consequently, we selected the regulatory quality 
indicator as a potential explanatory variable in the random effects model. Moreover, we chose the least correlated 
indicator, voice and accountability, as the second WGI included in the second stage analysis.   
We conducted correlation analyses for the selected explanatory variables; these show 
that the Regulator Quality variable has a strong correlation with the Per Capita GDP
variable (0.73) (see Table 6.10). Consequently, we exempted the Government 
Effectiveness indicator from the second stage analysis. Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show two 
different correlation analyses (Table 6.9:  among the WGI; Table 6.10: VACC and 
REGQ and the potential explanatory variables).  We conducted the correlation 
analyses in order to determine the least correlated variables that might avoid the
multicollinearity problem. 
Appendices (5, 6, 7 and 8) present the four RE models that include, individually and 
respectively, the four WGI (i.e POLTC, GOVEFF, RLAW, and CORRUP 
respectively) which we used to determine the drivers of PTE.  In addition, Appendix 9 
shows the regression analyses of pooled PTE whereby we used six year dummy 
variables  to capture potential trend and significance on the PTE during 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.  
Cor.Mat. VACC POLTC GOVEFF REGQ RLAW CORRUP
VACC 1.00 0.32 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.43
POLTC 0.32 1.00 0.82 0.75 0.82 0.87
GOVEFF 0.50 0.82 1.00 0.95 0.94 0.93
REGQ 0.53 0.75 0.95 1.00 0.96 0.94
RLAW 0.50 0.82 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.96
CORRUP 0.43 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.96 1.00
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Table 6.10: Correlation analyses of the 6 WGI and potential explanatory variables used in the second stage analysis 
Cor.Mat. NL_TA LLP_GL EQ_TA SIZERT YPCRAT YGR HHI INFL MKTCY VACC POLTC GOVEFF REGQ RLAW CORRUP
NL_TA 1.00 -0.09 -0.29 0.34 -0.05 0.05 0.26 0.09 -0.25 -0.10 0.05 -0.08 -0.17 -0.10 -0.03
LLP_GL -0.09 1.00 0.08 -0.09 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05
EQ_TA -0.29 0.08 1.00 -0.29 0.22 0.01 -0.12 -0.01 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.19
SIZERT 0.34 -0.09 -0.29 1.00 0.44 0.06 0.01 -0.08 0.10 -0.25 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.38 0.39
YPCRAT -0.05 0.00 0.22 0.44 1.00 0.05 -0.10 -0.19 0.32 -0.02 0.74 0.65 0.73 0.75 0.81
YGR 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.05 1.00 0.41 0.37 0.16 -0.19 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01
HHI 0.26 -0.04 -0.12 0.01 -0.10 0.41 1.00 0.16 -0.09 -0.16 0.17 -0.11 -0.25 -0.12 -0.06
INFL 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.19 0.37 0.16 1.00 -0.33 -0.14 -0.19 -0.30 -0.25 -0.28 -0.21
MKTCY -0.25 -0.03 0.08 0.10 0.32 0.16 -0.09 -0.33 1.00 0.07 0.33 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.37
VACC -0.10 0.01 0.02 -0.25 -0.02 -0.19 -0.16 -0.14 0.07 1.00 0.09 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.18
POLTC 0.05 -0.05 0.10 0.38 0.74 0.09 0.17 -0.19 0.33 0.09 1.00 0.81 0.74 0.80 0.87
GOVEFF -0.08 -0.03 0.12 0.31 0.65 -0.07 -0.11 -0.30 0.45 0.27 0.81 1.00 0.92 0.90 0.90
REGQ -0.17 -0.02 0.22 0.28 0.73 -0.05 -0.25 -0.25 0.44 0.30 0.74 0.92 1.00 0.95 0.93
RLAW -0.10 -0.04 0.18 0.38 0.75 -0.02 -0.12 -0.28 0.47 0.25 0.80 0.90 0.95 1.00 0.95
CORRUP -0.03 -0.05 0.19 0.39 0.81 -0.01 -0.06 -0.21 0.37 0.18 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.95 1.00
Note: GDP per capita (YPCRAT) show high correlation with five WGI- Political Stability (POLTC), Regulation Quality (REGQ), Government Effectiveness (GOVEFF), Rule of Law (RLAW) 
and Corruption Control (CORRUP). As this variable (YPCRAT) is significant, based on literature review, we have run orthogonalization technique between GDP per capita and the selected 
WGI (Regulatory Quality) to offset the fact of high correlation between these two variables. The residual values of GDP per capita, resulted from the orthogonalization technique, are referred to 
as RES_YPC.
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In order to test the relationship between the earlier described bank efficiency and the 
bank and country- specific determinants, we estimated a linear regression model and 
applied the Generalized Least Square (GLS) method. We used White’s (1980) 
transformation to calculate the standard errors and to control for cross-section 
heteroskedasticity. We used the GLS method because the sample was not distributed 
normally and the data might have either a heteroskedasticity problem or an 
autocorrelation problem or both. According to Gujarati (2003), the use of the GLS 
overcomes all these problems. Our work on the GLS estimator is in line with the 
studies of Isik and Hassan (2002), Sufian (2011), and Tanna (2009).
Table 6.12 presents the outcomes of the second stage analysis. Having taking account 
into the bank, institutional development and country-specific factors, the main finding 
is that, in terms of pure technical efficiency, there is no significant difference between 
Islamic and conventional banks. This result is consistent with our previous outcomes  
discussed earlier in section 6.1.  Moreover, being an IB was not be seen as being 
advantageous factor in a bank avoiding the negative effects of the global crisis. 
Therefore, similar to their conventional counterparts, Islamic Banks were not immune 
to the financial crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2009.
Table 6.11: Descriptive statistics for the second-stage variables (three inputs and two outputs)
Note: VRS500 refers to pure technical efficiency scores bootstrapped for 500 replications
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum Cases
Missing
Values
VRS500 0.42333 0.27849 0.0409 1.5633 1124 269
NL_TA 46.43039 23.63961 0 98.91697 1227 166
LLP_GL 672.5521 21529.16 -81.6425 699600 1056 337
EQ_TA 20.30835 33.21289 -669.479 100 1294 99
SIZERT 7.176541 1.75255 0.215111 11.43047 1287 106
YPCRAT 8.923005 1.420087 6.206078 11.43821 1375 18
RES_YPC 0.0      .956881     -1.75876       3.9569     1375 18
YGR 4.679409 4.207611 -15.0884 26.1704 1375 18
HHI 0.084492 0.047026 0.033858 0.27536 1153 240
INFL 7.711989 8.771664 -24.2186 39.81269 1375 18
MKTCY 76.08719 51.99398 5.026881 240.8822 1177 216
VACC 27.95768 18.98143 2.843602 93.75 1393 0
REGQ 52.01965     25.05352 4.30622        100.0     1393 0
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Table 6.12 Random Effects model to study the determinants of the pooled PTE 
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
Z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
FCRISIS -0.02187 0.02994 -0.73 0.4651 -0.08056 0.03681
ISMDUM -0.01693 0.02929 -0.58 0.5632 -0.07434 0.04048
ISFCRIS 0.02209 0.04331 0.51 0.6101 -0.06279 0.10697
NL_TA 0.00163*** 0.00053 3.07 0.0021 0.00059 0.00267
LLP_GL -0.12159D-04 0.4540D-04 -0.27 -0.7888 0.10114D-03 0.76821D-04
EQ_TA 0.00307*** 0.00078 3.94 0.0001 0.00154 0.0046
SIZERT 0.02765*** 0.0086 3.21 0.0013 0.01078 0.04451
RES_YPC -0.00699 0.01259 -0.56 0.5788 -0.03167 0.01769
YGR -0.00222 0.00321 -0.69 0.4887 -0.00852 0.00407
HHI 0.58471** 0.26154 2.24 0.0254 0.0721 1.09732
INFL -0.00074 0.00162 -0.46 0.6463 -0.00391 0.00243
MKTCY 0.00052** 0.00023 2.22 0.0264 0.00006 0.00097
VACC -0.00149** 0.00073 -2.03 0.0426 -0.00292 -0.00005
REGQ 0.00218*** 0.00071 3.08 0.0021 0.00079 0.00357
Constant -0.05488 0.0808 -0.68 0.497 -0.21325 0.10348
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
1393 observations
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)            =        e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                              =      0.061418
            SD.[e]                                    =        0.247826
            Var[u]                                     =        0.006187
            SD.[u]                                     =        0.078659
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                     =        0.091520
            Sum of Squares                                 0.278284E+09
            R-squared                                          -0.231732
[ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. Value  =         0.000000]
Note: We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
When considering bank specific variables, the capitalization variable (EQ/TA) 
displays the expected relationship with bank efficiency. The coefficient on EQTA is 
both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level; this indicates that well 
capitalized banks are more efficient. This result is in line with previous studies 
(Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan (2003); Staikouras and Wood 
(2004); Goddard et al. (2004); Reda and Isik, 2006; Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007); 
and Kosmidou (2008)). This finding is explained by the fact that high capital 
requirements may result in higher levels of equity capital. Thereby, this reduces the 
probability of financial distress and, in turn, reduces costs by lowering the risk 
premiums on substitutes for other potential more costly risk management activities 
(Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Casu and Molyneux 2000). In other words, the 
result gives  support to the argument that well capitalized banks face lower costs of 
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going bankrupt and face lower their cost of funding which, thereby, results in higher 
efficiency levels.  In addition, some studies (Isik and Hassan, 2003), which found that 
high capital requirements increased the banks’ efficiency, support the argument in 
favour of the moral hazard theory (Srairi, 2009). This positive relationship between 
PTE and bank capitalization may indicate, also, that, because there is less capital at 
stake, the shareholders of less capitalized banks have lower incentives to monitor their 
banks’ management (Naceur, 2011).
The results show that the relationship between PTE and bank size (SIZERT) is both 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results indicate clearly that 
the larger banks tend to exhibit a higher level of PTE. This  result is consistent with 
the findings of Akhavein et al. (1997), Cornett et al. (2006), Al-Sharkas et al. (2008), 
Olson and Zoubi (2011), and Sufian et al. (2012), which concluded that the larger the 
total assets, the greater  the degree of efficiency. The large banks can take advantage 
of economies of scale by sharing costs in the production process. The greater 
efficiency of larger banks can be due to the smaller differences between the bank’s 
capital size and its history (Hassan et al., 2009).  Therefore, this follows the theory of 
Conventional Economic Efficiency whereby, with the increment of bank size, banks 
are able to produce outputs at lower costs and, subsequently, increase their overall 
performance and efficiency. Moreover, compared to their small and medium sized 
peers, the large banks tend to report improvements in efficiency because incurred 
higher costs tend to be offset by higher revenues received via quality services (Sufian, 
2012). 
The coefficient on ratio of Net Loans to Total Assets (NL/TA) is both positive and 
significant at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, this indicates that, when the 
bank’s portfolio increases (hence exposing the bank to more credit risk), the bank’s 
manager may have incentives to better control costs (Fuentes and Vergara, 2003). For 
instance, by using a stochastic frontier model for a panel of 481 banks in Latin 
American countries, Carvallo and Kasman (2005) found a positive relationship 
between the loans to assets ratio and cost efficiency.  Therefore, they argue that banks, 
which engage in greater amounts of lending activity, have the ability to manage 
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operations more productively. This enables them to have lower production costs and, 
consequently, they tend to operate more efficiently. 
Four macroeconomic (country-level) variables are significant in the pure technical 
efficiency equations. Firstly, this is in line with the findings of Olson and Zoubi 
(2012) and Figueira et al. (2009) who report a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between efficiency and concentration (HHI) at the 5% level of 
significance level. This result is consistent with the Efficient Structure Theory (EST).  
ESH’s main idea is that an industry will become more concentrated under competitive 
conditions if some firms expand their outputs. Such expansion will increase the 
degree of concentration at the same time since it increases the rate of return. The 
result may be better products that satisfy demand at a lower cost. In this case, efficient 
firms tend to achieve a larger market share, leading to increased concentration within 
the industry. The firms’ success is reflected in higher returns and stock prices and not 
through higher input prices (Demsetz, 1973 and 1974). In other words, the best-
managed firms (i.e. efficient banks) have the lowest costs and the largest market 
shares lead to a higher degree of concentration. Secondly, the market capitalization 
variable (MKTCY) relates both positively and significantly to pure technical 
efficiency at the 5% level of significance. Therefore, as expected, an increase in 
market capitalization may lead to an improvement in pure technical efficiency. This 
result implies that, during the period under study, the stock market acted as a 
complement to rather than substitute for potential borrowers (banking sector). This is 
in line with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), Beck et al. (2000), and 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) which suggest a positive relationship between 
efficiency and market capitalization. 
The two World Governance Indicators (WGI) variables show different significant 
influences on the Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE). - Voice and Accountability 
(VACC) is significantly negative while Regulation Quality (REGQ) is positive. 
Firstly, with regard to the relevance of voice and accountability, the findings show 
that, at the 5% level of significance, a higher level of media independence has a 
negative influence on pure technical efficiency. This outcome might be justified by 
the fact that effective supervision on media might prevent negative rumours which, 
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regardless of their validity, could damage a bank’s reputation and could have a 
negative effect on the investors’ (lenders or depositors) sentiments and result in a run 
on the bank and deterioration of bank’s performance. Thus, a greater level of effective 
supervision on media independence promotes a bank’s pure technical efficiency. This 
is consistent with the findings of Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) which show a 
negative impact for Voice and accountability on the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
Secondly, at the 1% level of significance, REGQ exhibits a positive relationship with 
the PTE. This may be explained by the fact that often government intervention is 
justified in order to prevent the development of monopoly power and excessive risk 
taking by banks (e.g. Freixas and Santomero, 2004). Namely, this variable indicates 
good regulation and not more regulation. One approach points to the deregulation of 
financial services and institutions as being a fundamental reason that led to the crisis 
(Chortareas et al., 2012).
6.2.1 Regional Analyses 
In addition to our previous pooled-model analysis, we conducted five regression 
analyses for four different regions (MENA, East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, and EU 
and Central Asia) and one pooled region (MENA, East Asia and Pacific, South Asia).
Appendices 11, 12, 13 and 14 present four RE models that include, individually, the 
former four-region dummy variables in order to determine the drivers of PTE. 
Moreover, Appendix 10 shows the four region dummy variables pooled into a single 
RE in order to estimate the determinants of PTE.    
6.2.1.1. MENA Model
Similar to our previous findings, three bank- and one country-level variables exhibit 
positive relationships to the PTE. The coefficient on the capitalization variable 
(EQ/TA) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that 
well capitalized banks are more efficient. This result is in line with previous studies 
(Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2003; Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti, 2006; Reda and Isik, 2006; Naceur, 2011). Moreover, the coefficient on ratio of 
Net Loans to Total Assets (NT/TA) is both positive and significant at the 1% level of 
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significance; this is consistent with the findings of Fuentes and Vergara, 2003, and 
Carvallo and Kasman, 2005.
Table 6.13: Determinants of PTE of MENA
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
ISMDUM -0.04256 0.04921 -0.86 0.3871 -0.139 0.05388
ISFCRIS 0.0358 0.03426 1.04 0.296 -0.03134 0.10294
FCRISIS -0.01494 0.02361 -0.63 0.5268 -0.06121 0.03133
NL_TA .00408*** 0.00099 4.12 0 0.00214 0.00602
LLP_GL .27696D-04 0.4156D-04 0.67 -0.5051 0.53754D-04 0.10914D-03
EQ_TA .00633*** 0.00135 4.7 0 0.00369 0.00897
SIZERT .08499*** 0.01652 5.14 0 0.05261 0.11737
RES_YPC -0.0041 0.01804 -0.23 0.8204 -0.03946 0.03126
YGR -0.00317 0.00349 -0.91 0.3635 -0.01002 0.00367
HHI 0.51486 0.41434 1.24 0.214 -0.29722 1.32694
INFL 0.00094 0.00121 0.77 0.4386 -0.00143 0.0033
MKTCY 0.00121*** 0.00033 3.67 0.0002 0.00056 0.00185
VACC 0.00018 0.00197 0.09 0.9267 -0.00368 0.00404
REGQ -0.00131 0.00147 -0.89 0.3713 -0.00419 0.00156
Constant -0.62221*** 0.16238 -3.83 0.0001 -0.94046 -0.30396
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
777 observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)         =            e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                            =            0.021056
            SD.[e]                                  =            0.145107
            Var[u]                                  =         0.030502
            SD.[u]                                  =           0 .174648
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                  =           0.591605
            Sum of Squares                                  17.0256
            R-squared                                           0.332510
[1 degrees of freedom, prob. Value  =           0.000000]
Note: We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
Since the higher figures of the ratio denote lower liquidity (level of liquid assets held 
by the bank), the results imply that the relatively less (more) liquid banks tend to 
exhibit higher (lower) efficiency levels. The results show, also, that the relationship 
between PTE and bank size (SIZERT) is positive (and statistically significant at the 
1% level). The result is consistent with the findings of Akhavein et al. (1997), Cornett 
et al. (2006), Al-Sharkas et al. (2008), Olson and Zoubi (2011), Sufian et al. (2012) 
which concluded that the larger the total assets, the greater  the efficiency. The large 
banks can take advantage of economies of scale by sharing costs in the production 
process. At the country-level, the market capitalization variable (MKTCY) relates 
both positively and significantly related to pure technical efficiency at the 1% level of 
significance level. This is in line with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1996), Beck et al. (2000), and Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) which suggest that 
the stock market acts as a complement to, rather than substitute to potential borrowers 
(banking sector).
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6.2.1.2 East Asia and Pacific Model
Similar to previous findings, the PTE of East Asia and Pacific region show positive 
relationships with three bank-level variables (i.e. Net loans-to-Total Assets ratio 
(NL/TA), Equity-to-Total Assets ratio (EQ/TA), and Bank Size (SIZERT)). However, 
in addition to these former variables, a particular variable, namely the Islamic Banks-
During Crisis dummy (ISFCRIS), shows both a positive and significant influence on 
the pure technical efficiency of East Asia and Pacific banks. This suggests that, in the 
countries of East Asia and the Pacific region, the Islamic banks showed resilience 
towards the crisis (2007-2009). Moreover, (by 0.07) the IBs are more efficient than 
conventional banks. This outperformance is explained by the fact that Islamic banks 
transactions and instruments may comply with Shari’ah law, and are well regulated 
and supervised by responsible financial authorities.
Table 6.14: Determinants of PTE of East Asia and Pacific countries
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
ISMDUM -0.11625 0.07575 -1.53 0.1249 -0.26472 0.03221
ISFCRIS .07371** 0.0329 2.24 0.0251 0.00922 0.13819
FCRISIS -0.04292 0.03067 -1.4 0.1616 -0.10303 0.01718
NL_TA .00223** 0.00098 2.27 0.0231 0.0003 0.00415
LLP_GL 0.00096 0.00303 0.32 0.7511 -0.00497 0.00689
EQ_TA .00758*** 0.00167 4.53 0 0.0043 0.01087
SIZERT .07149*** 0.0249 2.87 0.0041 0.02269 0.12028
RES_YPC 0.03861 0.02749 1.4 0.1601 -0.01526 0.09249
YGR 0.00051 0.0062 0.08 0.934 -0.01163 0.01266
HHI -0.50074 1.36598 -0.37 0.7139 -3.17802 2.17653
INFL -0.0004 0.00352 -0.11 0.9102 -0.00729 0.0065
MKTCY -0.00014 0.00037 -0.38 0.7076 -0.00087 0.00059
VACC -0.00275 0.00432 -0.64 0.5245 -0.01122 0.00572
REGQ 0.00244 0.00252 0.97 0.3339 -0.00251 0.00738
Constant -0.16227 0.35813 -0.45 0.6505 -0.86421 0.53966
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
315 observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)        =             e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                          =             0.015392
            SD.[e]                                 =             0.124065
            Var[u]                                 =             0.054454
            SD.[u]                                 =            0.233354
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                 =            0.779628
            Sum of Squares                                 0.395607E+08
            R-squared                                          0.098889
[ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =           0.000000]
Note: We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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6.2.1.3 South Asia Model
In the South Asia region, Bank Size (SIZERT) was the only explanatory variables that 
had a significant effect on the banks’ PTE. This outcome may suggest that the 
countries of South Asia region are considered to be poor and underdeveloped and that 
they encounter adverse socioeconomic conditions. Unlike previous findings, SIZERT 
exhibits a negative relationship with PTE. This is in line with the findings of Berger 
and Hannan (1994), Beck et al. (2013) and Johnes et al. (2014). This result might be
explained by the fact that larger banks may tend to be less efficient due to their 
managements seeking  quiet lives by pursuing other objectives or by maintaining the 
advantages which their market power produces (Berger and Hannan, 1994).
Table 6.15: Determinants of PTE of South Asia countries 
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
ISMDUM 0.06204 0.06531 0.95 0.3422 -0.06596 0.19004
ISFCRIS -0.02679 0.02443 -1.1 0.2727 -0.07467 0.02108
FCRISIS -0.00704 0.02118 -0.33 0.7398 -0.04855 0.03448
NL_TA 0.00129 0.00105 1.23 0.2185 -0.00076 0.00334
LLP_GL 0.0016 0.00125 1.29 0.198 -0.00084 0.00405
EQ_TA 0.00119 0.00103 1.15 0.2497 -0.00084 0.00321
SIZERT -.08538*** 0.0163 -5.24 0 -0.11733 -0.05343
RES_YPC -0.0312 0.08996 -0.35 0.7287 -0.20753 0.14512
YGR 0.00768 0.00992 0.77 0.4389 -0.01177 0.02713
HHI -0.124 0.48215 -0.26 0.797 -1.06899 0.82099
INFL -0.00048 0.00304 -0.16 0.8735 -0.00645 0.00548
MKTCY 0.00021 0.00185 0.11 0.9111 -0.00343 0.00384
VACC 0.00035 0.00356 0.1 0.9223 -0.00664 0.00733
REGQ -0.00436 0.00972 -0.45 0.6534 -0.02341 0.01468
Constant .78845*** 0.24144 3.27 0.0011 0.31524 1.26165
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
182 observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)         =             e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                            =            0.004937
            SD.[e]                                  =             0.070266
            Var[u]                                  =             0.023552
            SD.[u]                                  =             0.153465
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                  =           0.826694
            Sum of Squares                                  4.97527
             R-squared                                          0.415404
  [ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =          0.000000]
Note: We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
6.2.1.4 EU and Central Asia Model
Similar to previous findings, Bank Size (SIZERT), Equity-to-Total Assets ratio 
(EQ/TA), and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) are the three explanatory 
variables which have a significant effect on the PTE, the former at the 1% level of 
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significance and the latter two latter at the 5%  level of significance. These three 
variables exhibit positive relationship with the PTE. This  was in line with the 
findings of Olson and Zoubi (2011) and Figueira et al. (2009) who reported  both a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between efficiency and concentration 
(HHI); Berger and Mester (1997), Isik and Hassan (2003), Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti (2006), Reda and Isik (2006) and Naceur (2011) who presented both a  positive 
significant relationship between efficiency and Capitalization (EQ/TA); and Akhavein 
et al. (1997), Cornett et al. (2006), Al-Sharkas et al. (2008), Olson and Zoubi (2011), 
Sufian et al. (2012)- who concluded that the larger the total assets (SIZERT) the 
greater the efficiency.
Table 6.16: Determinants of PTE of EU and Central Asia countries
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
ISMDUM 0.0006 0.0552 0.01 0.9913 -0.10759 0.1088
ISFCRIS -0.00216 0.03671 -0.06 0.9531 -0.0741 0.06979
FCRISIS -0.03646 0.03432 -1.06 0.2882 -0.10373 0.03082
NL_TA 0.00202 0.00124 1.63 0.1025 -0.00041 0.00445
LLP_GL .00511* 0.00305 1.68 0.0935 -0.00086 0.01109
EQ_TA .00335** 0.00138 2.42 0.0156 0.00063 0.00606
SIZERT .11626*** 0.03125 3.72 0.0002 0.05502 0.1775
RES_YPC -0.0471 0.0393 -1.2 0.2307 -0.12412 0.02993
YGR 0.00371 0.00343 1.08 0.2801 -0.00302 0.01043
HHI .98305** 0.47871 2.05 0.04 0.04481 1.9213
INFL -0.00576 0.0053 -1.09 0.2769 -0.01615 0.00462
MKTCY -.00131** 0.00057 -2.28 0.0227 -0.00243 -0.00018
VACC .01805*** 0.00352 5.12 0 0.01115 0.02496
REGQ -.01141*** 0.00374 -3.05 0.0023 -0.01875 -0.00408
Constant -.96813*** 0.36658 -2.64 0.0083 -1.68661 -0.24966
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
119 observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)              =          e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                                =          0.004868
            SD.[e]                                      =          0.069772
            Var[u]                                      =          0.007440
            SD.[u]                                      =          0.086257
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                     =           0.604489
            Sum of Squares                                    0.802277
            R-squared                                           0.504480
   [ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =           0.000000]
Note:  We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
On the other hand, three macroeconomic (country-level) variables (voice and 
accountability, regulation quality, and market capitalization) show different 
significant relationships with PTE. Relative to our previous findings- at  the 1%  level 
of significance level- the former (VACC) exhibit both a negative and statistically 
significant influence on the pure technical efficiency of EU and Central Asia banks 
whereas the  latter two variables  (REGQ) and (MKTCY) show a positive relationship 
with the PTE at the 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively.  Unlike our 
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previous findings, VACC suggests that more developed and democratic systems are 
conducive to the more efficient operations of financial institutions. It implies, also, 
that the capacity of government to formulate effectively, implement sound policies,
and promote socially desirable investments can enhance efficiency in the industry and 
the welfare of the economy. Despite our previous outcomes, the negative relationship 
between REGQ and PTE may be explained by the fact that banks’ greater 
independence from government control allows the bank boards to be accountable to 
their shareholders while limited financial freedom can distort the incentives of 
bankers’ boards accountable to government bodies and which strive to meet particular 
government imposed regulations. Moreover, limited financial freedom may encourage 
financial institutions to create opaque new instruments and miscalculate risk. In 
addition, the banking sector and the capital market are complementary and 
government imposed regulations may have a negative impact in the case of 
competition between them. As for Market capitalization variable,  the result shows 
that  higher levels of market capitalization lead to lower PTE of EU and Central Asia 
banks; this suggests that that there is competition between the banking sector and the 
capital market (stock market) . This is in line with the findings of Johnes et al. (2014). 
In addition to the previous findings’ variables, the ratio of LLP/Total Loans shows 
significant positive influence on the PTE at 10% significance level. In this case, the 
higher the level of reserves (and, hence, the greater degree of protection for the bank 
from bad loans) provides more PTE. This suggests that banks, which behave 
prudently in terms of insuring against bad loans, reap rewards in terms of PTE. 
6.2.1.5 MENA-East Asia and Pacific-South Asia Region Model
Similar to our previous findings, three bank-level (i.e. Net loans-to-Total Assets ratio 
(NL/TA), Equity-to-Total Assets ratio (EQ/TA), and Bank Size (SIZERT)) and three 
country-level variables (i.e. the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), Market 
Capitalization (MKT) and Voice and Accountability (VACC)) exhibit significant 
relationships to pure technical efficiency. The coefficient on ratio of Net Loans to 
Total Assets (NT/TA) is both positive and significant at the 1% level; this is 
consistent with the findings of Fuentes and Vergara, 2003, and Carvallo and Kasman, 
2005. Since the higher figures denote lower liquidity (level of liquid assets held by the 
bank), the results imply that the relatively less (more) liquid banks tend to exhibit 
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higher (lower) efficiency levels. Moreover, the coefficient on the capitalization 
variable (EQ/TA) is both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level; this 
indicates that well capitalized banks are more efficient. This result is in line with 
previous studies (Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2003; Berger and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Reda and Isik, 2006; Naceur, 2011).
Table 6.17: Determinants of PTE of MENA-East Asia and Pacific-South Asia region
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
ISMDUM -0.04958 0.04246 -1.17 0.2429 -0.13279 0.03364
ISFCRIS 0.03194 0.01999 1.6 0.1101 -0.00725 0.07112
FCRISIS -0.01678 0.01347 -1.25 0.2129 -0.04318 0.00962
NL_TA .00310*** 0.00064 4.83 0 0.00184 0.00436
LLP_GL -.21397D-04 .4689D-04 -0.46 -0.6482 .11330D-03 .70508D-04
EQ_TA .00571*** 0.00086 6.62 0 0.00402 0.0074
SIZERT .04020*** 0.01282 3.14 0.0017 0.01508 0.06533
RES_YPC 0.00223 0.01058 0.21 0.8331 -0.0185 0.02296
YGR -.00551** 0.00228 -2.42 0.0156 -0.00997 -0.00104
HHI .58028*** 0.19376 2.99 0.0027 0.20051 0.96005
INFL .00160* 0.0009 1.78 0.0755 -0.00016 0.00337
MKTCY .00043** 0.00017 2.54 0.0112 0.0001 0.00077
VACC -.00318** 0.00139 -2.28 0.0227 -0.00044 -0.00591
REGQ 0.0013 0.00101 1.29 0.1983 -0.00068 0.00329
Constant -.32212*** 0.11827 -2.72 0.0065 -0.55393 -0.09031
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
1274 observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)          =         e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                            =        0.016560
            SD.[e]                                  =        0.128685
            Var[u]                                  =        0.055247
            SD.[u]                                  =        0.235047
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                  =        0.769384
            Sum of Squares                              0.242987E+09
            R-squared                                      -0.226190
[1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =        0.000000]
Note:  We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
Also, the results show that the relationship between PTE and bank size (SIZERT) is 
positive (statistically significant at the 1% level). The result is consistent with the 
findings of Akhavein et al. (1997), Cornett et al. (2006), Al-Sharkas et al. (2008), 
Olson and Zoubi (2011), Sufian et al. (2012); they concluded that the larger the total 
assets, the higher the efficiency. The large banks can take advantage of economies of 
scale by sharing costs in the production process. At the country-level, the market 
capitalization variable (MKTCY) is related both positively and significantly to PTE at 
the 5% level of significance. This is in line with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (1996), Beck et al. (2000), and Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000);  they 
suggest that the stock market acts as a complement to rather than substitute to 
potential borrowers (banking sector). The HHI relates positively and significantly to 
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pure technical efficiency at the 10% level of significance. This supports the efficient 
structure theory, which states that the most efficient firms will be able to increase their 
market share, resulting in higher concentration. This is in line with the findings of 
Figueira et al. (2009) and Olson and Zoubi (2011). Regarding the relevance of Voice 
and Accountability (VACC), the findings show that, at the 5% level of significance, a 
higher level of media independence has a negative influence on pure technical 
efficiency. This outcome may be justified by the fact that effective supervision on 
media may prevent negative rumors, regardless of their validity, which can damage a 
bank’s reputation and can have a negative effect on the investors’ (lenders or 
depositors) sentiments and result in a run on the bank and deterioration in its 
performance. Thus, a higher level of effective supervision on media independence 
promotes a bank’s PTE. This is consistent with the findings of Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2015).
In addition to the previous findings’ variables, three macroeconomic (country-level) 
variables show significance in the PTE equations. Firstly, the coefficient of the 
Growth in real GDP (YGR) variable shows a negative sign (statistically significant at 
the 5% level). This suggests that, under expansive demand conditions, banks may feel 
less pressure to control their inputs and, thus, become less efficient. This is in line 
with Pasiouras (2008) who found a negative relationship between the growth of GDP 
and efficiency. Secondly, at the 10% level of significance, inflation shows both a 
significant and positive influence on PTE.  This suggests that a full anticipation of the 
rate of inflation may raise profits since banks can appropriately adjust interest rates to 
increase revenues. This is consistent with the findings of Bourke (1989), Molyneux 
and Thornton (1992), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). 
6.2.2 Analyses of Muslim versus non-Muslim Countries
We ran the following four regression analyses in order to differentiate between the 
determinants of banks based in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The four models 
were: IBs in non-Muslim countries; conventional banks in Muslim countries; IBs in 
Muslim countries; and conventional banks in non-Muslim countries. Appendices 16 
and 17 present two random effects models which  include dummy variables 
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(CBINMC and CBINNMC in N.6, and IBINMC and IBINNMC in O.6)  in order to 
determine the drivers of PTE, particularly the influence of these dummy variables on 
PTE, based in  Muslim and non-Muslim countries.
Table 6.18: Sample Distribution by Region and by Type of Bank
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total number of 
Observations
Islamic Banks in Muslim 
Countries
57 66 76 81 82 85 73 520
Islamic Banks in Non-
Muslim Countries
2 7 7 6 6 4 2 34
Conventional Banks in 
Muslim Countries
68 74 78 80 78 80 70 528
Conventional Banks in 
Non-Muslim Countries
6 6 7 7 7 5 5 43
Total  Ob./ year 133 153 168 174 173 174 150 1125
6.2.2.1 Islamic Banks in non-Muslim Countries Model
Similar to our previous findings, three variables determine the PTE of Islamic banks 
in non-Muslim countries. These determinants are the ratio of Net Loans to Total 
Assets (NL/TA), the ratio of Equity to Total Assets (EQ/TA), and Market 
Capitalization (MKTCY). The coefficient on the capitalization variable (EQ/TA) is 
both positive and statistically significant at the 5% level; this indicates that well 
capitalized banks are more efficient. This result is in line with previous studies 
(Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2003; Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti, 2006; Reda and Isik, 2006; Naceur, 2011). Moreover, the coefficient on ratio of 
Net Loans to Total Assets (NT/TA) is both positive and significant at the 1% level of 
significance. This is consistent with the findings of Fuentes and Vergara, 2003, and 
Carvallo and Kasman, 2005.
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Table 6.19: Determinants of PTE of Islamic banks in non-Muslim countries
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
Z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
FCRISIS 0.04448 0.03149 1.41 0.1578 -0.01723 0.10619
NL_TA 0.00599*** 0.00133 4.49 0 0.00337 0.0086
LLP_GL -.75896D-04** 0.3173D-04 -2.39 0.0168 -0.13810D-03 -0.13697D-04
EQ_TA 0.00424** 0.00176 2.41 0.0162 0.00079 0.0077
SIZERT -0.07911 0.0759 -1.04 0.2973 -0.22788 0.06966
RES_YPC 0.31289*** 0.08592 3.64 0.0003 0.14448 0.4813
YGR 0.00689* 0.00358 1.93 0.054 -0.00012 0.0139
HHI -51.1896*** 7.95698 -6.43 0 -66.785 -35.5942
INFL -0.00166 0.00888 -0.19 0.8517 -0.01906 0.01574
MKTCY 0.00122*** 0.00046 2.64 0.0082 0.00031 0.00212
VACC 0.00615** 0.00281 2.19 0.0289 0.00063 0.01166
REGQ 0.0038 0.00452 0.84 0.401 -0.00506 0.01266
Constant 2.31479*** 0.5777 4.01 0.0001 1.18251 3.44706
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
63 observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)            =       e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                              =       0.001747
            SD.[e]                                    =        0.041792
            Var[u]                                    =        0.010996
            SD.[u]                                   =         0.104864
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                   =         0.862937
            Sum of Squares                                0.314854
            R-squared                                         0.607522
[ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value   =        0.000000]
Note:  We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
Since the ratio’s higher figures denote lower liquidity (level of liquid assets held by 
the bank), the results imply that the relatively less (more) liquid banks tend to exhibit 
higher (lower) efficiency levels. At the country-level, the market capitalization 
variable (MKTCY) is related both positively and significantly at the 1% level of 
significance to PTE. This is in line with the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1996), Beck et al. (2000), and Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000); these suggest that 
the stock market acts as a complement to rather than substitute to potential borrowers 
(banking sector). On the other hand, when compared to previous findings, two 
macroeconomic variables (the normalized (HHI) and VACC) show different 
influences on pure technical efficiency. Firstly, at the 1% level of significance, the 
significantly negative coefficient on HHI provides support for the ‘quiet life’ 
hypothesis. This is in line with the findings of Berger and Humphrey (1997), and 
Berger and Hannan (1998), Yudistira (2004), and Staikouras et al. (2008). Secondly, 
at the 5% level of significance, VACC exhibits a positive relationship with the PTE. 
This suggests that more developed and democratic systems are conducive for banking 
operations that are more efficient. It implies, also, that the capacity of government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies and promote socially desirable 
investments can enhance the efficiency in the banking industry and the welfare of the 
economy. 
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In addition to the previous findings, one bank-level variable and two country-level 
variables exhibit a relationship with the PTE of IBs based in non-Muslim countries.  
At the 5% level of significance, the coefficient of the Loan Loss Provision-to-Gross 
Loans ratio (LLP/GL) variable is negative and this suggests that banks with higher 
credit risk tend to exhibit lower efficiency levels. This is consistent with the findings 
of Thakor (1987), and Miller and Noulas (1997). Moreover, at the 1% level of 
significance, the coefficient on GDP per Capita (RES_YPC) is positive. This may be 
explained by the fact that, in wealthy countries (with high GDP per capita), demand 
for loans may be lower relative to the non-wealthy countries (with low to medium 
GDP per capita). The coefficient of the Growth in real GDP (YGR) variable entered 
the regression model with a positive sign (statistically significant at the 1% level). 
Thus, it supports the argument of the association between economic growth and the 
performance of the banking sector. Countries, with higher per capita income, have 
banking systems which operate in a more mature environment; this results in more 
competitive interest rates and profit margins. Moreover, costs may reduce with overall 
development because of corresponding improvements in the quality of state 
institutions. This finding is in line with Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), and 
Grigorian and Manole (2002).
6.2.2.2 Conventional Banks in Muslim Countries Model
Similar to the previous findings, the PTE of the East Asia and Pacific regions show 
positive relationships with three bank-level and three country-level variables (i.e. 
NL/TA,  EQ/TA and  SIZERT) and the HHI, MKTCY and  REGQ). The coefficient 
on the ratio of NT/TA is both positive and significant at the 5% level of significance; 
this is consistent with the findings of Fuentes and Vergara, 2003, and Carvallo and 
Kasman, 2005. Moreover, the coefficient on EQ/TA is both positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level; this indicates that well capitalized banks are more 
efficient. This result is in line with previous studies (Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik 
and Hassan, 2003; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Reda and Isik, 2006; Naceur, 
2011). The results show, also, that the relationship between PTE and bank size 
(SIZERT) is both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 6.20: Determinants of PTE of conventional banks in Muslim countries 
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
FCRISIS -0.0203 0.01289 -1.58 0.1151 -0.04556 0.00495
NL_TA .00212** 0.00088 2.4 0.0165 0.00039 0.00384
LLP_GL -0.00091 0.00285 -0.32 0.7505 -0.00648 0.00467
EQ_TA 0.00700*** 0.00186 3.77 0.0002 0.00336 0.01065
SIZERT 0.04892*** 0.01626 3.01 0.0026 0.01704 0.08079
RES_YPC 0.01242 0.01279 0.97 0.3312 -0.01264 0.03749
YGR -0.00556** 0.00261 -2.13 0.0332 -0.01067 -0.00044
HHI 0.60043*** 0.23202 2.59 0.0097 0.14569 1.05517
INFL 0.00148 0.0011 1.35 0.1778 -0.00067 0.00364
MKTCY 0.00042** 0.00021 1.98 0.0477 0 0.00083
VACC 0.00176 0.00173 1.02 0.3081 -0.00162 0.00514
REGQ 0.00223* 0.0013 1.71 0.0866 -0.00032 0.00478
Constant -0.38971** 0.15416 -2.53 0.0115 -0.69186 -0.08757
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
602 observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)    =     e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                      =       0.014624
            SD.[e]                            =       0.120928
            Var[u]                            =       0.038040
            SD.[u]                           =       0.195038
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]            =       0.722319
            Sum of Squares                       22.1061
            R-squared                               0.180196
[1 degrees of freedom, prob. Value  =       0.000000]
Note: We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
The result is consistent with the findings of Akhavein et al. (1997), Cornett et al. 
(2006), Al-Sharkas et al. (2008), Olson and Zoubi (2011), Sufian et al. (2012).   They 
concluded that the larger the total assets, the higher the efficiency. The large banks 
can take advantage of economies of scale by sharing costs in the production process. 
At the country-level and at the 5% level of significance, the market MKTCY variable 
is related positively and significantly to PTE. This is in line with the findings of
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), Beck et al. (2000), and Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 
(2000); they suggest that the stock market acts as a complement to rather than an 
substitute to potential borrowers (banking sector). Moreover, two macroeconomic 
variables (the HHI and REGQ) show a positive influence on PTE. Firstly, at the 1% 
level of significance, the significantly positive coefficient on HHI, provides support 
for the efficient structure theory. This is in line with the findings of Figueira et al. 
(2009) and Olson and Zoubi (2011). Secondly, at the 19% level of significance, 
REGQ exhibits a positive relationship with the PTE. This is explained by the fact that 
often government intervention is justified in order to prevent the development of 
banks’ monopoly power and excessive risk taking (e.g., Freixas and Santomero, 
2004). One approach points to the deregulation of financial services and institutions as 
a fundamental reason which led to the crisis. Thirdly, the coefficient of the YGR 
168
variable shows a negative sign (statistically significant at the 5% level); this suggests 
that, under expansive demand conditions, banks may feel less pressure to control their 
inputs and, thus, become less efficient. This is in line with Pasiouras (2008) who 
found a negative relationship between growth of GDP and efficiency.
6.2.2.3. Islamic Banks in Muslim Countries Model
Three bank- and one country-level variables exhibit positive relationships to the PTE. 
The coefficient on the ratio of NT/TA is positive and significant at the 1% level; this 
is consistent with the findings of Fuentes and Vergara, 2003, and Carvallo and 
Kasman, 2005. Since the  higher figures denote lower liquidity (level of liquid assets 
held by the bank), the results imply that the relatively less (more) liquid banks tend to 
exhibit higher (lower) efficiency levels. Moreover, the coefficient on the EQ/TA 
variable is both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level; this indicates that 
well capitalized banks are more efficient. This result is in line with previous studies 
(Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2003; Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti, 2006; Reda and Isik, 2006; Naceur, 2011).
The results show, also, that the relationship between PTE and bank size (SIZERT) is 
both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The result is consistent with 
the findings of Akhavein et al. (1997), Cornett et al. (2006), Al-Sharkas et al. (2008), 
Olson and Zoubi (2011), Sufian et al. (2012); they  concluded that the larger the total 
assets, the higher the efficiency. The large banks can take advantage of economies of 
scale by sharing costs in the production process. At the country-level and at the 1% 
level of significance, the significantly positive coefficient on HHI provides support 
for the efficient structure theory. This is in line with the findings of this is in line with 
the findings of Figueira et al. (2009) and Olson and Zoubi (2011). 
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Table 6.21: Determinants of PTE of Islamic banks in Muslim countries 
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
FCRISIS 0.00886 0.01698 0.52 0.6017 -0.02442 0.04215
NL_TA .00398*** 0.00098 4.04 0.0001 0.00205 0.00591
LLP_GL -0.00043 0.00027 -1.59 0.1123 -0.00096 0.0001
EQ_TA 0.00664*** 0.00115 5.79 0 0.00439 0.00888
SIZERT 0.05547*** 0.01987 2.79 0.0053 0.01652 0.09443
RES_YPC -0.02164 0.01666 -1.3 0.1939 -0.05428 0.01101
YGR -0.0018 0.00338 -0.53 0.5934 -0.00843 0.00482
HHI 0.82802*** 0.29146 2.84 0.0045 0.25677 1.39927
INFL 0.00023 0.0014 0.16 0.8697 -0.00251 0.00297
MKTCY 0.00035 0.00028 1.28 0.2 -0.00019 0.00089
VACC 0.00167 0.00216 0.77 0.4404 -0.00257 0.00591
REGQ -0.00058 0.00157 -0.37 0.7103 -0.00365 0.00249
Constant -0.42842** 0.18036 -2.38 0.0175 -0.78192 -0.07493
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
665 observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)            =      e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                              =      0.018470
            SD.[e]                                    =       0.135905
            Var[u]                                    =       0.064414
            SD.[u]                                   =       0.253800
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                   =        0.777156
            Sum of Squares                               29.8721
            R-squared                                       0.039854
[1 degrees of freedom, prob. Value  =       0.000000]
Note: We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
6.2.2.4. Conventional Banks in non-Muslim Countries Model
At the bank level and at the 1% level of significance, the coefficient LLP/GL variable 
shows both a positive and significant influence on pure technical efficiency. In this 
case the higher the reserves (and, hence, the higher the protection for the bank from 
bad loans) the higher pure technical efficiency. Unlike previous findings, at the 10% 
level of significance, SIZERT exhibits a negative relationship with PTE. This is in 
line with the findings of Berger and Hannan (1994), Beck et al. (2013) and Johnes et 
al. (2014). This result might be explained by the fact that larger banks may tend to be 
less efficient due to their managements seeking  quiet lives by pursuing other 
objectives or by maintaining the advantages which their market power produces 
(Berger and Hannan, 1994).
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Table 6.22: Determinants of PTE of conventional banks in non-Muslim countries 
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
FCRISIS 0.00085 0.03471 0.02 0.9806 -0.06719 0.06888
NL_TA -0.00031 0.00181 -0.17 0.8658 -0.00385 0.00324
LLP_GL 0.01233*** 0.00456 2.71 0.0068 0.0034 0.02126
EQ_TA -0.00255 0.00167 -1.53 0.1262 -0.00581 0.00072
SIZERT -0.08252* 0.04377 -1.89 0.0594 -0.1683 0.00326
RES_YPC -.13189*** 0.04685 -2.82 0.0049 -0.22371 -0.04006
YGR 0.00099 0.00481 0.21 0.8374 -0.00845 0.01042
HHI 3.10328*** 1.01959 3.04 0.0023 1.10493 5.10163
INFL -0.00474 0.0056 -0.85 0.3973 -0.01573 0.00624
MKTCY 0.00049 0.00038 1.3 0.1951 -0.00025 0.00124
VACC -.000361** 0.0017 -2.12 0.0336 -0.00694 -0.00028
REGQ 0.00627*** 0.00233 2.69 0.0071 0.0017 0.01084
Constant 0.49102** 0.22867 2.15 0.0318 0.04284 0.9392
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
63 observations observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)            =     e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                              =      0.003352
            SD.[e]                                    =       0.057899
            Var[u]                                    =       0.004984
            SD.[u]                                    =       0.070601
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                   =       0.597889
            Sum of Squares                              0.275331
            R-squared                                       0.843215
[1 degrees of freedom, prob. Value  =       0.000000]
Note:  We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
At the country-level and at the 1% level of significance, the significantly positive 
coefficient on HHI provides support for the efficient structure theory. This is in line 
with the findings of Figueira et al. (2009) and Olson and Zoubi (2011).  Regarding the 
relevance of the VACC variable, the findings show, at the 5% level of significance, a 
negative relationship between this variable and the PTE; this suggests that a higher 
level of media independence has a negative influence on PTE. This outcome may be 
justified by the fact that effective supervision on media may prevent negative 
rumours, regardless of their validity, which can damage a bank’s reputation and can 
have a negative effect on the investors’ (lenders or depositors) sentiments resulting in 
a run on the bank and deterioration of the bank’s performance. Thus, a higher level of 
effective supervision on media independence promotes a bank’s pure technical 
efficiency. This is consistent with the findings of Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015).  At 
the 1% level of significance, REGQ exhibits a positive relationship with the PTE. 
This may be explained by the fact that often government intervention is justified in 
order to prevent the development of the banks’ monopoly power and excessive risk 
taking (e.g., Freixas and Santomero, 2004). One approach points to the deregulation 
of financial services and institutions as a fundamental reason that led to the crisis.  At 
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the 1% level of significance, the coefficient on RES_YPC is negative. This may be 
explained by the fact that relative to the non-wealthy countries (with low to medium 
GDP per capita), there is lower demand for loans in wealthy countries (with high GDP 
per capita). In other words, people, earning high incomes, may have lower tendencies 
to borrow money. In order to enhance the level of borrowings or demand for loans, 
banks may reduce their returns on loans; this would result in narrowing the net 
interest spread.  Therefore, banks may incur a decline in their earnings and 
subsequently in their profits, leading to lower efficiency. The findings are consistent 
with Grigorian and Manole (2002), and Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000).
6.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter reported the empirical results from the methodologies summarized in the 
previous chapter. It consisted of two sections; the first section measured at the global 
level (21 countries) the three types of efficiency (OTE, PTE and SE) of Islamic and 
conventional banks over the period of study from 2006 to2012. The second section 
investigated the impact of bank and country-level variables on the banks’ efficiency 
(PTE); this was based on three different analysis models (i.e. pooled analysis, regional 
analysis and an analysis of Muslim compared with non-Muslim countries).
  
The first section measured the overall technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency 
and scale efficiency by applying a non-parametric approach- Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA).  We employed the bootstrap method In order to reach the best-
statistically efficiency scores and to enhance the statistical inferences.  We estimated a 
common frontier for a panel of 199 banks (104 Islamic banks and 95 conventional 
banks). The findings implied that, when compared to conventional banks, IBs  showed 
significant higher mean Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE) and Scale Efficiency 
(SE) previous to, during and post-crisis. Although, relative to conventional banks,  
IBs  showed more resilience previous  to crisis- during crisis- and post crisis periods, 
the DEA results provided evidence that, on average, there were  no significant 
differences in pure technical efficiency  between conventional and IBs. This result is 
in line with a number of previous studies (El-Gamal and Inanoglu, 2005, Mokhtar et 
al., 2006, Bader, 2008 and Hassan et al., 2009). 
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The second section examined the determinants of the IBs’ and conventional banks’ 
pooled PTE. The findings implied that, during the financial crisis (2007-2009), IBs 
had no significance on pooled PTE and showed no significant differences in 
performance (efficiency) relative to conventional banks. Moreover, the larger Net 
Loans-to-Total Assets ratio (NT/TA), Bank Capitalization (EQ/TA), Bank Size 
(SIZERT), Market Concentration (HHI), Market Capitalization (MKTCY) and 
Regulation Quality (REGQ) tended to improve efficiency. However, less dependency 
of media and democracy (VACC) resulted in better bank efficiency. 
Under the regional analyses, we conducted five models in order to determine the 
drivers of the PTE in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Asia and 
Pacific, South Asia, Europe (EU) and Central Asia, and MENA-East Asia and Pacific-
South Asia regions. The outcomes of four regional regression analyses showed similar 
determinants to our previous findings which were (pooled PTE) for the PTE of the 
MENA region (NL/TA, EQ/TA, SIZERT, and MKTCY), East Asia and Pacific region 
(NL/TA, EQ/TA, and SIZERT), EU and Central Asia region (EQ/TA, SIZERT, HHI 
VACC and REGQ), and MENA-East Asia and Pacific-South Asia region-North 
Africa region (NL/TA, EQ/TA, SIZERT, HHI, MKTCY, and VACC). In addition to 
these explored determinants, the ISFCRIS dummy variable presented a positive-
statistically influence on the PTE of the East Asia and Pacific regions. This suggested 
that, when compared to conventional banks, IBs were more efficient during the 
financial crisis (2007-2009). Moreover, LLP/GL ratio reported a positive influence on 
the pure technical efficiency of EU and Central Asia. Unlike the pooled pure technical 
efficiency’s findings, the Growth in Real GDP (YGR) and Inflation (INFL) were the 
two variables which displayed statistical-significance on the PTE of MENA-East 
Asia and Pacific-South Asia - North Africa region, the former negatively and the 
latter positively. On the other hand, only one variable (SIZERT) exhibited a 
significant relationship with the PTE of the South Asia region; this was negative 
unlike our previous results. Additionally, two variables (VACC and REGQ) showed 
significant relationships with the PTE of EU and Central Asia regions,; these were, 
also, opposite to the pooled PTE’s findings. 
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As for the comparison of Muslim with non-Muslim countries’ analyses, we used four 
random effects models to examine the determinants of pure technical efficiency of IBs  
in Non-Muslim Countries (IBINNMC), Conventional Banks in Muslim Countries 
(CBINMC), Islamic Banks in Muslim Countries (IBINMC), and Conventional Banks 
in Non-Muslim Countries (CBINNMC). The four regression analyses noted similar 
determinants to our previous findings (pooled PTE) for the pure technical efficiency 
of IBINNMC (NL/TA, EQ/TA and MKTCY), CBINMC (NL/TA, EQ/TA, SIZERT, 
HHI, MKTCY, and REGQ), IBINMC (NL/TA, EQ/TA, SIZERT and HHI,), and 
CBINNMC (HHI, VACC and REGQ). 
Further to our previous findings, two variables (i.e. Loan Loss Provision-to-Gross 
loans ratio and GDP per Capita) presented statistically-significant relationships with 
both pure technical efficiency of IBINNMC and CBINNMC- Loan Loss Provision-to-
Gross loans ratio (LLP/GL) affect the former (IBINNMC)  negatively and the latter 
(CBINNMC) positively, whereas GDP per Capita (RES_YPC) influenced the former 
positively and the latter negatively. Moreover, the Growth in real GDP (YGR) 
showed significance in the PTE of IBINNMC, stating that YGR led to higher pure 
technical efficiency. On the other hand and compared to our previous findings, two 
macroeconomic variables, namely showed different influences on the PTE of 
IBINNMC-; the HHI negatively, and VACC positively. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This chapter considers the conclusions, contributions and implications of the thesis’ 
findings as well as limitations and suggestions for future research.  We arrived at the 
conclusions after taking into account the results and the discussion of the findings and 
conclusions in previous chapters. As one of the fastest growing segments in global 
financial services, Islamic banking has become systemically significant in many 
markets and too big to ignore in others. While conventional banks are largely debt-
based and allow for risk transfer, IBs, in contrast, are asset-based and concentrate on
sharing risk. In addition to providing IBs with additional buffers, these features make 
their activities more closely related to the real economy and tend to reduce their 
contribution to excesses and bubbles. 
The development of modern Islamic banking arose from Muslims' rejection of the 
interest element in conventional banking. IBs, which started to operate in the early 
1970s, were concentrated initially in the Middle East before spreading to other regions 
such as Asia and Europe. This was due to demand from the Muslim communities as 
well as providing banking choices to bank customers.  Nowadays, Islamic banking 
services are offered by both conventional banks that choose to operate Islamic 
banking windows and full-fledged IBs. They can be either foreign or domestic-owned.
Since Islamic banking has been in operation for over 30 years and was viewed as an 
alternative to interest-based banking, there is a need to assess the performance of 
Islamic banking. In addition, since Islamic banking is part of a country's banking 
system, the performance of Islamic banks may affect the soundness and stability of
the banking system. Moreover, Islamic banking influences the performance of 
conventional banks if they choose to operate Islamic banking windows in addition to 
conventional windows. Therefore, evaluation of the relative performance of Islamic to 
conventional banks will help policy makers to devise policies in order to improve the 
performance of a country's banking system. In addition, the increase in number of 
Islamic banks has boosted the competition between Islamic and conventional banks. 
Consequently, the determination of their relative performances will encourage both 
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Islamic and conventional bank managers to improve their performance in order to 
compete with each other.
7.1 Summary of the Research Questions, Objectives and Methodology 
7.1.1 Research Questions:
This study seeks to tackle these following questions:
1. Do the scale efficiency and the overall and pure technical efficiency vary across 
the two different bank types over 2006-2012?  
2. How efficient are Islamic banks at the global level when compared to 
conventional banks during 2006-2012, particularly during the financial crisis (i.e. 
2007-2009)?  In other words, is there any significance between both types of 
banks?  
3. What are the determinants of efficiency for Islamic and conventional banks, at the 
pooled level?
4. Do the determinants of bank efficiency differ across regions and in Muslim 
countries when compared to non-Muslim countries? Do the determinants of 
Islamic and conventional banks vary in Muslim countries and in non-Muslim 
ones?   
5. Do the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) have any influence on the pure 
technical efficiency of banks?
The findings of this research indicate that Islamic banks outperform conventional 
counterparts in terms of scale efficiency and overall technical efficiency during the 
entire study period (2006-2012). Despite the fact that Islamic banks demonstrate more 
resilience during the financial crisis (2007-2009) at the managerial level (i.e. in terms 
of pure technical efficiency), both of Islamic and conventional   banks show 
insignificant difference since their pure technical values were approximate  and 
showed similar pattern during 2006-2012. Another finding of this thesis, which 
follows from investigating the determinants of bank pure technical efficiency, is that 
worldwide governance indicators (i.e. voice and accountability and regulatory quality) 
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and other variables- capital strength, bank size, market capitalisation, market 
concentration (i.e. HHI), Growth in Real GDP, GDP per Capita, and inflation- show 
distinct influences on bank pure technical efficiency. These variables vary across 
different levels- pooled, regional and religion-based levels.  For instance, Islamic 
banks in Muslim countries and non-Muslim counterparts present similar PTE 
determinants in terms of Net Loans to Total Assets (NL/TA), Capital Strength 
(EQ/TA). On the other hand, five additional variables influence particularly the PTE 
of Islamic banks in non-Muslim countries- such as proxy of Credit Risk (LLP/GL), 
GDP per Capita (RES_YPC), Growth in Real GDP (YGR), Market Capitalisation 
(MKTCY) and Voice and Accountability (VACC). Only one distinct variable, which 
is Bank Size (SIZERT), determine uniquely the PTE of Islamic banks in Muslim 
countries. Moreover, the Market Concentration (HHI) shows positive significance on 
PTE of Islamic banks in Muslim countries whereas it is negative in non-Muslim
countries. 
Conventional banks in Muslim countries and non-Muslim counterparts show two 
common determinants of bank PTE, which are positively significance. These 
variables are Market Concentration (HHI) and Regulatory Quality (REGQ). However, 
five variables- Net Loans to Total Assets (NL/TA), Capital Strength (EQ/TA), Bank 
Size (SIZERT), Growth in Real GDP (YGR) and Market Capitalisation (MKTCY)-
have influence on the PTE of conventional banks in Muslim countries only. However, 
proxy of Credit Risk (LLP/GL), GDP per Capita (RES_YPC), and Voice and 
Accountability (VACC) are statistically significant on PTE of conventional banks in 
non-Muslim countries exceptionally.
Under the regional analyses, the research conducts five models in order to determine 
the drivers of PTE in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Asia and 
Pacific, South Asia, Europe (EU) and Central Asia, and MENA-East Asia and Pacific-
South Asia regions. The findings show that the determinants of bank PTE vary across 
the four regions. In addition, some of them might have various influences depending 
on the region
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7.1.2 Objectives
Given the above issues, the research’s first objective was to measure the efficiency 
(i.e. overall and pure technical efficiency, and scale efficiency) of Islamic banks
relative to conventional counterparts- before the financial crisis, during the crisis and 
after the crisis. The study examines 104 Islamic and 95 conventional banks operating
in 21 countries, which host particularly Islamic banking. The second objective was to 
determine the environmental factors, including the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI), which influenced their PTE. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is 
the first study that investigates any potential association between the WGI and the 
efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks, mainly at the global level. The third 
objective was to capture possible different regional influences on the PTE 
determinants. For this reason, the study classifies the 21 countries into four regions: 
Middle and North Africa, East Asia & Pacific, South Asia, and Europe & Central 
Asia. Lastly, the thesis examines whether there are different determinants of bank 
efficiency for Islamic and conventional banks operating in Muslim countries and non-
Muslim countries. This was done by dividing the sample into Muslim countries and 
non-Muslim countries, and conducting many regression models to capture any 
significance on PTE.
7.1.3 Methodology
In achieving the first objective of how IBs performed relative to conventional banks 
globally, we applied a DEA in chapter 6. In addition, we employed a bootstrap 
procedure to provide statistical properties of efficiency estimates. We investigated the 
relative efficiency, i.e. pure technical, overall technical and scale efficiency, of 
Islamic and conventional b in all the 21 countries which operated Islamic banking. 
These were, namely, Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Great Britain, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. The study 
excluded Iran since it operated only Islamic banking.
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Before conducting the DEA approach, we decided that it was essential to identify 
significant inputs and outputs. In the literature of banking efficiency, we utilized 
different approaches to select the inputs and outputs.  After reviewing the literature, 
we selected an intermediation approach for this research study. Under this approach, 
banks were mediator agents (intermediaries) between the demand for, and the supply 
of funds. Deposits and short-term funds, fixed assets, and personal expenses 
composed the input vector while Total loans and net income shaped this study’s 
output vector.
Chapter 6 examined the second objective of determining the influence of bank- and 
country- specific factors on the PTE of Islamic and conventional banks. As mentioned 
in chapter 5 about the regression model, we conducted this by including 
environmental variables.   We employed the Random Effects (RE) model to examine 
the relationship between bootstrapped efficiency scores, derived from the DEA, and a 
set of explanatory variables.  We selected the RE model since it had the advantage of 
including and enabling time-invariant variables to play a role as the explanatory 
variables. Moreover, we conducted additional RE models in order to determine and 
analyse the influence of potential variables on PTE. This was based on regions’ 
(MENA, East Asia & Pacific, South Asia and Europe and Central Asia) and a 
comparison of the approaches of Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 
7.2 Summary of findings 
This section summarises this thesis’ findings as presented and discussed in the 
different sections of chapter six.  By using DEA, the first section analysed and 
compared the OTE, PTE and SE of IBs as compared to conventional banks in the 21 
countries that host Islamic banking. The second section discussed the impact of the 
environmental variables on the banks’ PTE.
Having used CRS and VRS technology, the empirical findings suggest the existence 
of scale inefficiency among Islamic and conventional banks during the entire period 
of the study (2006-2012). However, before crisis, during crisis and after crisis periods, 
PTE seemed to outweigh SE in determining the OTE of Islamic and conventional 
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banks. The findings imply that, when compared to conventional banks, Islamic banks 
showed significant higher mean OTE and SE pre-crisis, during crisis and post-crisis. 
On the other hand, although, relative to conventional banks,   IBs showed more 
resilience during the pre- crisis- and post crisis periods, the PTE scores of Islamic and 
conventional banks demonstrated insignificant differences since their values were  
very close and showed similar trend over the years- On average, Islamic and 
conventional banks achieve respectively 0.43 and 0.42 of PTE. For both Islamic and 
conventional banks, bank inefficiency related to PTE rather than to scale inefficiency 
for each year of the entire study (2006-2012). Consequently, they were managerially 
inefficient in controlling their operating costs and in making full use of their resources 
in terms of deposits, capital (as fixed asset) and labour (as personnel expenses).
The DEA results provided evidence that, although IBs were proven to be more 
resilient during the financial crisis, there were, on average, no significant differences 
in PTE between conventional and Islamic banks. This result is in line with a number 
of previous studies (El-Gamal and Inanoglu, 2005, Mokhtar et al., 2006, Bader, 
2008 and Hassan et al., 2009).
In a second stage analysis, we investigated the determinants of PTE in order to 
provide more information to managers and policy-makers regarding ways of 
improving performance.  The findings imply that Islamic banks had no significance 
on pooled PTE and, during the entire period of the study including the financial crisis 
(2007 to 2009), showed no significant difference in performance (efficiency) relative 
to conventional banks. Moreover, the results from the random effects analysis 
suggested that PTE was associated both positively and significantly with loans 
intensity. This suggested that banks, with higher net loans-to-asset ratio, exhibited 
higher efficiency scores. Moreover, banks, which are more managerially efficient, 
tend to have larger market shares. This supports the efficient structure theory that
states the most efficient firms will be able to increase their market share, resulting in 
higher concentration. The findings indicate, also, that large and well-capitalized banks 
display higher PTE; this suggests that banks, with sound capital positions, face lower 
bankruptcy costs. 
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Furthermore, the results demonstrate that banks, with larger assets, size tend to 
improve their efficiency and consequently, the large banks can take advantage of 
economies of scale by sharing costs in the production process. Similarly, there is, also, 
a positive relationship between market capitalization (MKTY) and PTE. This is 
explained by the fact that the banking sector and capital market are a complement to 
rather than a substitute to potential borrowers (Banking sector). The findings imply, 
also, that the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies and to promote socially desirable investments can enhance efficiency 
in the banking industry and the welfare of the economy. This is proxied by the RQ 
variable. On the other hand, the VACC variable has a negative impact on efficiency. 
This suggests that freedom of speech, accountability and press reporting on matters 
such as minimum wages, health and safety, environmental controls, tax evasion and 
human rights abuse may not favour returns to direct investment.
We expanded the study to observe the influence of countries on PTE; we did so by 
comparing Muslim with non-Muslim countries.  We used four random effects models 
to examine the determinants of IBs’ PTE in Non-Muslim Countries (IBINNMC), 
Conventional Banks in Muslim Countries (CBINMC), Islamic Banks in Muslim 
Countries (IBINMC), and Conventional Banks in Non-Muslim Countries 
(CBINNMC). The four regression analyses noted similar determinants to our previous 
findings (pooled PTE) for the PTE of IBINNMC (NL/TA, EQ/TA and MKTCY), 
CBINMC (NL/TA, EQ/TA, SIZERT, HHI, MKTCY, and REGQ), IBINMC (NL/TA, 
EQ/TA, SIZERT and HHI,), and CBINNMC (HHI, VACC and REGQ). 
Further to our previous findings, two variables (i.e. Loan Loss Provision-to-Gross 
loans ratio and GDP per Capita) presented statistically significant relationships with 
the PTE of both IBINNMC and CBINNMC. Loan Loss Provision-to-Gross loans ratio 
(LLP/GL) affected the former (IBINNMC) negatively and the latter (CBINNMC) 
positively whereas GDP per Capita (RES_YPC) influenced the former positively and 
the latter negatively. Moreover, the Growth in real GDP (YGR) showed significance 
in the PTE of IBINNMC; this stated that YGR  led to higher PTE. On the other hand, 
compared to previous findings, two macroeconomic variables showed different 
influences on the IBINNMC’s PTE - the HHI negatively and VACC positively.
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Under the regional analyses, we conducted five models in order to determine the 
drivers of PTE in the   Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Asia and Pacific, 
South Asia, Europe (EU) and Central Asia, and MENA-East Asia and Pacific-South 
Asia regions. The outcomes of the four regional regression analyses showed similar 
determinants to our previous findings which were (pooled PTE) for the MENA 
region’s PTE  (NL/TA, EQ/TA, SIZERT, and MKTCY), East Asia and Pacific region 
(NL/TA, EQ/TA, and SIZERT), EU and Central Asia region (EQ/TA, SIZERT, HHI 
VACC and REGQ), and MENA-East Asia and Pacific-South Asia region-North 
Africa region (NL/TA, EQ/TA, SIZERT, HHI, MKTCY, and VACC). In addition to 
these explored determinants, the ISFCRIS dummy variable presented both a positive 
and a statistically significant influence on the PTE of East Asia and Pacific region. 
This suggested that, when compared to conventional banks, IBs  were more efficient 
during the financial crisis (2007-2009). Moreover, Loan Loss Provision-to-Gross 
loans ratio (LLP/GL) reported a positive influence on the PTE of EU and Central 
Asia. Unlike the pooled PTE’s findings, Growth in Real GDP (YGR) and Inflation 
(INFL) were two variables which displayed statistical significance on the PTE of 
MENA-East Asia and Pacific-South Asia - North Africa regions, the former 
negatively and the latter positively. On the other hand, only one variable (SIZERT) 
exhibited a significant relationship with the PTE of South Asia region, unlike our 
previous results, this was negative. Additionally, two variables (VACC and REGQ) 
showed significant relationships with the PTE of the EU and Central Asia regions. 
These were, also, opposite to the pooled PTE’s findings.
7.3 Research Implications
The significant message that might be derived from the study’s findings is that 
managers should implement effective strategies to mitigate risks, reduce unnecessary 
costs, and explore better ways of operating banks. In addition, regulators need to set-
up a separate entity, which might be a pillar of their central bank, to supervise 
uniquely the Islamic banks and monitor their activities and financial products, and 
ensure majorly their compliancy with Shari’ah.  Moreover, this body would be 
responsible for issuing policies and laws that are dedicated to Islamic banks.  Based 
182
on the random effects model, at the pooled level, findings reveal that the voice and 
accountability has a significant influence on the bank efficiency. Therefore, policy 
makers are advised to conduct effective supervision on media while maintaining and 
promoting healthy democracy. In terms of enhancing bank efficiency, the regulatory 
quality’s results suggest that adequate and appropriate regulatory intervention, which 
is not excessive, may contribute significantly in promoting bank performance. This is 
to prevent any development of monopoly power, banks’ excessive exposure to risks, 
and potential stress in the market, and therefore, to guarantee soundness of banking 
system.   
7.4 Research contributions
This thesis contributes to the literature from three different perspectives. First, it is the 
first study to examine the performance of banks that operate in all countries that host 
both Islamic banks and conventional counterparts, based on BankScope database. The 
study period is 7 years representing three stages:  before-crisis (2006), during crisis 
(2007-2009), and after-crisis (2010-2012). Second, to the best knowledge of the 
researcher, this is the first research to observe any potential influence of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) on bank efficiency, particularly at the 
global level. Third, regional analyses were conducted separately to examine any 
difference in the determinants of bank efficiency between regions. Moreover, this 
study implemented various models, based on countries’ religion aspect, to observe 
any variations between banks in Muslim-countries and non-Muslim countries.     
7.5 Research Limitations
While there are limitations attached to this research’s findings, such shortcomings can 
motivate potential research. Although the chosen techniques, which we employed in 
the thesis, were appropriate, consistent with the scope, sample and data of the studies, 
we employed only in our research study a non-parametric model- data envelopment 
analysis (DEA). Different techniques such as parametric model- Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) would be an interesting direction for further research in order to 
estimate the relative efficiency of IBs compared to conventional banks. This would 
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enhance, also, the methodological cross-checking procedures which have been so 
valuable to researchers and policy makers in assessing the robustness of empirically 
estimated efficiency levels in this area of the literature
This study’s other limitation was the number of observations included in dataset 
sample. Since this study considered only banks with at least 4 years observations, we 
omitted from the dataset a large number of banks that misses 4 years of data covered 
by the study’s seven-year period. Moreover, this study’s other limitation was the 
unavailability of data for some countries. For instance, for banks operating in 
Lebanon, data was available only for the period from 2006 to2010 since IBs were 
small in size and few in number (two Islamic banks with asset size below 250 million 
USD). 
In addition, the Islamic banks, which are covered in this study and are referred as 
fully- fledge Islamic banks by BankScope, might not comply with Shari’ah. For 
instance, many Islamic banks depend on LIBOR to determine the percentage of 
profits, and this practice violates the Islamic principles. Consequently, these banks 
should not be considered as Islamic banks.  
7.6 Recommendations for future research
This study examines the performance of banks by conducting non-parametric 
technique- the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  However, parametric techniques, 
such as the stochastic frontier approach, could be applied as an additional technique to 
support the outcomes of this research. Moreover, it could provide more insight into 
the pros and cons of various techniques. 
Although the techniques that we applied in this research for measuring the 
performance of banks are valid, the results of this application are specific to the used 
data. Different datasets (input and output variables, banks and period) could produce 
different efficiency scores. Therefore, this study’s other limitation is the availability of 
data used to produce the efficiency score. Within the area of a cross-country study, it 
may be useful in future to extend the research by using  two approaches, namely, 
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classification of the 21 countries into country (s) with the most efficient Islamic and 
conventional banks; and ranking  the countries’ banks based on the level of efficiency 
scores (from highest to least  efficient).
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: OTE, PTE and SE for banks in 21 countries
Bankname Year PTE OTE SE
Dubai Islamic Bank plc 2006 0.5654 0.1908 0.33746
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2006 0.4552 0.2564 0.563269
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2006 0.2291 0.1940 0.846792
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2006 . . .
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2006 0.2852 0.2473 0.867111
Noor Islamic Bank 2006 . . .
Tamweel PJSC 2006 1.0000 0.3784 0.3784
Ajman Bank 2006 . . .
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2006 0.3059 0.1760 0.575351
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2006 . . .
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2006 . . .
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2006 . . .
First energy bank 2006 . . .
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2006 0.3784 0.3114 0.822939
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2006 0.9091 1.4703 1.617314
Gulf Finance House BSC 2006 1.5577 0.2337 0.150029
Bank Alkhair BSC 2006 . . .
Elaf Bank 2006 . . .
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2006 . . .
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2006 1.0000 1.3468 1.3468
International Investment Bank BSC-IIB 2006 . . .
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2006 . . .
Capivest 2006 0.3839 0.3497 0.910914
Investors Bank BSC 2006 1.0000 1.4956 1.4956
Citi Islamic Investment Bank 2006 . . .
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 2006 0.2461 0.2120 0.861438
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. 2006 0.3734 0.3730 0.998929
Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd 2006 0.4887 0.4884 0.999386
First Security Islami Bank Limited 2006 0.4756 0.4720 0.992431
Social Islami Bank Ltd 2006 0.3734 0.3712 0.994108
ICB Islamic Bank Limited 2006 0.3842 0.3666 0.954191
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2006 . . .
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2006 . . .
Bank of London and The Middle East Plc-BLME 2006 . . .
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc 2006 0.1147 0.1118 0.974717
Gatehouse Bank Plc 2006 . . .
European Islamic Investment Bank Plc 2006 0.6289 0.6271 0.997138
DD&Co. Limited 2006 . . .
Bank Syariah Mandiri 2006 0.1875 0.1870 0.997333
PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk 2006 0.1999 0.1995 0.997999
PT Bank BRI Syariah 2006 . . .
PT Bank Maybank Syariah Indonesia 2006 0.7555 0.7466 0.98822
Kurdistan International Bank for Investment and Development 2006 0.6250 0.6221 0.99536
Al-Bilad Islamic Bank for Investments & Financing 2006 . . .
Cihan Bank for Islamic Investment and Finance P.S.C 2006 . . .
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Elaf Islamic Bank 2006 . . .
Jordan Islamic Bank 2006 0.1738 0.1722 0.990794
Islamic International Arab Bank 2006 0.3316 0.3301 0.995476
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2006 0.6623 0.5047 0.762041
Kuwait Finance House 2006 0.5302 0.1706 0.321765
Boubyan Bank KSC 2006 0.1252 0.0781 0.623802
Kuwait International Bank 2006 0.2453 0.2118 0.863433
First Investment Company K.S.C.C. 2006 . . .
A'Ayan Leasing & Investment Company 2006 0.1485 0.0863 0.581145
Al Baraka Bank Lebanon SAL 2006 . . .
Arab Finance House sal 2006 . . .
Maybank Islamic Berhad 2006 . . .
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 2006 0.3515 0.3492 0.993457
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 2006 0.2240 0.1805 0.805804
AmIslamic Bank Berhad 2006 . . .
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 2006 . . .
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 2006 0.3465 0.3427 0.989033
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 2006 . . .
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 2006 0.1908 0.1855 0.972222
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad 2006 . . .
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 2006 0.9583 1.5802 1.648962
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad 2006 0.2025 0.2020 0.997531
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 2006 . . .
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad 2006 0.2564 0.2479 0.966849
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 2006 . . .
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2006 . . .
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 2006 1.5404 1.6461 1.068619
Meezan Bank Limited 2006 0.2449 0.2446 0.998775
BankIslami Pakistan Limited 2006 0.5435 0.5405 0.99448
Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2006 0.5952 0.5907 0.99244
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited 2006 0.1459 0.1442 0.988348
Standard Chartered Modaraba 2006 0.9207 1.4899 1.618225
First Habib Modaraba 2006 . . .
First National Bank Modaraba 2006 1.0000 1.6453 1.6453
Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines 2006 . . .
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2006 0.5053 0.2035 0.402731
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2006 . . .
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2006 0.4798 0.3331 0.694248
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation-Al Rajhi Bank 2006 1.0000 0.2221 0.2221
Islamic Development Bank 2006 . . .
Alinma Bank 2006 . . .
Bank AlBilad 2006 0.2316 0.1912 0.825561
Islamic Bank of Asia (The) 2006 . . .
Bank of Khartoum 2006 . . .
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2006 0.2739 0.2351 0.858342
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2006 0.1717 0.1227 0.714619
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Al Salam Bank 2006 0.6618 0.4714 0.7123
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 2006 0.0855 0.0850 0.994152
United Capital Bank 2006 . . .
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2006 . . .
Syria International Islamic Bank 2006 . . .
Cham Islamic Bank SA 2006 . . .
Albaraka Bank Tunisia 2006 0.2842 0.2818 0.991555
Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya 2006 . . .
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. 2006 0.1578 0.1508 0.95564
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS 2006 . . .
Tadhamon International Islamic Bank 2006 0.3966 0.3961 0.998739
Saba Islamic Bank 2006 0.2652 0.2648 0.998492
Shamil Bank of Yemen & Bahrain 2006 0.5375 0.5368 0.998698
Dubai Islamic Bank plc 2007 0.6809 0.1632 0.239683
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2007 0.4297 0.2173 0.505702
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2007 0.2815 0.1974 0.701243
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2007 . . .
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2007 0.2509 0.1868 0.74452
Noor Islamic Bank 2007 . . .
Tamweel PJSC 2007 0.4560 0.2586 0.567105
Ajman Bank 2007 . . .
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2007 0.3715 0.1907 0.513324
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2007 0.4506 0.0133 0.029516
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2007 . . .
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2007 . . .
First energy bank 2007 . . .
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2007 0.4066 0.2280 0.560748
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2007 1.0000 1.6497 1.6497
Gulf Finance House BSC 2007 . . .
Bank Alkhair BSC 2007 0.5308 0.0327 0.061605
Elaf Bank 2007 . . .
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2007 . . .
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2007 1.0000 0.2598 0.2598
International Investment Bank BSC-IIB 2007 . . .
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2007 . . .
Capivest 2007 0.4142 0.4061 0.980444
Investors Bank BSC 2007 0.4437 0.4359 0.982421
Citi Islamic Investment Bank 2007 . . .
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 2007 0.2954 0.2411 0.816181
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. 2007 0.3012 0.3004 0.997344
Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd 2007 0.4833 0.4816 0.996483
First Security Islami Bank Limited 2007 0.4450 0.4428 0.995056
Social Islami Bank Ltd 2007 0.3450 0.3435 0.995652
ICB Islamic Bank Limited 2007 0.3992 0.3936 0.985972
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2007 . . .
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2007 . . .
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Bank of London and The Middle East Plc-BLME 2007 0.3413 0.3385 0.991796
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc 2007 0.1280 0.1258 0.982813
Gatehouse Bank Plc 2007 . . .
European Islamic Investment Bank Plc 2007 0.5556 0.5393 0.970662
DD&Co. Limited 2007 . . .
Bank Syariah Mandiri 2007 0.1798 0.1793 0.997219
PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk 2007 0.1987 0.1983 0.997987
PT Bank BRI Syariah 2007 . . .
PT Bank Maybank Syariah Indonesia 2007 0.8469 1.3082 1.544692
Kurdistan International Bank for Investment and Development 2007 0.4836 0.4791 0.990695
Al-Bilad Islamic Bank for Investments & Financing 2007 . . .
Cihan Bank for Islamic Investment and Finance P.S.C 2007 . . .
Elaf Islamic Bank 2007 . . .
Jordan Islamic Bank 2007 0.1861 0.1791 0.962386
Islamic International Arab Bank 2007 0.3513 0.3366 0.958155
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2007 1.5350 1.4989 0.976482
Kuwait Finance House 2007 0.8239 0.2267 0.275155
Boubyan Bank KSC 2007 0.1226 0.0812 0.662316
Kuwait International Bank 2007 0.2632 0.2021 0.767857
First Investment Company K.S.C.C. 2007 . . .
A'Ayan Leasing & Investment Company 2007 0.1133 0.0617 0.544572
Al Baraka Bank Lebanon SAL 2007 0.2368 0.2350 0.992399
Arab Finance House sal 2007 0.2439 0.2433 0.99754
Maybank Islamic Berhad 2007 . . .
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 2007 0.4878 0.4834 0.99098
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 2007 0.2231 0.1529 0.685343
AmIslamic Bank Berhad 2007 0.9381 1.4785 1.576058
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 2007 . . .
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 2007 0.3456 0.3325 0.962095
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 2007 . . .
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 2007 0.1971 0.1830 0.928463
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad 2007 . . .
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 2007 0.9217 1.4901 1.616687
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad 2007 0.1898 0.1888 0.994731
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 2007 . . .
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad 2007 0.1842 0.1820 0.988056
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 2007 . . .
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2007 . . .
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 2007 0.3891 0.3887 0.998972
Meezan Bank Limited 2007 0.1650 0.1637 0.992121
BankIslami Pakistan Limited 2007 0.2601 0.2587 0.994617
Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2007 0.2885 0.2866 0.993414
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited 2007 0.1178 0.1168 0.991511
Standard Chartered Modaraba 2007 0.9766 1.5888 1.626869
First Habib Modaraba 2007 . . .
First National Bank Modaraba 2007 1.0000 1.6423 1.6423
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Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines 2007 0.9804 1.6073 1.639433
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2007 0.7839 0.2137 0.272611
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2007 1.5350 0.3516 0.229055
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2007 0.4370 0.2373 0.543021
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation-Al Rajhi Bank 2007 1.0000 0.2143 0.2143
Islamic Development Bank 2007 1.0000 1.4657 1.4657
Alinma Bank 2007 . . .
Bank AlBilad 2007 0.2498 0.1759 0.704163
Islamic Bank of Asia (The) 2007 0.5042 0.5038 0.999207
Bank of Khartoum 2007 0.1055 0.1054 0.999052
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2007 0.1900 0.1583 0.833158
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2007 0.1320 0.0897 0.679545
Al Salam Bank 2007 0.5669 0.4971 0.876874
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 2007 0.1024 0.1021 0.99707
United Capital Bank 2007 . . .
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2007 0.2738 0.2728 0.996348
Syria International Islamic Bank 2007 0.5556 0.5494 0.988841
Cham Islamic Bank SA 2007 0.3906 0.3861 0.988479
Albaraka Bank Tunisia 2007 0.2743 0.2743 1
Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya 2007 0.3126 0.1636 0.523353
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. 2007 0.1900 0.1566 0.824211
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS 2007 0.2594 0.1928 0.743254
Tadhamon International Islamic Bank 2007 0.3355 0.3350 0.99851
Saba Islamic Bank 2007 0.2363 0.2361 0.999154
Shamil Bank of Yemen & Bahrain 2007 0.4464 0.4441 0.994848
Dubai Islamic Bank plc 2008 0.6726 0.2076 0.308653
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2008 0.5769 0.2250 0.390016
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2008 0.6655 0.2478 0.372352
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2008 0.0809 0.0794 0.981459
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2008 0.2880 0.2106 0.73125
Noor Islamic Bank 2008 0.2357 0.1436 0.609249
Tamweel PJSC 2008 0.6467 0.3440 0.531931
Ajman Bank 2008 1.5297 1.6624 1.086749
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2008 0.3476 0.1784 0.513234
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2008 0.5604 0.0160 0.028551
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2008 0.2450 0.1361 0.55551
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2008 . . .
First energy bank 2008 1.0000 1.6553 1.6553
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2008 0.1888 0.0926 0.490466
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2008 1.0000 1.6600 1.66
Gulf Finance House BSC 2008 . . .
Bank Alkhair BSC 2008 . . .
Elaf Bank 2008 . . .
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2008 . . .
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2008 . . .
International Investment Bank BSC-IIB 2008 . . .
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Global Banking Corporation BSC 2008 . . .
Capivest 2008 0.1281 0.0861 0.672131
Investors Bank BSC 2008 0.4369 0.4153 0.950561
Citi Islamic Investment Bank 2008 . . .
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 2008 0.2983 0.2225 0.745893
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. 2008 0.2825 0.2823 0.999292
Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd 2008 0.3898 0.3897 0.999743
First Security Islami Bank Limited 2008 0.4418 0.4398 0.995473
Social Islami Bank Ltd 2008 0.2814 0.2804 0.996446
ICB Islamic Bank Limited 2008 0.3801 0.3751 0.986846
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2008 . . .
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2008 . . .
Bank of London and The Middle East Plc-BLME 2008 0.2967 0.2884 0.972026
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc 2008 0.1767 0.1749 0.989813
Gatehouse Bank Plc 2008 . . .
European Islamic Investment Bank Plc 2008 0.6944 0.6659 0.958957
DD&Co. Limited 2008 . . .
Bank Syariah Mandiri 2008 0.1696 0.1692 0.997642
PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk 2008 0.2486 0.2484 0.999195
PT Bank BRI Syariah 2008 . . .
PT Bank Maybank Syariah Indonesia 2008 0.7736 0.7679 0.992632
Kurdistan International Bank for Investment and Development 2008 0.3885 0.3423 0.881081
Al-Bilad Islamic Bank for Investments & Financing 2008 0.4913 0.4883 0.993894
Cihan Bank for Islamic Investment and Finance P.S.C 2008 . . .
Elaf Islamic Bank 2008 . . .
Jordan Islamic Bank 2008 0.2104 0.1845 0.876901
Islamic International Arab Bank 2008 0.3553 0.3547 0.998311
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2008 0.3896 0.3889 0.998203
Kuwait Finance House 2008 0.7340 0.2125 0.28951
Boubyan Bank KSC 2008 0.1927 0.1630 0.845874
Kuwait International Bank 2008 0.2988 0.2152 0.720214
First Investment Company K.S.C.C. 2008 0.5798 0.5715 0.985685
A'Ayan Leasing & Investment Company 2008 0.0571 0.0570 0.998249
Al Baraka Bank Lebanon SAL 2008 0.1980 0.1966 0.992929
Arab Finance House sal 2008 0.1931 0.1929 0.998964
Maybank Islamic Berhad 2008 . . .
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 2008 0.4843 0.4737 0.978113
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 2008 0.2188 0.1403 0.641225
AmIslamic Bank Berhad 2008 1.0000 1.6130 1.613
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 2008 1.0000 1.6447 1.6447
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 2008 0.3216 0.3102 0.964552
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 2008 0.6616 0.6543 0.988966
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 2008 0.2052 0.1840 0.896686
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad 2008 0.6430 0.6417 0.997978
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 2008 0.5208 0.5092 0.977727
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad 2008 0.2447 0.2110 0.86228
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Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 2008 . . .
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad 2008 0.1903 0.1882 0.988965
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 2008 0.9063 1.4732 1.62551
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2008 1.5372 1.6523 1.074876
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 2008 0.3953 0.3877 0.980774
Meezan Bank Limited 2008 0.1433 0.1429 0.997209
BankIslami Pakistan Limited 2008 0.2052 0.2041 0.994639
Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2008 0.2170 0.2153 0.992166
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited 2008 0.1343 0.1336 0.994788
Standard Chartered Modaraba 2008 0.9627 1.5609 1.621377
First Habib Modaraba 2008 . . .
First National Bank Modaraba 2008 0.9831 1.6151 1.642864
Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines 2008 1.0000 1.6445 1.6445
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2008 0.7742 0.2268 0.292948
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2008 0.8651 0.4301 0.497168
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2008 0.5183 0.3281 0.633031
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation-Al Rajhi Bank 2008 0.9893 0.2290 0.231477
Islamic Development Bank 2008 . . .
Alinma Bank 2008 . . .
Bank AlBilad 2008 0.1160 0.1056 0.910345
Islamic Bank of Asia (The) 2008 0.3622 0.3620 0.999448
Bank of Khartoum 2008 0.1019 0.1014 0.995093
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2008 0.1747 0.1421 0.813394
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2008 0.1548 0.0977 0.631137
Al Salam Bank 2008 0.4784 0.4783 0.999791
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 2008 0.1018 0.0974 0.956778
United Capital Bank 2008 0.3305 0.3017 0.912859
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2008 0.1948 0.1941 0.996407
Syria International Islamic Bank 2008 0.3261 0.3249 0.99632
Cham Islamic Bank SA 2008 0.3359 0.3334 0.992557
Albaraka Bank Tunisia 2008 0.2592 0.2529 0.975694
Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya 2008 0.2663 0.1648 0.618851
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. 2008 0.1962 0.1516 0.772681
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS 2008 0.2616 0.1843 0.704511
Tadhamon International Islamic Bank 2008 0.2077 0.2076 0.999519
Saba Islamic Bank 2008 0.1886 0.1880 0.996819
Shamil Bank of Yemen & Bahrain 2008 0.4740 0.4734 0.998734
Dubai Islamic Bank plc 2009 0.6257 0.2126 0.339779
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2009 0.5919 0.2223 0.37557
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2009 0.5932 0.2090 0.352326
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2009 0.2322 0.1670 0.719208
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2009 0.2716 0.1959 0.721281
Noor Islamic Bank 2009 0.3100 0.2039 0.657742
Tamweel PJSC 2009 0.9072 0.4732 0.521605
Ajman Bank 2009 0.0749 0.0747 0.99733
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2009 0.3361 0.1709 0.50848
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Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2009 0.0457 0.0446 0.97593
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2009 0.1993 0.1464 0.734571
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2009 . . .
First energy bank 2009 0.1258 0.1009 0.802067
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2009 0.1570 0.1567 0.998089
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2009 0.8980 1.4532 1.618263
Gulf Finance House BSC 2009 . . .
Bank Alkhair BSC 2009 . . .
Elaf Bank 2009 . . .
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2009 . . .
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2009 . . .
International Investment Bank BSC-IIB 2009 . . .
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2009 . . .
Capivest 2009 0.0990 0.0952 0.961616
Investors Bank BSC 2009 . . .
Citi Islamic Investment Bank 2009 . . .
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 2009 0.3381 0.2355 0.696539
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. 2009 0.2863 0.2862 0.999651
Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd 2009 0.3090 0.3090 1
First Security Islami Bank Limited 2009 0.4275 0.4259 0.996257
Social Islami Bank Ltd 2009 0.2749 0.2742 0.997454
ICB Islamic Bank Limited 2009 0.2679 0.2601 0.970885
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2009 . . .
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2009 0.1922 0.1891 0.983871
Bank of London and The Middle East Plc-BLME 2009 0.3436 0.3230 0.940047
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc 2009 0.1862 0.1819 0.976907
Gatehouse Bank Plc 2009 . . .
European Islamic Investment Bank Plc 2009 0.7576 0.7206 0.951162
DD&Co. Limited 2009 . . .
Bank Syariah Mandiri 2009 0.1687 0.1545 0.915827
PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk 2009 0.2008 0.1949 0.970618
PT Bank BRI Syariah 2009 0.1759 0.1752 0.99602
PT Bank Maybank Syariah Indonesia 2009 . . .
Kurdistan International Bank for Investment and Development 2009 0.3579 0.2876 0.803576
Al-Bilad Islamic Bank for Investments & Financing 2009 0.3389 0.3265 0.963411
Cihan Bank for Islamic Investment and Finance P.S.C 2009 0.7705 0.7702 0.999611
Elaf Islamic Bank 2009 1.5450 1.5239 0.986343
Jordan Islamic Bank 2009 0.2074 0.1859 0.896336
Islamic International Arab Bank 2009 0.4841 0.4832 0.998141
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2009 0.4640 0.4639 0.999784
Kuwait Finance House 2009 0.7557 0.1996 0.264126
Boubyan Bank KSC 2009 0.2258 0.1864 0.825509
Kuwait International Bank 2009 0.3057 0.2323 0.759895
First Investment Company K.S.C.C. 2009 0.7415 0.6417 0.865408
A'Ayan Leasing & Investment Company 2009 0.0628 0.0528 0.840764
Al Baraka Bank Lebanon SAL 2009 . . .
221
Arab Finance House sal 2009 0.1495 0.1477 0.98796
Maybank Islamic Berhad 2009 . . .
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 2009 0.7047 0.6956 0.987087
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 2009 0.1739 0.1370 0.787809
AmIslamic Bank Berhad 2009 0.9729 1.5779 1.621852
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 2009 1.5633 1.6706 1.068637
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 2009 0.3050 0.2863 0.938689
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 2009 0.6773 0.6753 0.997047
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 2009 0.2144 0.1878 0.875933
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad 2009 0.4641 0.4638 0.999354
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 2009 0.4484 0.4393 0.979706
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad 2009 0.3299 0.2550 0.772962
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 2009 . . .
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad 2009 0.2016 0.2009 0.996528
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 2009 0.3587 0.3553 0.990521
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2009 0.8403 1.3059 1.554088
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 2009 0.3876 0.3830 0.988132
Meezan Bank Limited 2009 0.1132 0.1131 0.999117
BankIslami Pakistan Limited 2009 0.1644 0.1631 0.992092
Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2009 0.1801 0.1781 0.988895
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited 2009 0.1654 0.1648 0.996372
Standard Chartered Modaraba 2009 0.9989 1.6292 1.630994
First Habib Modaraba 2009 0.8333 0.8322 0.99868
First National Bank Modaraba 2009 0.9524 1.5439 1.621063
Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines 2009 1.0000 1.6605 1.6605
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2009 0.6206 0.2637 0.424911
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2009 0.8319 0.4242 0.509917
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2009 0.5680 0.3659 0.64419
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation-Al Rajhi Bank 2009 1.0000 0.2293 0.2293
Islamic Development Bank 2009 1.0000 1.6628 1.6628
Alinma Bank 2009 0.5515 0.0395 0.071623
Bank AlBilad 2009 0.1698 0.1299 0.765018
Islamic Bank of Asia (The) 2009 0.3704 0.3291 0.888499
Bank of Khartoum 2009 0.0957 0.0954 0.996865
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2009 0.2086 0.1629 0.78092
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2009 0.1699 0.0953 0.560918
Al Salam Bank 2009 0.4666 0.4664 0.999571
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 2009 0.0873 0.0867 0.993127
United Capital Bank 2009 0.2524 0.2509 0.994057
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2009 0.1751 0.1745 0.996573
Syria International Islamic Bank 2009 0.2501 0.2495 0.997601
Cham Islamic Bank SA 2009 0.3119 0.3077 0.986534
Albaraka Bank Tunisia 2009 0.2881 0.2724 0.945505
Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya 2009 0.2884 0.1610 0.558252
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. 2009 0.2157 0.1464 0.67872
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS 2009 0.2483 0.1733 0.697946
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Tadhamon International Islamic Bank 2009 0.1380 0.1378 0.998551
Saba Islamic Bank 2009 0.1587 0.1584 0.99811
Shamil Bank of Yemen & Bahrain 2009 0.3985 0.3968 0.995734
Dubai Islamic Bank plc 2010 0.7647 0.2407 0.314764
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2010 0.6341 0.2139 0.337328
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2010 0.3485 0.1769 0.507604
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2010 0.2864 0.1809 0.631634
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2010 0.2528 0.1823 0.721123
Noor Islamic Bank 2010 0.3388 0.2329 0.687426
Tamweel PJSC 2010 0.6394 0.5097 0.797154
Ajman Bank 2010 0.1122 0.1118 0.996435
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2010 0.4164 0.1822 0.43756
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2010 0.0409 0.0384 0.938875
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2010 0.1659 0.1658 0.999397
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2010 . . .
First energy bank 2010 0.1684 0.1678 0.996437
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2010 0.1669 0.1648 0.987418
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2010 0.8926 1.4333 1.605758
Gulf Finance House BSC 2010 . . .
Bank Alkhair BSC 2010 0.1235 0.0905 0.732794
Elaf Bank 2010 . . .
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2010 . . .
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2010 . . .
International Investment Bank BSC-IIB 2010 . . .
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2010 . . .
Capivest 2010 0.0926 0.0865 0.934125
Investors Bank BSC 2010 . . .
Citi Islamic Investment Bank 2010 . . .
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 2010 0.3384 0.2162 0.638889
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. 2010 0.3012 0.2908 0.965471
Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd 2010 0.2934 0.2818 0.960464
First Security Islami Bank Limited 2010 0.3665 0.3653 0.996726
Social Islami Bank Ltd 2010 0.2244 0.2240 0.998217
ICB Islamic Bank Limited 2010 0.2500 0.2449 0.9796
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2010 0.1235 0.0797 0.645344
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2010 0.1907 0.1906 0.999476
Bank of London and The Middle East Plc-BLME 2010 0.4525 0.4409 0.974365
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc 2010 0.2519 0.2461 0.976975
Gatehouse Bank Plc 2010 . . .
European Islamic Investment Bank Plc 2010 0.7634 0.7531 0.986508
DD&Co. Limited 2010 . . .
Bank Syariah Mandiri 2010 0.1975 0.1522 0.770633
PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk 2010 0.2372 0.2043 0.861298
PT Bank BRI Syariah 2010 0.1378 0.1373 0.996372
PT Bank Maybank Syariah Indonesia 2010 . . .
Kurdistan International Bank for Investment and Development 2010 0.2967 0.2812 0.947759
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Al-Bilad Islamic Bank for Investments & Financing 2010 0.3065 0.3062 0.999021
Cihan Bank for Islamic Investment and Finance P.S.C 2010 0.6556 0.6517 0.994051
Elaf Islamic Bank 2010 0.6113 0.5239 0.857026
Jordan Islamic Bank 2010 0.2265 0.1999 0.882561
Islamic International Arab Bank 2010 0.4369 0.4365 0.999084
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2010 0.2517 0.2509 0.996822
Kuwait Finance House 2010 0.7575 0.2055 0.271287
Boubyan Bank KSC 2010 0.3737 0.2127 0.569173
Kuwait International Bank 2010 0.2946 0.2261 0.767481
First Investment Company K.S.C.C. 2010 0.7373 0.6850 0.929066
A'Ayan Leasing & Investment Company 2010 0.0613 0.0577 0.941272
Al Baraka Bank Lebanon SAL 2010 . . .
Arab Finance House sal 2010 0.1383 0.1357 0.9812
Maybank Islamic Berhad 2010 . . .
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 2010 1.0000 1.6320 1.632
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 2010 0.2462 0.1009 0.409829
AmIslamic Bank Berhad 2010 1.0000 1.6623 1.6623
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 2010 1.0000 1.3736 1.3736
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 2010 0.4660 0.3798 0.815021
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 2010 0.6379 0.6364 0.997649
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 2010 0.1706 0.1433 0.839977
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad 2010 0.4518 0.4502 0.996459
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 2010 0.5958 0.5825 0.977677
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad 2010 0.3473 0.2221 0.639505
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 2010 . . .
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad 2010 0.2286 0.2165 0.947069
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 2010 0.3063 0.3053 0.996735
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2010 0.8475 1.3510 1.5941
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 2010 0.4115 0.3930 0.955043
Meezan Bank Limited 2010 0.1166 0.1154 0.989708
BankIslami Pakistan Limited 2010 0.1767 0.1759 0.995473
Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2010 0.2237 0.2209 0.987483
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited 2010 0.1440 0.1435 0.996528
Standard Chartered Modaraba 2010 1.0000 1.6510 1.651
First Habib Modaraba 2010 0.8130 1.2965 1.594711
First National Bank Modaraba 2010 0.9524 1.5562 1.633977
Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines 2010 0.6536 0.6494 0.993574
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2010 0.6627 0.3053 0.460691
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2010 0.9988 0.4926 0.493192
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2010 0.4494 0.2836 0.631064
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation-Al Rajhi Bank 2010 0.9681 0.2377 0.245532
Islamic Development Bank 2010 . . .
Alinma Bank 2010 0.3357 0.2299 0.684838
Bank AlBilad 2010 0.1915 0.1344 0.701828
Islamic Bank of Asia (The) 2010 0.4762 0.4515 0.948131
Bank of Khartoum 2010 0.0995 0.0994 0.998995
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Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2010 0.2513 0.1815 0.722244
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2010 0.1829 0.1146 0.626572
Al Salam Bank 2010 0.3566 0.3371 0.945317
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 2010 0.1052 0.1003 0.953422
United Capital Bank 2010 0.2958 0.2689 0.90906
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2010 0.1585 0.1569 0.989905
Syria International Islamic Bank 2010 0.1669 0.1292 0.774116
Cham Islamic Bank SA 2010 0.3659 0.3647 0.99672
Albaraka Bank Tunisia 2010 0.3000 0.2820 0.94
Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya 2010 0.3182 0.1805 0.567253
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. 2010 0.3054 0.1736 0.568435
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS 2010 0.3114 0.1931 0.620103
Tadhamon International Islamic Bank 2010 0.1362 0.1356 0.995595
Saba Islamic Bank 2010 0.1572 0.1558 0.991094
Shamil Bank of Yemen & Bahrain 2010 0.3484 0.3469 0.995695
Dubai Islamic Bank plc 2011 0.6260 0.1991 0.318051
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2011 0.5999 0.1973 0.328888
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2011 0.3742 0.1572 0.420096
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2011 0.3405 0.2005 0.58884
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2011 0.2644 0.1897 0.717474
Noor Islamic Bank 2011 0.2776 0.2002 0.721182
Tamweel PJSC 2011 0.6500 0.4827 0.742615
Ajman Bank 2011 0.1538 0.1532 0.996099
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2011 0.3514 0.1573 0.447638
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2011 0.0640 0.0440 0.6875
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2011 0.2545 0.2466 0.968959
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2011 . . .
First energy bank 2011 0.2729 0.2727 0.999267
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2011 0.1459 0.1451 0.994517
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2011 1.0000 1.6516 1.6516
Gulf Finance House BSC 2011 . . .
Bank Alkhair BSC 2011 0.1538 0.1537 0.99935
Elaf Bank 2011 . . .
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2011 . . .
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2011 . . .
International Investment Bank BSC-IIB 2011 . . .
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2011 . . .
Capivest 2011 0.3476 0.1313 0.377733
Investors Bank BSC 2011 . . .
Citi Islamic Investment Bank 2011 . . .
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 2011 0.3433 0.2232 0.65016
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. 2011 0.2597 0.2585 0.995379
Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd 2011 0.2674 0.2669 0.99813
First Security Islami Bank Limited 2011 0.3414 0.3401 0.996192
Social Islami Bank Ltd 2011 0.2188 0.2186 0.999086
ICB Islamic Bank Limited 2011 0.2631 0.2567 0.975675
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Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2011 0.0687 0.0591 0.860262
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2011 0.1653 0.1651 0.99879
Bank of London and The Middle East Plc-BLME 2011 0.5882 0.5587 0.949847
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc 2011 0.2882 0.2806 0.973629
Gatehouse Bank Plc 2011 . . .
European Islamic Investment Bank Plc 2011 . . .
DD&Co. Limited 2011 . . .
Bank Syariah Mandiri 2011 0.2722 0.1552 0.570169
PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk 2011 0.2353 0.1850 0.78623
PT Bank BRI Syariah 2011 0.1413 0.1407 0.995754
PT Bank Maybank Syariah Indonesia 2011 0.4642 0.4633 0.998061
Kurdistan International Bank for Investment and Development 2011 0.3647 0.2410 0.660817
Al-Bilad Islamic Bank for Investments & Financing 2011 0.3078 0.2899 0.941845
Cihan Bank for Islamic Investment and Finance P.S.C 2011 0.7424 0.6656 0.896552
Elaf Islamic Bank 2011 0.6175 0.4331 0.701377
Jordan Islamic Bank 2011 0.2044 0.1769 0.86546
Islamic International Arab Bank 2011 0.2811 0.2806 0.998221
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2011 0.2839 0.2838 0.999648
Kuwait Finance House 2011 0.7724 0.2018 0.261264
Boubyan Bank KSC 2011 0.4637 0.2257 0.486737
Kuwait International Bank 2011 0.2726 0.2133 0.782465
First Investment Company K.S.C.C. 2011 0.2189 0.1917 0.875742
A'Ayan Leasing & Investment Company 2011 0.0488 0.0462 0.946721
Al Baraka Bank Lebanon SAL 2011 . . .
Arab Finance House sal 2011 . . .
Maybank Islamic Berhad 2011 . . .
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 2011 0.9760 1.3771 1.410963
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 2011 0.2814 0.1442 0.512438
AmIslamic Bank Berhad 2011 0.9280 1.4948 1.610776
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 2011 1.0000 1.4169 1.4169
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 2011 0.5411 0.4209 0.77786
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 2011 0.5012 0.5012 1
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 2011 0.1815 0.1481 0.815978
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad 2011 0.6027 0.5608 0.93048
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 2011 0.5202 0.5102 0.980777
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad 2011 0.2527 0.1747 0.691334
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 2011 0.5068 0.5065 0.999408
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad 2011 0.1887 0.1884 0.99841
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 2011 0.3425 0.3342 0.975766
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2011 0.8910 1.4175 1.590909
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 2011 0.3984 0.3890 0.976406
Meezan Bank Limited 2011 0.1057 0.0969 0.916746
BankIslami Pakistan Limited 2011 0.1597 0.1590 0.995617
Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2011 0.1824 0.1819 0.997259
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited 2011 0.1455 0.1449 0.995876
Standard Chartered Modaraba 2011 1.5409 1.6478 1.069375
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First Habib Modaraba 2011 0.7874 0.7866 0.998984
First National Bank Modaraba 2011 0.9615 1.5717 1.634633
Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines 2011 0.5882 0.5844 0.99354
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2011 0.5272 0.2307 0.437595
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2011 0.8914 0.4398 0.493381
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2011 0.4406 0.2647 0.600772
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation-Al Rajhi Bank 2011 0.9693 0.2416 0.249252
Islamic Development Bank 2011 0.4072 0.2378 0.583988
Alinma Bank 2011 0.2220 0.1213 0.546396
Bank AlBilad 2011 0.6790 0.6722 0.989985
Islamic Bank of Asia (The) 2011 0.1160 0.1158 0.998276
Bank of Khartoum 2011 0.2352 0.1323 0.5625
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2011 0.1672 0.1042 0.623206
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2011 0.2961 0.2658 0.89767
Al Salam Bank 2011 0.1012 0.0957 0.945652
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 2011 0.2665 0.2374 0.890807
United Capital Bank 2011 0.1401 0.1397 0.997145
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2011 0.1431 0.1116 0.779874
Syria International Islamic Bank 2011 0.3722 0.3692 0.99194
Cham Islamic Bank SA 2011 0.2313 0.2313 1
Albaraka Bank Tunisia 2011 0.3392 0.1952 0.575472
Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya 2011 0.4118 0.1889 0.458718
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. 2011 0.2931 0.1829 0.624019
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS 2011 0.0926 0.0916 0.989201
Tadhamon International Islamic Bank 2011 0.1298 0.1291 0.994607
Saba Islamic Bank 2011 0.3344 0.3327 0.994916
Shamil Bank of Yemen & Bahrain 2011 0.6826 0.2099 0.307501
Dubai Islamic Bank plc 2012 0.5778 0.1945 0.336622
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2012 0.5355 0.2350 0.438842
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2012 0.3690 0.2097 0.568293
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2012 0.2627 0.1848 0.703464
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2012 0.2987 0.2306 0.772012
Noor Islamic Bank 2012 0.6962 0.5106 0.73341
Tamweel PJSC 2012 0.1892 0.1884 0.995772
Ajman Bank 2012 0.4561 0.1686 0.369656
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2012 . . .
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2012 . . .
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2012 0.3204 0.3202 0.999376
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2012 . . .
First energy bank 2012 0.6047 0.1049 0.173474
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2012 0.2012 0.2002 0.99503
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2012 1.0000 1.6551 1.6551
Gulf Finance House BSC 2012 . . .
Bank Alkhair BSC 2012 0.3030 0.2851 0.940924
Elaf Bank 2012 0.1235 0.1208 0.978138
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2012 0.2166 0.2048 0.945522
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Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2012 . . .
International Investment Bank BSC-IIB 2012 . . .
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2012 . . .
Capivest 2012 . . .
Investors Bank BSC 2012 . . .
Citi Islamic Investment Bank 2012 . . .
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 2012 0.3544 0.2145 0.605248
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. 2012 0.1755 0.1718 0.978917
Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd 2012 0.2758 0.2757 0.999637
First Security Islami Bank Limited 2012 0.3188 0.3181 0.997804
Social Islami Bank Ltd 2012 0.2220 0.2218 0.999099
ICB Islamic Bank Limited 2012 0.2316 0.2276 0.982729
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2012 0.1062 0.0502 0.472693
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2012 0.1626 0.1625 0.999385
Bank of London and The Middle East Plc-BLME 2012 0.6098 0.5946 0.975074
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc 2012 0.4425 0.4271 0.965198
Gatehouse Bank Plc 2012 . . .
European Islamic Investment Bank Plc 2012 . . .
DD&Co. Limited 2012 . . .
Bank Syariah Mandiri 2012 0.2928 0.1806 0.616803
PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk 2012 0.3088 0.2057 0.666127
PT Bank BRI Syariah 2012 0.1503 0.1501 0.998669
PT Bank Maybank Syariah Indonesia 2012 0.5379 0.5370 0.998327
Kurdistan International Bank for Investment and Development 2012 0.3632 0.2011 0.553689
Al-Bilad Islamic Bank for Investments & Financing 2012 . . .
Cihan Bank for Islamic Investment and Finance P.S.C 2012 0.6210 0.3759 0.605314
Elaf Islamic Bank 2012 0.3826 0.3400 0.888657
Jordan Islamic Bank 2012 0.3272 0.2459 0.751528
Islamic International Arab Bank 2012 0.2275 0.2272 0.998681
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2012 0.1761 0.1754 0.996025
Kuwait Finance House 2012 0.8183 0.2109 0.257729
Boubyan Bank KSC 2012 0.5288 0.2458 0.464826
Kuwait International Bank 2012 0.2916 0.2153 0.73834
First Investment Company K.S.C.C. 2012 . . .
A'Ayan Leasing & Investment Company 2012 0.0479 0.0476 0.993737
Al Baraka Bank Lebanon SAL 2012 . . .
Arab Finance House sal 2012 . . .
Maybank Islamic Berhad 2012 . . .
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 2012 1.0000 1.3429 1.3429
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 2012 0.3949 0.1721 0.435807
AmIslamic Bank Berhad 2012 1.0000 1.6449 1.6449
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 2012 1.5375 1.6614 1.080585
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 2012 0.7774 0.5285 0.67983
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 2012 0.6071 0.5704 0.939549
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 2012 0.2460 0.1712 0.695935
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad 2012 0.5796 0.5144 0.887509
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Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 2012 0.5153 0.5066 0.983117
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad 2012 . . .
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad 2012 0.5332 0.5331 0.999812
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad 2012 0.2128 0.1964 0.922932
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 2012 0.3299 0.3278 0.993634
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2012 0.9193 1.4768 1.60644
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 2012 0.4525 0.4364 0.96442
Meezan Bank Limited 2012 0.1009 0.0950 0.941526
BankIslami Pakistan Limited 2012 0.1699 0.1691 0.995291
Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited 2012 0.1764 0.1748 0.99093
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Limited 2012 0.1301 0.1297 0.996925
Standard Chartered Modaraba 2012 0.9911 1.6165 1.631016
First Habib Modaraba 2012 0.7937 1.2581 1.585108
First National Bank Modaraba 2012 0.9346 1.5171 1.623261
Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines 2012 . . .
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2012 0.6881 0.2862 0.415928
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2012 1.0000 0.4948 0.4948
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2012 0.5713 0.3493 0.611413
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation-Al Rajhi Bank 2012 1.0000 0.2668 0.2668
Islamic Development Bank 2012 . . .
Alinma Bank 2012 0.6202 0.2771 0.446791
Bank AlBilad 2012 0.4141 0.1460 0.352572
Islamic Bank of Asia (The) 2012 . . .
Bank of Khartoum 2012 0.1521 0.1365 0.897436
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2012 0.2359 0.1778 0.753709
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2012 0.1868 0.1437 0.769272
Al Salam Bank 2012 . . .
Al Baraka Bank Sudan 2012 . . .
United Capital Bank 2012 . 0.2386 .
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2012 . . .
Syria International Islamic Bank 2012 . . .
Cham Islamic Bank SA 2012 . . .
Albaraka Bank Tunisia 2012 . . .
Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya 2012 0.6947 0.1989 0.286311
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S. 2012 0.3625 0.1681 0.463724
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankasi AS 2012 0.2905 0.1750 0.60241
Tadhamon International Islamic Bank 2012 0.0925 0.0876 0.947027
Saba Islamic Bank 2012 0.1495 0.1492 0.997993
Shamil Bank of Yemen & Bahrain 2012 0.3268 0.3251 0.994798
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2006 0.4255 0.2346 0.551351
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2006 0.3724 0.2646 0.710526
Mashreqbank 2006 0.6987 0.1732 0.247889
National Bank of Fujairah 2006 0.2859 0.2289 0.80063
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2006 0.2487 0.2048 0.823482
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain 2006 0.3562 0.3561 0.999719
Union National Bank 2006 0.6689 0.3299 0.493198
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United Arab Bank PJSC 2006 0.1934 0.1905 0.985005
Addax Bank BSC 2006 . . .
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2006 . . .
Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company BSC 2006 . . .
BBK B.S.C. 2006 0.3022 0.2112 0.698875
BMI Bank BSC 2006 0.2623 0.2619 0.998475
Future Bank B.S.C. 2006 0.5626 0.5618 0.998578
Gulf International Bank BSC 2006 0.4555 0.2173 0.477058
National Bank of Bahrain 2006 0.2552 0.1814 0.710815
Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd 2006 0.7407 0.7372 0.995275
City Bank Ltd 2006 0.1774 0.1767 0.996054
Dhaka Bank Limited 2006 0.3046 0.3040 0.99803
Eastern Bank Limited 2006 0.3061 0.3056 0.998367
IFIC Bank Limited-International Finance Investment and Commerce Bank Limited 2006 0.1971 0.1912 0.970066
Janata Bank Limited 2006 0.2041 0.1619 0.793239
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2006 . . .
Bank of Alexandria 2006 . . .
Allied Bank Philippines (UK) Plc 2006 0.8545 0.8543 0.999766
Melli Bank Plc 2006 0.8117 0.7346 0.905014
National Bank of Kuwait (International) PLC 2006 0.3571 0.3513 0.983758
Reliance Bank Limited 2006 0.4739 0.4730 0.998101
Wesleyan Bank Ltd 2006 . . .
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT 2006 0.6199 0.6165 0.994515
Bank DBS Indonesia 2006 0.1864 0.1863 0.999464
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional PT 2006 0.1180 0.1179 0.999153
PT Bank Resona Perdania 2006 0.2856 0.2792 0.977591
Bank of Baghdad 2006 . . .
Investment Bank of Iraq SA Co 2006 . . .
National Bank of Iraq 2006 . . .
North Bank 2006 . . .
Capital Bank of Jordan 2006 0.3300 0.3156 0.956364
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2006 0.0987 0.0987 1
Jordan Commercial Bank 2006 0.2467 0.2387 0.967572
Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The) 2006 0.6685 0.3043 0.455198
National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. 2006 0.7410 0.2402 0.324157
Jammal Trust Bank SAL 2006 . . .
Near East Commercial Bank SAL 2006 . . .
Affin Bank 2006 0.3756 0.2430 0.646965
Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad 2006 0.3780 0.2091 0.553175
AmBank (M) Berhad 2006 0.7405 0.3371 0.455233
Bangkok Bank Berhad 2006 0.3983 0.5135 1.289229
Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad 2006 0.8333 1.3124 1.574943
Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad 2006 0.7246 0.7205 0.994342
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 2006 0.3249 0.2787 0.857802
CIMB Bank (L) Limited (2011) 2006 0.8344 0.7810 0.936002
Citibank Berhad 2006 0.5595 0.2061 0.368365
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Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2006 0.3223 0.3219 0.998759
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 2006 0.4067 0.1882 0.462749
JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad 2006 0.5813 0.5755 0.990022
Maybank International (L) Ltd 2006 0.9844 0.7927 0.805262
RHB Bank (L) Ltd 2006 0.5145 . .
Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad (The) 2006 0.4950 0.4849 0.979596
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 2006 0.5458 0.2499 0.45786
United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2006 0.4976 0.3161 0.635249
Bank of Khyber 2006 0.1571 0.3074 1.956715
First Dawood Investment Bank Limited 2006 0.8221 1.3048 1.587155
First Women Bank Limited 2006 . . .
Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited 2006 0.2015 0.3826 1.898759
KASB Bank Limited 2006 0.2031 0.2008 0.988676
Samba Bank Limited 2006 . 0.1543 .
Silkbank Limited 2006 0.3077 0.2015 0.654859
United Overseas Bank Philippines 2006 0.6408 0.6398 0.998439
Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC 2006 0.4950 0.2499 0.504848
Doha Bank 2006 0.5385 0.2979 0.553203
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2006 0.3835 0.3509 0.914993
Bank Al-Jazira 2006 1.5546 0.0959 0.061688
National Commercial Bank (The) 2006 1.5461 0.1881 0.121661
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2006 0.5713 0.2533 0.443375
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2006 0.8398 0.2470 0.294118
Far Eastern Bank Limited 2006 0.8145 0.7942 0.975077
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2006 . . .
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2006 . . .
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2006 0.3974 0.3802 0.956719
Elnilein  Bank 2006 . . .
Farmers Commercial Bank 2006 . . .
Omdurman National Bank 2006 0.5133 0.3843 0.748685
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2006 0.1914 0.1897 0.991118
Sudanese French Bank (The) 2006 0.1046 0.0915 0.874761
Bank Audi Syria 2006 0.3281 0.3264 0.994819
Byblos Bank Syria SA 2006 0.4899 0.4862 0.992447
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 2006 0.3681 0.3666 0.995925
Alternatifbank A.S. 2006 0.2444 0.2437 0.997136
HSBC Bank A.S 2006 . . .
ING Bank A.S. 2006 0.2571 0.1498 0.582653
Sekerbank T.A.S. 2006 0.0740 0.0740 1
International Bank of Yemen YSC 2006 . . .
National Bank of Yemen 2006 . . .
Yemen Commercial Bank 2006 0.2708 0.2697 0.995938
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2007 0.5250 0.2580 0.491429
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2007 0.3289 0.2544 0.773487
Mashreqbank 2007 0.7275 0.1619 0.222543
National Bank of Fujairah 2007 0.3075 0.2220 0.721951
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National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2007 0.2701 0.1792 0.663458
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain 2007 0.3326 0.2370 0.712568
Union National Bank 2007 0.7260 0.3466 0.47741
United Arab Bank PJSC 2007 0.1996 0.1752 0.877756
Addax Bank BSC 2007 . . .
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2007 1.5398 1.6747 1.087609
Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company BSC 2007 0.2876 0.2624 0.912378
BBK B.S.C. 2007 0.3158 0.2163 0.684927
BMI Bank BSC 2007 0.2729 0.2723 0.997801
Future Bank B.S.C. 2007 0.2789 0.2052 0.735748
Gulf International Bank BSC 2007 0.6731 0.3143 0.466944
National Bank of Bahrain 2007 0.2699 0.1784 0.660986
Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd 2007 0.6452 0.6431 0.996745
City Bank Ltd 2007 0.1457 0.1453 0.997255
Dhaka Bank Limited 2007 0.2705 0.2700 0.998152
Eastern Bank Limited 2007 0.2900 0.2892 0.997241
IFIC Bank Limited-International Finance Investment and Commerce Bank Limited 2007 0.1681 0.1670 0.993456
Janata Bank Limited 2007 0.1569 0.1337 0.852135
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2007 . . .
Bank of Alexandria 2007 . . .
Allied Bank Philippines (UK) Plc 2007 0.8533 1.3508 1.583031
Melli Bank Plc 2007 1.0000 1.6485 1.6485
National Bank of Kuwait (International) PLC 2007 0.4000 0.3918 0.9795
Reliance Bank Limited 2007 0.4408 0.4400 0.998185
Wesleyan Bank Ltd 2007 . . .
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT 2007 0.6036 0.6012 0.996024
Bank DBS Indonesia 2007 0.2675 0.2365 0.884112
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional PT 2007 0.1192 0.1038 0.870805
PT Bank Resona Perdania 2007 0.3447 0.3411 0.989556
Bank of Baghdad 2007 . . .
Investment Bank of Iraq SA Co 2007 . . .
National Bank of Iraq 2007 . . .
North Bank 2007 0.4814 0.3986 0.828002
Capital Bank of Jordan 2007 0.2630 0.2604 0.990114
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2007 0.1013 0.1010 0.997038
Jordan Commercial Bank 2007 0.2375 0.2275 0.957895
Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The) 2007 0.8608 0.3432 0.398699
National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. 2007 0.8732 0.2627 0.300847
Jammal Trust Bank SAL 2007 0.1971 0.1969 0.998985
Near East Commercial Bank SAL 2007 . . .
Affin Bank 2007 0.3512 0.2162 0.615604
Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad 2007 0.3579 0.1726 0.482258
AmBank (M) Berhad 2007 0.8179 0.3367 0.411664
Bangkok Bank Berhad 2007 0.3773 0.3758 0.996024
Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad 2007 0.7143 0.7093 0.993
Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad 2007 0.4542 0.4494 0.989432
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Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 2007 0.3021 0.2935 0.971533
CIMB Bank (L) Limited (2011) 2007 0.8854 0.7658 0.86492
Citibank Berhad 2007 0.4903 0.2069 0.421987
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2007 0.3763 0.3677 0.977146
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 2007 0.4618 0.1831 0.396492
JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad 2007 0.5289 0.5283 0.998866
Maybank International (L) Ltd 2007 0.9055 0.7698 0.850138
RHB Bank (L) Ltd 2007 . . .
Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad (The) 2007 0.0937 0.0937 1
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 2007 0.5288 0.2377 0.449508
United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2007 0.5495 0.3244 0.590355
Bank of Khyber 2007 0.2572 0.2565 0.997278
First Dawood Investment Bank Limited 2007 0.8526 1.3594 1.594417
First Women Bank Limited 2007 . . .
Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited 2007 0.2893 0.2646 0.914622
KASB Bank Limited 2007 0.1981 0.1970 0.994447
Samba Bank Limited 2007 0.1202 0.1170 0.973378
Silkbank Limited 2007 0.1872 0.1817 0.97062
United Overseas Bank Philippines 2007 . . .
Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC 2007 0.7036 0.2951 0.419414
Doha Bank 2007 0.5163 0.2575 0.498741
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2007 0.4136 0.3451 0.834381
Bank Al-Jazira 2007 0.2222 0.1141 0.513501
National Commercial Bank (The) 2007 0.9328 0.1808 0.193825
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2007 0.5379 0.2211 0.411043
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2007 0.4521 0.2469 0.546118
Far Eastern Bank Limited 2007 0.7470 0.7343 0.982999
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2007 . . .
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2007 0.3978 0.3638 0.91453
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2007 0.3511 0.3207 0.913415
Elnilein  Bank 2007 . . .
Farmers Commercial Bank 2007 0.1176 0.1176 1
Omdurman National Bank 2007 0.4011 0.4009 0.999501
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2007 0.2106 0.2063 0.979582
Sudanese French Bank (The) 2007 0.1060 0.0933 0.880189
Bank Audi Syria 2007 0.2281 0.2278 0.998685
Byblos Bank Syria SA 2007 0.3051 0.3037 0.995411
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 2007 0.2961 0.2946 0.994934
Alternatifbank A.S. 2007 0.2310 0.1593 0.68961
HSBC Bank A.S 2007 0.5128 0.1442 0.281201
ING Bank A.S. 2007 0.4069 0.1470 0.361268
Sekerbank T.A.S. 2007 0.1289 0.0958 0.743212
International Bank of Yemen YSC 2007 . . .
National Bank of Yemen 2007 . . .
Yemen Commercial Bank 2007 0.2534 0.2498 0.985793
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2008 0.5628 0.2896 0.51457
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Invest Bank P.S.C. 2008 0.3564 0.3100 0.869809
Mashreqbank 2008 0.7917 0.1846 0.233169
National Bank of Fujairah 2008 0.3056 0.2361 0.772579
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2008 0.2610 0.1597 0.611877
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain 2008 0.4909 0.3601 0.733551
Union National Bank 2008 1.4993 0.3814 0.254385
United Arab Bank PJSC 2008 0.2454 0.1928 0.785656
Addax Bank BSC 2008 . . .
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2008 0.5796 0.5631 0.971532
Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company BSC 2008 0.3003 0.2546 0.847819
BBK B.S.C. 2008 0.3377 0.2213 0.655315
BMI Bank BSC 2008 0.2089 0.1955 0.935854
Future Bank B.S.C. 2008 0.2663 0.1998 0.750282
Gulf International Bank BSC 2008 0.8047 0.3573 0.444016
National Bank of Bahrain 2008 0.2911 0.1995 0.685332
Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd 2008 0.6494 0.6475 0.997074
City Bank Ltd 2008 0.1517 0.1513 0.997363
Dhaka Bank Limited 2008 0.2571 0.2567 0.998444
Eastern Bank Limited 2008 0.2407 0.2404 0.998754
IFIC Bank Limited-International Finance Investment and Commerce Bank Limited 2008 0.1716 0.1710 0.996503
Janata Bank Limited 2008 0.1679 0.1379 0.821322
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2008 . . .
Bank of Alexandria 2008 . . .
Allied Bank Philippines (UK) Plc 2008 . . .
Melli Bank Plc 2008 0.3630 0.3628 0.999449
National Bank of Kuwait (International) PLC 2008 0.3704 0.3604 0.973002
Reliance Bank Limited 2008 0.3722 0.3718 0.998925
Wesleyan Bank Ltd 2008 . . .
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT 2008 0.6218 0.6134 0.986491
Bank DBS Indonesia 2008 0.2031 0.1878 0.924668
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional PT 2008 0.1185 0.1137 0.959494
PT Bank Resona Perdania 2008 0.3656 0.3645 0.996991
Bank of Baghdad 2008 . . .
Investment Bank of Iraq SA Co 2008 . . .
National Bank of Iraq 2008 0.3884 0.3700 0.952626
North Bank 2008 0.3613 0.2999 0.830058
Capital Bank of Jordan 2008 0.2359 0.2341 0.99237
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2008 0.1140 0.1128 0.989474
Jordan Commercial Bank 2008 0.2223 0.2222 0.99955
Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The) 2008 0.7099 0.3445 0.48528
National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. 2008 0.8157 0.2438 0.298884
Jammal Trust Bank SAL 2008 0.1962 0.1955 0.996432
Near East Commercial Bank SAL 2008 0.3110 0.3109 0.999678
Affin Bank 2008 0.4311 0.2538 0.588727
Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad 2008 0.3788 0.1920 0.506864
AmBank (M) Berhad 2008 0.9697 0.3386 0.34918
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Bangkok Bank Berhad 2008 0.4312 0.4302 0.997681
Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad 2008 0.6211 0.6181 0.99517
Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad 2008 0.5469 0.5447 0.995977
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 2008 0.3314 0.2939 0.886844
CIMB Bank (L) Limited (2011) 2008 0.8377 0.7848 0.936851
Citibank Berhad 2008 0.5497 0.2422 0.440604
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2008 0.3826 0.3707 0.968897
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 2008 0.5206 0.2004 0.38494
JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad 2008 0.5566 0.5491 0.986525
Maybank International (L) Ltd 2008 0.9853 0.8319 0.844311
RHB Bank (L) Ltd 2008 0.8754 1.4008 1.600183
Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad (The) 2008 0.1575 0.0998 0.633651
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 2008 0.5679 0.2438 0.429301
United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2008 0.5583 0.3131 0.56081
Bank of Khyber 2008 0.2971 0.2968 0.99899
First Dawood Investment Bank Limited 2008 0.6431 0.6413 0.997201
First Women Bank Limited 2008 0.3340 0.3333 0.997904
Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited 2008 0.2622 0.2341 0.89283
KASB Bank Limited 2008 0.1710 0.1689 0.987719
Samba Bank Limited 2008 0.1119 0.1104 0.986595
Silkbank Limited 2008 0.1486 0.1466 0.986541
United Overseas Bank Philippines 2008 0.8555 1.3500 1.578025
Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC 2008 0.7036 0.2802 0.398238
Doha Bank 2008 0.5498 0.2758 0.501637
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2008 0.4615 0.3461 0.749946
Bank Al-Jazira 2008 0.2161 0.1385 0.640907
National Commercial Bank (The) 2008 0.7235 0.1800 0.248791
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2008 0.6418 0.2877 0.44827
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2008 0.5115 0.2991 0.584751
Far Eastern Bank Limited 2008 0.7325 0.7288 0.994949
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2008 0.3788 0.3769 0.994984
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2008 0.5071 0.3869 0.762966
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2008 . . .
Elnilein  Bank 2008 . . .
Farmers Commercial Bank 2008 0.1122 0.1110 0.989305
Omdurman National Bank 2008 0.3732 0.3727 0.99866
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2008 0.2305 0.2305 1
Sudanese French Bank (The) 2008 0.1171 0.0929 0.793339
Bank Audi Syria 2008 0.1929 0.1926 0.998445
Byblos Bank Syria SA 2008 0.2530 0.2523 0.997233
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 2008 0.3157 0.3149 0.997466
Alternatifbank A.S. 2008 0.1777 0.1537 0.864941
HSBC Bank A.S 2008 0.4773 0.1366 0.286193
ING Bank A.S. 2008 0.4236 0.1608 0.379603
Sekerbank T.A.S. 2008 0.1259 0.0969 0.769658
International Bank of Yemen YSC 2008 . . .
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National Bank of Yemen 2008 0.1848 0.1786 0.96645
Yemen Commercial Bank 2008 0.2187 0.2184 0.998628
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2009 0.5312 0.2655 0.499812
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2009 0.3779 0.2857 0.75602
Mashreqbank 2009 0.4928 0.1743 0.353693
National Bank of Fujairah 2009 0.2338 0.1972 0.843456
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2009 0.2902 0.1659 0.571675
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain 2009 0.4201 0.2995 0.712925
Union National Bank 2009 0.9371 0.3721 0.397076
United Arab Bank PJSC 2009 0.2105 0.1706 0.810451
Addax Bank BSC 2009 . . .
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2009 0.3598 0.3510 0.975542
Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company BSC 2009 0.2966 0.2488 0.83884
BBK B.S.C. 2009 0.2628 0.1644 0.625571
BMI Bank BSC 2009 0.1731 0.1726 0.997111
Future Bank B.S.C. 2009 0.2430 0.2027 0.834156
Gulf International Bank BSC 2009 0.8010 0.3627 0.452809
National Bank of Bahrain 2009 0.3100 0.1989 0.641613
Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd 2009 0.6410 0.6383 0.995788
City Bank Ltd 2009 0.1456 0.1454 0.998626
Dhaka Bank Limited 2009 0.2455 0.2452 0.998778
Eastern Bank Limited 2009 0.2059 0.2010 0.976202
IFIC Bank Limited-International Finance Investment and Commerce Bank Limited 2009 0.1557 0.1556 0.999358
Janata Bank Limited 2009 0.1816 0.1446 0.796256
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2009 . . .
Bank of Alexandria 2009 0.2582 0.1270 0.491867
Allied Bank Philippines (UK) Plc 2009 . . .
Melli Bank Plc 2009 0.2600 0.2585 0.994231
National Bank of Kuwait (International) PLC 2009 0.4000 0.3917 0.97925
Reliance Bank Limited 2009 0.4041 0.4034 0.998268
Wesleyan Bank Ltd 2009 . . .
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT 2009 0.6750 0.5255 0.778519
Bank DBS Indonesia 2009 0.1952 0.1733 0.887807
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional PT 2009 0.1041 0.1014 0.974063
PT Bank Resona Perdania 2009 0.3364 0.3266 0.970868
Bank of Baghdad 2009 . . .
Investment Bank of Iraq SA Co 2009 . . .
National Bank of Iraq 2009 0.3636 0.3601 0.990374
North Bank 2009 0.3245 0.2573 0.792912
Capital Bank of Jordan 2009 0.2141 0.2130 0.994862
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2009 0.1239 0.1163 0.93866
Jordan Commercial Bank 2009 0.1989 0.1985 0.997989
Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The) 2009 0.6513 0.3714 0.570244
National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. 2009 0.9007 0.2715 0.301432
Jammal Trust Bank SAL 2009 0.1761 0.1755 0.996593
Near East Commercial Bank SAL 2009 0.2790 0.2768 0.992115
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Affin Bank 2009 0.5160 0.2702 0.523643
Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad 2009 0.4162 0.2101 0.504805
AmBank (M) Berhad 2009 0.9063 0.3245 0.358049
Bangkok Bank Berhad 2009 0.3927 0.3911 0.995926
Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad 2009 0.4079 0.4077 0.99951
Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad 2009 0.5896 0.5870 0.99559
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 2009 0.2835 0.2627 0.926631
CIMB Bank (L) Limited (2011) 2009 1.0000 1.3123 1.3123
Citibank Berhad 2009 0.5266 0.2160 0.410179
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2009 0.4860 0.4848 0.997531
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 2009 0.4562 0.1797 0.393906
JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad 2009 0.5236 0.5221 0.997135
Maybank International (L) Ltd 2009 0.7938 0.7863 0.990552
RHB Bank (L) Ltd 2009 0.9069 1.4648 1.615173
Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad (The) 2009 0.0994 0.0994 1
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 2009 0.6360 0.2656 0.41761
United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2009 0.7395 0.3079 0.416362
Bank of Khyber 2009 0.2019 0.1996 0.988608
First Dawood Investment Bank Limited 2009 0.6947 0.6711 0.966029
First Women Bank Limited 2009 0.3166 0.3152 0.995578
Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited 2009 0.1903 0.1848 0.971098
KASB Bank Limited 2009 0.1204 0.1177 0.977575
Samba Bank Limited 2009 0.1456 0.1440 0.989011
Silkbank Limited 2009 0.1198 0.1177 0.982471
United Overseas Bank Philippines 2009 0.8403 1.3232 1.574676
Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC 2009 0.6718 0.2659 0.395802
Doha Bank 2009 0.5172 0.2598 0.50232
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2009 0.3756 0.2580 0.686901
Bank Al-Jazira 2009 0.2330 0.1428 0.612876
National Commercial Bank (The) 2009 0.7215 0.1687 0.233818
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2009 0.5985 0.2633 0.439933
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2009 0.5165 0.2926 0.566505
Far Eastern Bank Limited 2009 0.7587 0.7573 0.998155
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2009 0.3106 0.3105 0.999678
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2009 0.4363 0.3161 0.724501
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2009 . . .
Elnilein  Bank 2009 . . .
Farmers Commercial Bank 2009 0.1332 0.1331 0.999249
Omdurman National Bank 2009 0.3930 0.3924 0.998473
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2009 0.1469 0.1467 0.998639
Sudanese French Bank (The) 2009 0.0906 0.0843 0.930464
Bank Audi Syria 2009 0.1937 0.1936 0.999484
Byblos Bank Syria SA 2009 0.2520 0.2511 0.996429
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 2009 0.3006 0.2987 0.993679
Alternatifbank A.S. 2009 0.2649 0.1613 0.608909
HSBC Bank A.S 2009 0.3167 0.1196 0.377644
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ING Bank A.S. 2009 0.4055 0.1611 0.397287
Sekerbank T.A.S. 2009 0.1569 0.1057 0.673678
International Bank of Yemen YSC 2009 0.2092 0.1878 0.897706
National Bank of Yemen 2009 0.1763 0.1719 0.975043
Yemen Commercial Bank 2009 0.2043 0.2040 0.998532
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2010 0.5131 0.2569 0.500682
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2010 0.4201 0.3125 0.743871
Mashreqbank 2010 0.4003 0.1577 0.393955
National Bank of Fujairah 2010 0.2722 0.2137 0.785084
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2010 0.3193 0.1639 0.51331
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain 2010 0.3798 0.2666 0.701948
Union National Bank 2010 0.9937 0.3804 0.382812
United Arab Bank PJSC 2010 0.2477 0.1885 0.761001
Addax Bank BSC 2010 . . .
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2010 0.2883 0.2591 0.898717
Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company BSC 2010 0.2772 0.2377 0.857504
BBK B.S.C. 2010 0.2598 0.1596 0.614319
BMI Bank BSC 2010 0.1366 0.1340 0.980966
Future Bank B.S.C. 2010 0.2613 0.2260 0.864906
Gulf International Bank BSC 2010 0.6789 0.3524 0.519075
National Bank of Bahrain 2010 0.2418 0.1609 0.665426
Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd 2010 0.5952 0.5915 0.993784
City Bank Ltd 2010 0.1529 0.1525 0.997384
Dhaka Bank Limited 2010 0.2270 0.2237 0.985463
Eastern Bank Limited 2010 0.1992 0.1902 0.954819
IFIC Bank Limited-International Finance Investment and Commerce Bank Limited 2010 0.1541 0.1538 0.998053
Janata Bank Limited 2010 0.2332 0.1619 0.694254
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2010 0.2520 0.2441 0.968651
Bank of Alexandria 2010 0.3068 0.1288 0.419817
Allied Bank Philippines (UK) Plc 2010 . . .
Melli Bank Plc 2010 0.2520 0.2498 0.99127
National Bank of Kuwait (International) PLC 2010 0.4167 0.4053 0.972642
Reliance Bank Limited 2010 0.4760 0.4741 0.996008
Wesleyan Bank Ltd 2010 . . .
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT 2010 0.5771 0.5769 0.999653
Bank DBS Indonesia 2010 0.2454 0.1985 0.808883
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional PT 2010 0.2478 0.1190 0.480226
PT Bank Resona Perdania 2010 0.3833 0.3696 0.964258
Bank of Baghdad 2010 . . .
Investment Bank of Iraq SA Co 2010 0.3297 0.3050 0.925083
National Bank of Iraq 2010 0.3356 0.3345 0.996722
North Bank 2010 0.3104 0.2395 0.771585
Capital Bank of Jordan 2010 0.2224 0.2215 0.995953
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2010 0.1345 0.1193 0.886989
Jordan Commercial Bank 2010 0.1977 0.1971 0.996965
Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The) 2010 0.6425 0.3679 0.572607
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National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. 2010 0.9435 0.2806 0.297403
Jammal Trust Bank SAL 2010 0.1772 0.1767 0.997178
Near East Commercial Bank SAL 2010 0.2745 0.2733 0.995628
Affin Bank 2010 0.5845 0.2713 0.464157
Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad 2010 0.5127 0.2277 0.444119
AmBank (M) Berhad 2010 1.5404 0.3036 0.197092
Bangkok Bank Berhad 2010 0.3451 0.3439 0.996523
Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad 2010 0.3181 0.3173 0.997485
Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad 2010 0.6238 0.6238 1
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 2010 0.3061 0.2862 0.934989
CIMB Bank (L) Limited (2011) 2010 . . .
Citibank Berhad 2010 0.5355 0.1819 0.339683
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2010 0.4893 0.4792 0.979358
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 2010 0.5058 0.2038 0.402926
JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad 2010 0.4673 0.4567 0.977316
Maybank International (L) Ltd 2010 . . .
RHB Bank (L) Ltd 2010 . . .
Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad (The) 2010 0.1276 0.1265 0.991379
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 2010 0.8264 0.3451 0.417594
United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2010 0.8480 0.3230 0.380896
Bank of Khyber 2010 0.1885 0.1884 0.999469
First Dawood Investment Bank Limited 2010 0.9449 1.4922 1.579215
First Women Bank Limited 2010 0.3247 0.3235 0.996304
Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited 2010 0.2010 0.1857 0.923881
KASB Bank Limited 2010 0.1155 0.1137 0.984416
Samba Bank Limited 2010 0.1535 0.1525 0.993485
Silkbank Limited 2010 0.1305 0.1291 0.989272
United Overseas Bank Philippines 2010 0.8197 1.2856 1.568379
Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC 2010 0.7017 0.2752 0.39219
Doha Bank 2010 0.5138 0.2489 0.48443
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2010 0.4542 0.2886 0.635403
Bank Al-Jazira 2010 0.2657 0.1554 0.58487
National Commercial Bank (The) 2010 0.8344 0.1760 0.21093
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2010 0.5854 0.2825 0.482576
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2010 0.5214 0.2872 0.550825
Far Eastern Bank Limited 2010 0.7359 0.7343 0.997826
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2010 0.2528 0.2503 0.990111
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2010 0.4179 0.2642 0.632209
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2010 . . .
Elnilein  Bank 2010 . . .
Farmers Commercial Bank 2010 . . .
Omdurman National Bank 2010 0.3778 0.3775 0.999206
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2010 0.1506 0.1505 0.999336
Sudanese French Bank (The) 2010 0.0841 0.0798 0.94887
Bank Audi Syria 2010 0.2065 0.2061 0.998063
Byblos Bank Syria SA 2010 0.2512 0.2503 0.996417
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North Africa International Bank - NAIB 2010 0.2535 0.2516 0.992505
Alternatifbank A.S. 2010 0.2999 0.1716 0.572191
HSBC Bank A.S 2010 0.3641 0.1146 0.314749
ING Bank A.S. 2010 0.4016 0.1705 0.424552
Sekerbank T.A.S. 2010 0.2165 0.1276 0.589376
International Bank of Yemen YSC 2010 0.2151 0.1822 0.847048
National Bank of Yemen 2010 0.1805 0.1633 0.904709
Yemen Commercial Bank 2010 0.1971 0.1959 0.993912
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2011 0.4878 0.2417 0.49549
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2011 0.4261 0.3055 0.716968
Mashreqbank 2011 0.3434 0.1490 0.433896
National Bank of Fujairah 2011 0.3560 0.2128 0.597753
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2011 0.3461 0.1583 0.457382
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain 2011 0.3257 0.2315 0.710777
Union National Bank 2011 1.0000 0.3728 0.3728
United Arab Bank PJSC 2011 0.3100 0.2169 0.699677
Addax Bank BSC 2011 . . .
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2011 0.3558 0.2730 0.767285
Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company BSC 2011 0.2753 0.2393 0.869234
BBK B.S.C. 2011 0.2614 0.1669 0.638485
BMI Bank BSC 2011 0.1504 0.1495 0.994016
Future Bank B.S.C. 2011 0.2623 0.2276 0.867709
Gulf International Bank BSC 2011 0.5736 0.2642 0.4606
National Bank of Bahrain 2011 0.2471 0.1618 0.654796
Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd 2011 0.4695 0.4681 0.997018
City Bank Ltd 2011 0.1706 0.1702 0.997655
Dhaka Bank Limited 2011 0.2440 0.2377 0.97418
Eastern Bank Limited 2011 0.1996 0.1932 0.967936
IFIC Bank Limited-International Finance Investment and Commerce Bank Limited 2011 0.1696 0.1689 0.995873
Janata Bank Limited 2011 0.2397 0.1659 0.692115
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2011 0.2407 0.2282 0.948068
Bank of Alexandria 2011 0.3039 0.1178 0.387628
Allied Bank Philippines (UK) Plc 2011 . . .
Melli Bank Plc 2011 0.3722 0.3707 0.99597
National Bank of Kuwait (International) PLC 2011 0.4545 0.4432 0.975138
Reliance Bank Limited 2011 0.4282 0.4262 0.995329
Wesleyan Bank Ltd 2011 . . .
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT 2011 0.6683 0.6647 0.994613
Bank DBS Indonesia 2011 0.3804 0.1968 0.51735
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional PT 2011 0.3630 0.1203 0.331405
PT Bank Resona Perdania 2011 0.3609 0.3449 0.955666
Bank of Baghdad 2011 0.1738 0.1259 0.724396
Investment Bank of Iraq SA Co 2011 0.3254 0.3041 0.934542
National Bank of Iraq 2011 0.2573 0.2570 0.998834
North Bank 2011 0.3035 0.2137 0.704119
Capital Bank of Jordan 2011 0.1884 0.1874 0.994692
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Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2011 0.1453 0.1262 0.868548
Jordan Commercial Bank 2011 0.1936 0.1924 0.993802
Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The) 2011 0.5879 0.3552 0.604184
National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. 2011 0.9477 0.2814 0.296929
Jammal Trust Bank SAL 2011 . . .
Near East Commercial Bank SAL 2011 . . .
Affin Bank 2011 0.6129 0.2984 0.486866
Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad 2011 0.5597 0.2397 0.428265
AmBank (M) Berhad 2011 0.9756 0.2723 0.27911
Bangkok Bank Berhad 2011 0.3332 0.3319 0.996098
Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad 2011 0.3368 0.3366 0.999406
Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad 2011 0.6648 0.6572 0.988568
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 2011 0.2588 0.2429 0.938563
CIMB Bank (L) Limited (2011) 2011 . . .
Citibank Berhad 2011 0.4772 0.1669 0.349749
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2011 0.4695 0.4646 0.989563
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 2011 0.5303 0.2082 0.392608
JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad 2011 0.4762 0.4717 0.99055
Maybank International (L) Ltd 2011 . . .
RHB Bank (L) Ltd 2011 . . .
Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad (The) 2011 0.1773 0.1702 0.959955
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 2011 0.8369 0.3504 0.418688
United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2011 0.8783 0.3418 0.389161
Bank of Khyber 2011 0.1367 0.1346 0.984638
First Dawood Investment Bank Limited 2011 0.6803 0.6762 0.993973
First Women Bank Limited 2011 0.3025 0.3018 0.997686
Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited 2011 0.1532 0.1443 0.941906
KASB Bank Limited 2011 0.1169 0.1144 0.978614
Samba Bank Limited 2011 0.1648 0.1644 0.997573
Silkbank Limited 2011 0.1234 0.1229 0.995948
United Overseas Bank Philippines 2011 0.7194 0.7181 0.998193
Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC 2011 0.8184 0.3170 0.387341
Doha Bank 2011 0.5434 0.2445 0.449945
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2011 0.4808 0.2803 0.582987
Bank Al-Jazira 2011 0.3342 0.1727 0.516756
National Commercial Bank (The) 2011 0.9198 0.1785 0.194064
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2011 0.6368 0.2902 0.455716
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2011 0.4236 0.2339 0.552172
Far Eastern Bank Limited 2011 0.7782 0.7744 0.995117
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2011 0.2159 0.2156 0.99861
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2011 0.5091 0.3044 0.597918
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2011 . . .
Elnilein  Bank 2011 . . .
Farmers Commercial Bank 2011 0.1277 0.1276 0.999217
Omdurman National Bank 2011 0.3107 0.3107 1
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2011 0.1562 0.1545 0.989117
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Sudanese French Bank (The) 2011 0.0756 0.0734 0.970899
Bank Audi Syria 2011 0.2146 0.2135 0.994874
Byblos Bank Syria SA 2011 0.2911 0.2898 0.995534
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 2011 0.2450 0.2369 0.966939
Alternatifbank A.S. 2011 0.3011 0.1665 0.552972
HSBC Bank A.S 2011 0.5277 0.1352 0.256206
ING Bank A.S. 2011 0.4915 0.2066 0.420346
Sekerbank T.A.S. 2011 0.2321 0.1452 0.625592
International Bank of Yemen YSC 2011 0.1829 0.1656 0.905413
National Bank of Yemen 2011 0.1471 0.1271 0.864038
Yemen Commercial Bank 2011 0.1962 0.1961 0.99949
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2012 0.4976 0.2458 0.493971
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2012 0.4095 0.2980 0.727717
Mashreqbank 2012 0.4261 0.1558 0.365642
National Bank of Fujairah 2012 0.4275 0.2101 0.491462
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2012 0.3834 0.1558 0.406364
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain 2012 0.3425 0.2432 0.710073
Union National Bank 2012 0.9703 0.3474 0.358034
United Arab Bank PJSC 2012 . . .
Addax Bank BSC 2012 . . .
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2012 0.3612 0.2854 0.790144
Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company BSC 2012 0.2752 0.2170 0.788517
BBK B.S.C. 2012 0.2717 0.1607 0.591461
BMI Bank BSC 2012 0.2070 0.1924 0.929469
Future Bank B.S.C. 2012 0.2304 0.1941 0.842448
Gulf International Bank BSC 2012 0.5491 0.2369 0.431433
National Bank of Bahrain 2012 0.2157 0.1419 0.657858
Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd 2012 0.3270 0.3263 0.997859
City Bank Ltd 2012 0.1533 0.1525 0.994781
Dhaka Bank Limited 2012 0.2341 0.2335 0.997437
Eastern Bank Limited 2012 0.1991 0.1900 0.954294
IFIC Bank Limited-International Finance Investment and Commerce Bank Limited 2012 0.1666 0.1658 0.995198
Janata Bank Limited 2012 0.2609 0.1757 0.673438
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2012 0.2634 0.2479 0.941154
Bank of Alexandria 2012 0.2199 0.1027 0.46703
Allied Bank Philippines (UK) Plc 2012 . . .
Melli Bank Plc 2012 0.3756 0.3698 0.984558
National Bank of Kuwait (International) PLC 2012 0.4762 0.4687 0.98425
Reliance Bank Limited 2012 0.4308 0.4292 0.996286
Wesleyan Bank Ltd 2012 . . .
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT 2012 0.7572 0.7467 0.986133
Bank DBS Indonesia 2012 0.6045 0.3732 0.61737
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional PT 2012 0.4406 0.1195 0.271221
PT Bank Resona Perdania 2012 0.5417 0.5404 0.9976
Bank of Baghdad 2012 0.1455 0.0968 0.665292
Investment Bank of Iraq SA Co 2012 . . .
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National Bank of Iraq 2012 . . .
North Bank 2012 . . .
Capital Bank of Jordan 2012 0.1702 0.1628 0.956522
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2012 0.1502 0.1301 0.866178
Jordan Commercial Bank 2012 0.1975 0.1966 0.995443
Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The) 2012 0.5877 0.3607 0.613749
National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. 2012 1.0000 0.2953 0.2953
Jammal Trust Bank SAL 2012 . . .
Near East Commercial Bank SAL 2012 . . .
Affin Bank 2012 0.6888 0.3055 0.443525
Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad 2012 0.6103 0.2371 0.388497
AmBank (M) Berhad 2012 1.0000 0.3122 0.3122
Bangkok Bank Berhad 2012 0.3226 0.3213 0.99597
Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad 2012 0.2867 0.2867 1
Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad 2012 0.7201 0.7199 0.999722
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 2012 0.2393 0.2121 0.886335
CIMB Bank (L) Limited (2011) 2012 . . .
Citibank Berhad 2012 0.5150 0.1574 0.305631
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2012 0.4673 0.4635 0.991868
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 2012 0.6420 0.2250 0.350467
JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad 2012 0.4386 0.4300 0.980392
Maybank International (L) Ltd 2012 . . .
RHB Bank (L) Ltd 2012 . . .
Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad (The) 2012 0.2288 0.2242 0.979895
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 2012 0.8479 0.3306 0.389904
United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2012 1.0000 0.3540 0.354
Bank of Khyber 2012 0.1459 0.1427 0.978067
First Dawood Investment Bank Limited 2012 0.9586 1.5575 1.624765
First Women Bank Limited 2012 0.2984 0.2979 0.998324
Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited 2012 0.1290 0.1236 0.95814
KASB Bank Limited 2012 0.1026 0.1016 0.990253
Samba Bank Limited 2012 0.1652 0.1647 0.996973
Silkbank Limited 2012 0.1095 0.1086 0.991781
United Overseas Bank Philippines 2012 0.6904 0.6900 0.999421
Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC 2012 0.8780 0.3186 0.36287
Doha Bank 2012 0.6023 0.2670 0.443301
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2012 0.4868 0.2861 0.587716
Bank Al-Jazira 2012 0.3931 0.1818 0.462478
National Commercial Bank (The) 2012 1.0000 0.2011 0.2011
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2012 0.7918 0.3180 0.401617
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2012 0.5627 0.2893 0.514128
Far Eastern Bank Limited 2012 0.7609 0.7608 0.999869
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2012 0.2309 0.2308 0.999567
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2012 0.5576 0.3322 0.595768
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2012 . . .
Elnilein  Bank 2012 . . .
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Farmers Commercial Bank 2012 . . .
Omdurman National Bank 2012 0.2827 0.2824 0.998939
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2012 . . .
Sudanese French Bank (The) 2012 . . .
Bank Audi Syria 2012 . . .
Byblos Bank Syria SA 2012 0.2159 0.2145 0.993516
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 2012 . . .
Alternatifbank A.S. 2012 0.4115 0.1953 0.474605
HSBC Bank A.S 2012 0.4657 0.1179 0.253167
ING Bank A.S. 2012 0.7140 0.2129 0.298179
Sekerbank T.A.S. 2012 0.2503 0.1549 0.618857
International Bank of Yemen YSC 2012 0.3296 0.1740 0.527913
National Bank of Yemen 2012 0.1061 0.0846 0.797361
Yemen Commercial Bank 2012 . . .
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Appemdix 2; Descriptive statistics for different regions and countries based on Logarithm of total assets (in USD millions)
Note: Size is measured by logarithm of total assets (Ln TA). The sample consists of 199 banks covering 21 countries from 4 regions Middle East & North Africa (MENA): United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. East Asia & Pacific (E.Asia&Pac): Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Singapore. South Asia (S.Asia): Bangladesh and Pakistan. Europe and Central Asia (EU & C. Asia):The United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey. The data are extracted from BankScope 
database for 7 years from 2006 to 2012 inclusive.
Region/Country Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum No. Year Obs. No. of Banks
ISB CB T ISB CB T ISB CB T ISB CB T ISB CB T ISB CB T
MENA 7.05 7.41 7.19 1.41 1.60 1.45 2.49 3.80 2.49 11.17 11.43 11.43 382.00 324.00 706.00 61.00 50.00 111.00
UAE 8.59 8.62 8.61 1.07 0.90 0.98 5.63 7.17 5.63 9.86 10.31 10.16 50 56 106 8 8 16
Bahrain 6.27 7.43 6.65 1.62 1.65 1.71 2.49 3.80 2.49 8.78 8.83 10.31 110 54 164 17 8 25
Egypt 8.04 8.00 8.02 0.51 0.81 0.67 7.16 6.56 6.56 6.79 7.02 8.83 14 14 28 2 2 4
Iraq 5.55 5.53 5.54 0.74 0.90 0.82 4.01 4.09 4.01 8.36 8.23 7.02 20 23 43 4 4 8
Jordan 6.93 7.42 7.18 1.08 0.54 0.88 5.08 6.59 5.08 10.86 10.98 8.36 21 21 42 3 3 6
Kuwait 8.25 10.08 8.78 1.35 0.65 1.45 6.18 9.22 6.18 5.55 6.32 10.98 34 14 48 5 2 7
Lebanon 4.95 5.66 5.31 0.58 0.57 0.66 4.01 4.96 4.01 9.91 10.00 6.32 8 8 16 2 2 4
Qatar 8.84 9.16 9.00 0.66 0.62 0.65 7.74 7.52 7.52 11.17 11.43 10.00 20 21 41 3 3 6
Saudi A. 9.44 9.79 9.62 0.93 0.84 0.89 8.01 8.34 8.01 7.53 8.12 11.43 26 28 54 4 4 8
Sudan 6.29 5.98 6.12 0.64 0.95 0.83 5.40 4.22 4.22 7.41 7.60 8.12 42 48 90 7 8 15
Syria 6.11 6.59 6.38 0.89 0.66 0.79 5.01 5.27 5.01 6.39 6.23 7.60 10 13 23 2 2 4
Tunisia 6.18 5.85 6.02 0.21 0.32 0.31 5.86 5.40 5.40 7.65 7.20 6.39 6 6 12 1 1 2
Yemen 6.21 6.22 6.22 1.06 0.43 0.82 4.46 5.34 4.46 10.16 10.16 7.65 21 18 39 3 3 6
E. Asia &Pac 5.80 6.38 6.12 2.62 1.89 2.22 0.22 3.06 0.22 10.31 10.22 10.31 131 155 286 22 23 45
Indonesia 6.87 6.96 6.92 1.35 1.06 1.18 3.68 5.15 3.68 8.63 8.72 8.72 23 28 51 4 4 8
Malaysia 7.97 8.26 8.12 1.01 1.24 1.15 4.41 5.73 4.41 10.31 10.22 10.31 98 114 212 16 17 33
Philippines 1.99 3.76 2.96 1.42 0.49 1.33 0.22 3.06 0.22 3.24 4.22 4.22 5 6 11 1 1 2
Singapore 6.36 6.53 6.46 0.29 0.16 0.23 5.90 6.30 5.90 6.60 6.75 6.75 5 7 12 1 1 2
S. Asia 5.87 6.44 6.16 1.06 0.51 0.80 3.03 2.50 2.50 8.68 8.70 8.70 91 89 180 13 13 26
Bangladesh 6.62 6.81 6.72 0.98 1.04 1.01 4.95 4.51 4.51 8.68 8.70 8.70 42 42 84 6 6 12
Pakistan 5.12 6.08 5.59 1.45 1.27 1.44 3.03 2.50 2.50 7.95 8.07 8.07 49 47 96 7 7 14
EU &C. Asia 6.85 7.20 7.04 2.42 2.24 2.34 2.41 2.54 2.41 9.40 9.63 9.63 53 62 115 8 9 17
UK 5.14 5.62 5.38 1.56 1.72 1.65 2.41 2.54 2.41 7.40 8.18 8.18 33 35 68 5 5 10
Turkey 8.56 8.78 8.69 0.52 0.67 0.62 7.48 7.26 7.26 9.40 9.63 9.63 20 27 47 3 4 7
Total 6.68 7.10 6.87 1.70 1.60 1.59 0.22 2.50 0.22 11.17 11.43 11.43 657 630 1287 104 95 199
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Appendix 3: Total assets of the selected Islamic and conventional banks (in USD millions)
Country 
Name
Islamic bank
Islamic 
total assets 
mil USD
Conventional 
total assets mil 
USD
Conventional bank
Arab 
Emirates
Dubai Islamic Bank plc 25,967.24 23,727 Union National Bank
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public 
Joint Stock Co.
23,325.96 20,799 Mashreqbank
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 10,146.71 10,747 Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C.
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 8,746.60 7,420
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah 
(P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK
Sharjah Islamic Bank 4,987.39 4,777
National Bank of Fujairah
Noor Islamic Bank 4,888.93 4,088 United Arab Bank PJSC
Tamweel PJSC 2,980.78 3,333 National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain
Ajman Bank 1,494.81 3,107 Invest Bank P.S.C.
Bangladesh
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited 5,905.57 5,978 Janata Bank Limited
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. 1,848.31 1,842 Eastern Bank Limited
Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd 1,637.85 1,631 Dhaka Bank Limited
First Security Islami Bank 
Limited
1,603.56 1,575 City Bank Ltd
Social Islami Bank Ltd 1,417.99 1,400
IFIC Bank Limited-International 
Finance Investment and Commerce 
Bank Limited
ICB Islamic Bank Limited 140.49 245 Bangladesh Commerce Bank Ltd
Bahrain
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 19,055.10 17,705 Gulf International Bank BSC
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. (2011) 3,718.30 8,265 BBK B.S.C.
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2,505.85 7,060 National Bank of Bahrain
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2,214.89 2,005 BMI Bank BSC
First energy bank 1,400.50 1,453 Future Bank B.S.C.
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 1,258.40 1,112 Alubaf Arab International Bank
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 1,066.80 515
Bahrain Commercial Facilities 
Company BSC
Gulf Finance House BSC 890.40 57 Addax Bank BSC
Bank Alkhair BSC 483.00
Elaf Bank 382.80
Seera Investment Bank BSC 360.30
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-
VCBank
209.51
International Investment Bank 
BSC-IIB
165.30
Global Banking Corporation BSC 141.00
Capivest 133.60
Investors Bank BSC 42.50
Citi Islamic Investment Bank 16.10
Egypt
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 6,514.77 6,520 Bank of Alexandria
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2,468.36 2,473 Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE
Great 
Britain
Bank of London and The Middle 
East Plc-BLME
1,639.51 1,785
National Bank of Kuwait 
(International) PLC
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc 412.02 458 Melli Bank Plc
Gatehouse Bank Plc 309.14 314 Reliance Bank Limited
European Islamic Investment 
Bank Plc
270.95 298 Wesleyan Bank Ltd
DD&Co. Limited (2011) 14.00 19 Allied Bank Philippines (UK) Plc
Indonesia
Bank Syariah Mandiri 5,367.44 6,111
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan 
Nasional PT
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PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk 4,638.51 4,311 Bank DBS Indonesia
PT Bank BRI Syariah 1,456.97 1,238 PT Bank Resona Perdania
PT Bank Maybank Syariah 
Indonesia
213.29 436 Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT
Iraq
Kurdistan International Bank for 
Investment and Development
884.91 1,115 Bank of Baghdad
Al-Bilad Islamic Bank for 
Investments & Financing
450.85 771 North Bank
Cihan Bank for Islamic 
Investment and Finance P.S.C
401.26 280
Investment Bank of Iraq SA Co 
(12/2011)
Elaf Islamic Bank 326.46 144 National Bank of Iraq (12/2011)
Jordan
Jordan Islamic Bank 4,254.23 3,733 Jordan Ahli Bank Plc
Islamic International Arab Bank 1,653.80 2,263 Capital Bank of Jordan
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 669.32 1,189 Jordan Commercial Bank
Kuwait
Kuwait Finance House 52,287.70 58,409 National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K.
Boubyan Bank KSC 6,702.35 13,044
Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK 
(The)
Kuwait International Bank 4,443.46
First Investment Company 
K.S.C.C. (2011)
591.53
A'Ayan Leasing & Investment 
Company
1,454.48
Lebanon
Al Baraka Bank Lebanon SAL 
(2010)
226.31 554 Jammal Trust Bank SAL
Arab Finance House sal (Islamic 
Bank) (2010)
121.12 236 Near East Commercial Bank SAL
Malaysia
Maybank Islamic Berhad 29,896.48 26,357
United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) 
Bhd.
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 16,749.51 26,301 AmBank (M) Berhad
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 12,236.50 25,055 HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad
AmIslamic Bank Berhad 10,524.59 17,037 Affin Bank
Public Islamic Bank Berhad 9,580.19 16,891
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia 
Berhad
RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 8,373.84 12,935 Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 6,867.06 12,573 Citibank Berhad
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 6,683.18 3,533
Maybank International (L) Ltd 
(2011)
HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad 3,971.55 3,507 Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd.
Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 3,833.53 3,451
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 
(Malaysia) Berhad
Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) 
Berhad (2011)
2,974.43 2,399 CIMB Bank (L) Limited (2011)
Standard Chartered Saadiq 
Berhad
2,396.72 1,905 JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment 
Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad
2,286.98 1,499
Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad 
(The)
OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 2,275.55 1,496 Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad
Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2,121.32 1,444 Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad
Asian Finance Bank Berhad 918.98 1,012 RHB Bank (L) Ltd (2011)
852 Bangkok Bank Berhad (2011)
Philippines
Al-Amanah Islamic Investment 
Bank of the Philippines (2011)
17.25 68 United Overseas Bank Philippines
Pakistan
Meezan Bank Limited 2,825.28 3,096 Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited
BankIslami Pakistan Limited 764.25 929 KASB Bank Limited
Albaraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited 760.47 917 Silkbank Limited
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan 
Limited
653.73 846 Bank of Khyber
Standard Chartered Modaraba 64.80 348 Samba Bank Limited
First Habib Modaraba 48.25 232 First Women Bank Limited
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First National Bank Modaraba 20.74 12
First Dawood Investment Bank 
Limited
Qatar
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 20,107.72 21,988
Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) 
QSC
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 16,930.88 15,168 Doha Bank
Qatar International Islamic Bank 7,845.88 8,844 International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C.
Saudi Arabia
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment 
Corporation-Al Rajhi Bank
71,302.03 92,085 National Commercial Bank (The)
Islamic Development Bank 17,478.74 18,268 Saudi Hollandi Bank
Alinma Bank 14,403.87 15,751 Saudi Investment Bank (The)
Bank AlBilad 7,940.67 13,588 Bank Al-Jazira
Sudan
Bank of Khartoum 1,534.90 2,068 Omdurman National Bank (2011)
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 1,261.49 594
Sudanese French Bank (The) 
(2011)
Tadamon Islamic Bank 694.50 494 Farmers Commercial Bank (2011)
Al Salam Bank (2011) 536.48 441 Elnilein  Bank
Al Baraka Bank Sudan (2011) 351.26 352 Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd
United Capital Bank 339.33 295 Byblos Bank Africa Ltd
Al Shamal Islamic Bank (2011) 303.00 252 Saudi Sudanese Bank (2011)
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Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian 
Bank
Singapore
Islamic Bank of Asia (The) 
(2011)
366.40 768 Far Eastern Bank Limited
Syria
Syria International Islamic Bank 
(2011)
1,151.31 1,153 Bank Audi Syria (2011)
Cham Islamic Bank SA (2011) 237.23 622 Byblos Bank Syria SA
Tunisia Albaraka Bank Tunisia (2011) 592.30 509
North Africa International Bank -
NAIB (2011)
Turkey
Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank 
Asya
12,107.30 15,281 ING Bank A.S.
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi 
A.S.
10,436.08 14,218 HSBC Bank A.S
Albaraka Turk Participation 
Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim 
Bankasi AS
6,918.26 8,447 Sekerbank T.A.S.
4,506 Alternatifbank A.S.
Yemen
Tadhamon International Islamic 
Bank
2,094.62 1,335 International Bank of Yemen YSC
Saba Islamic Bank 836.08 592 National Bank of Yemen
Shamil Bank of Yemen & 
Bahrain
224.45 495 Yemen Commercial Bank
Total Assets 897,927.60 659,778
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Appendix 4: Frequency of Inputs & Outputs used in literature review 
Inputs Freq. Outputs Freq.
Employees 20 Loans 12
Labour 13 Deposits 10
Physical capital 7 Number of transactions 7
Capital 6 Non-interest income 6
Expenses 5 Total loans 5
Space 5 Net profit 3
Deposits 5 Real estate loans 3
Assets 5 Commercial loans 3
Terminals 4 Number of branches 3
Total deposits 4 Advances 3
number of branches 4 Investments 3
Rent 3 Interest income 3
Credit applications 2 Industrial loans 2
Capital stock 2 Bonds 2
capital ( book value of machinery and 
equipment )
2 Consumer loans 2
Location 2 ROA 2
Interest on deposits 2 ROE 2
Borrowing 2 Customers response 1
ATMs 2 Error corrections 1
Price of labour 2 Demand deposits 1
Buildings 2 Time deposits 1
Networth 1 Short- term loans 1
Operating expense 1 Long-term loans 1
Number of accounts 1 Other services 1
Suppliers 1 Index of quantities of each service provided i.e. 
checks debit and credit loans, deposits.
1
Computer 1 Balance of current accounts 1
Machine 1 Savings account 1
Automatic teller machines 1 Loans sales 1
Materials 1 Short term loans to nonbanks 1
Capital ( book value) 1 loans to banks 1
Acquired equipment 1 Private loans to individuals 1
Funds from customers 1 Loan revenue 1
Windows 1 Other revenues 1
Price of deposits 1 Value of demand deposits 1
Volume of deposits 1 Small time and saving deposits 1
Time deposits 1 Installment loans 1
Interest expenses on deposits 1 Automatic teller machine operations 1
Interest on purchased funds 1 International operations 1
loanable funds 1 Stocks 1
Counter transactions 1 Credit operations 1
Potential market 1 Opening of new accounts 1
Total cost 1 Special services 1
Price of capital 1 Business loans 1
Volume of labour 1 Total deposits 1
Volume of deposits 1 Guarantees given to customers 1
Expenses for federal funds purchased and 
repurchased in domestic offices salaries
1 Investments in securities 1
Furniture 1 Loans sales 1
Equipment 1 Liability sale 1
Borrowed funds 1 Investments and insurance policies sold 1
Funding 1 Fixed deposits 1
Interest cost 1 Current deposits 1
Not-interest cost 1 Investments income 1
Expenses on personnel 1 Short term loans to nonbanks 1
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Selected financial ratios 1 loans to banks 1
Fixed assets 1 Cash 1
Operation costs 1 Real estate 1
Interest expenses 1 Fees 1
Materials ( non-labour, non-capital  ) 1 Commissions 1
Marketing 1 Revenue from sales 1
Number of loans accounts 1 Number of offices. 1
Number of mortgage account 1 Total loans Interest 1
Number of cheque accounts 1 Fees on loans 1
Current accounts 1 Income on federal funds sold and repurchases in 
domestic offices
1
Savings accounts 1 Allowances for loan losses 1
Employees per branch 1 Net of unearned income 1
loans 1 Transactions deposits 1
Non sales FTE 1 Fee-based income 1
Sales FTE 1 Lease financing receivable 1
Size and city employment rate 1 Agricultural loans 1
Equity 1 Other loans 1
Total overhead expenses 1 Private loans to individuals 1
Transactions 1
Maintenance 1
Selected financial ratios 1
Investments interest income 1
Public loans 1
Guarantees 1
Revenue 1
Profits 1
Accounts per customer and satisfaction 1
Personal loans 1
New cheque account 1
Mortgage loans 1
Insurance commission and change in “ marketed 
balances”
1
Sales 1
Assets 1
Operating income 1
Revenues 1
Average number of products/customer 1
Customer loyalty 1
Income 1
Other earning assets 1
Off-balance sheet items 1
Total earning assets 1
Securities 1
Source: Own Table
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Appendix 5: Determinants of PTE including only one of the 6 WGI (Political stability)
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
FCRISIS -0.02456 0.02939 -0.84 0.4034 -0.08215 0.03304
ISMDUM -0.01805 0.02877 -0.63 0.5304 -0.07444 0.03834
ISFCRIS 0.02291 0.04254 0.54 0.5901 -0.06046 0.10629
NL_TA .00146*** 0.00052 2.78 0.0055 0.00043 0.00249
LLP_GL -.89700D-05 .4531D-04 -0.2 0.8431 -0.97768D-04 0.79828D-04
EQ_TA .00323*** 0.00075 4.31 0 0.00176 0.00471
SIZERT .02846*** 0.00826 3.45 0.0006 0.01228 0.04464
RES_YPC -.02292* 0.01338 -1.71 0.0867 -0.04914 0.0033
YGR -0.00143 0.00319 -0.45 0.6529 -0.00768 0.00481
HHI 0.14256 0.27083 0.53 0.5986 -0.38826 0.67339
INFL -0.00063 0.0016 -0.4 0.6923 -0.00377 0.0025
MKTCY .00054** 0.00022 2.39 0.0171 0.0001 0.00098
VACC -.00147** 0.0007 -2.09 0.0364 -0.00284 -0.00009
POLTC .00207*** 0.00052 3.99 0.0001 0.00106 0.00309
Constant 0.02392 0.08223 0.29 0.7711 -0.13724 0.18509
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)        =       e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                          =       0.061614
            SD.[e]                                 =      0.248222
            Var[u]                                 =      0 .005565
            SD.[u]                                 =      0 .074596
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                 =     0 .082832
            Sum of Squares                           0 .250585E+09
            R-squared                                    0 .021414
[ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =     0.000000]
Note:  We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 6: Determinants of PTE including only one of the 6 WGI (Government Effectiveness)
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
FCRISIS -0.02326 0.02953 -0.79 0.4309 -0.08114 0.03462
ISMDUM -0.01704 0.0289 -0.59 0.5554 -0.0737 0.03961
ISFCRIS 0.02355 0.04274 0.55 0.5816 -0.06021 0.10732
NL_TA .00155*** 0.00052 2.96 0.0031 0.00052 0.00257
LLP_GL -.12023D-04 .4512D-04 -0.27 0.7899 -0.10045D-03 0.76406D-04
EQ_TA .00305*** 0.00076 4.04 0.0001 0.00157 0.00453
SIZERT .02433*** 0.00846 2.88 0.004 0.00776 0.04091
RES_YPC -0.00483 0.0124 -0.39 0.6968 -0.02913 0.01947
YGR -0.00119 0.00319 -0.37 0.7089 -0.00744 0.00506
HHI 0.40782 0.25781 1.58 0.1137 -0.09748 0.91311
INFL -0.00027 0.00161 -0.17 0.8673 -0.00342 0.00288
MKTCY .00040* 0.00023 1.72 0.0857 -0.00006 0.00086
VACC -.00171** 0.00071 -2.4 0.0166 -0.00311 -0.00031
GOVEFF .00260*** 0.00059 4.42 0 0.00145 0.00375
Constant -0.0382 0.08015 -0.48 0.6336 -0.1953 0.11889
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)         =    e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                            =   0.060953
            SD.[e]                                  =    0.246887
            Var[u]                                  =    0.005883
            SD.[u]                                  =    0.076701
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                 =     0.088021
            Sum of Squares                          0.256570E+09
            R-squared                                  -0.090095
[ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =    0.000000]
Note:  We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 7: Determinants of PTE including only one of the 6 WGI (Rule of Law)
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
FCRISIS -0.02013 0.02993 -0.67 0.5011 -0.07879 0.03852
ISMDUM -0.01864 0.02929 -0.64 0.5245 -0.07606 0.03877
ISFCRIS 0.02089 0.0433 0.48 0.6295 -0.06397 0.10575
NL_TA .00162*** 0.00053 3.06 0.0022 0.00058 0.00266
LLP_GL .87763D-05 .4543D-04 -0.19 0.8468 -.97808D-04 0.80255D-04
EQ_TA .00307*** 0.00078 3.94 0.0001 0.00154 0.0046
SIZERT .02527*** 0.00892 2.83 0.0046 0.00779 0.04275
RES_YPC -0.00846 0.01265 -0.67 0.5037 -0.03325 0.01633
YGR -0.00176 0.00321 -0.55 0.5851 -0.00805 0.00454
HHI 0.42662 0.26 1.64 0.1008 -0.08297 0.93621
INFL -0.00061 0.00162 -0.37 0.708 -0.00378 0.00257
MKTCY .00048** 0.00024 2.02 0.0439 0.00001 0.00094
VACC -.00149** 0.00073 -2.04 0.0416 -0.00293 -0.00006
RLAW .00225*** 0.00073 3.1 0.0019 0.00083 0.00368
Constant -0.02046 0.0812 -0.25 0.801 -0.17962 0.13869
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)        =       e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                            =       0.061481
            SD.[e]                                 =       0.247953
            Var[u]                                  =       0.006272
            SD.[u]                                  =       0.079193
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                  =       0.092567
            Sum of Squares                             0.258022E+09
            R-squared                                     -0.101789
[ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =       0.000000]
Note:  We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 8: Determinants of PTE including only one of the 6 WGI (Corruption Control)
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
FCRISIS -0.0237 0.03005 -0.79 0.4302 -0.0826 0.03519
ISMDUM -0.01739 0.02935 -0.59 0.5536 -0.07492 0.04014
ISFCRIS 0.02186 0.04339 0.5 0.6145 -0.06319 0.10691
NL_TA .00149*** 0.00053 2.82 0.0049 0.00045 0.00253
LLP_GL -.10087D-04 .4559D-04 -0.22 0.8249 -.99435D-04 0.79261D-04
EQ_TA .00330*** 0.00078 4.24 0 0.00178 0.00483
SIZERT .03021*** 0.00871 3.47 0.0005 0.01315 0.04727
RES_YPC -0.01028 0.01302 -0.79 0.4302 -0.0358 0.01525
YGR -0.00176 0.00322 -0.54 0.5862 -0.00808 0.00457
HHI .43683* 0.26095 1.67 0.0941 -0.07462 0.94829
INFL -0.00093 0.00162 -0.57 0.5676 -0.0041 0.00225
MKTCY .00060*** 0.00023 2.62 0.0089 0.00015 0.00106
VACC -0.00116 0.00072 -1.61 0.108 -0.00257 0.00025
RLAW .00123** 0.00056 2.2 0.0275 0.00014 0.00232
Constant -0.01654 0.08217 -0.2 0.8405 -0.1776 0.14452
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)        =          e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                          =          0.061906
            SD.[e]                                 =         0.248809
            Var[u]                                 =         0.006268
            SD.[u]                                 =         0.079168
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                 =         0.091935
            Sum of Squares                              0.258093E+09
            R-squared                                      -0.105291
[ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =        0.000000]
Note:  We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 9: Determinants of pooled PTE of Islamic and conventional banks, including each year 
dummy variable
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
P07 -0.02133 0.04443 -0.48 0.6312 -0.10842 0.06576
P08 0.00528 0.045 0.12 0.9066 -0.08293 0.09348
P09 -0.04287 0.05217 -0.82 0.4112 -0.14511 0.05937
P10 -0.0311 0.04133 -0.75 0.4518 -0.1121 0.0499
P11 -0.02137 0.04181 -0.51 0.6092 -0.10332 0.06057
P12 .09293* 0.04837 1.92 0.0547 -0.00188 0.18774
ISMDUM 0.0006 0.0552 0.01 0.9913 -0.10759 0.1088
ISFCRIS -0.00216 0.03671 -0.06 0.9531 -0.0741 0.06979
FCRISIS -0.03646 0.03432 -1.06 0.2882 -0.10373 0.03082
NL_TA 0.00202 0.00124 1.63 0.1025 -0.00041 0.00445
LLP_GL .00511* 0.00305 1.68 0.0935 -0.00086 0.01109
EQ_TA .00335** 0.00138 2.42 0.0156 0.00063 0.00606
SIZERT .11626*** 0.03125 3.72 0.0002 0.05502 0.1775
RES_YPC -0.0471 0.0393 -1.2 0.2307 -0.12412 0.02993
YGR 0.00371 0.00343 1.08 0.2801 -0.00302 0.01043
HHI .98305** 0.47871 2.05 0.04 0.04481 1.9213
INFL -0.00576 0.0053 -1.09 0.2769 -0.01615 0.00462
MKTCY -.00131** 0.00057 -2.28 0.0227 -0.00243 -0.00018
VACC .01805*** 0.00352 5.12 0 0.01115 0.02496
REGQ -.01141*** 0.00374 -3.05 0.0023 -0.01875 -0.00408
Constant -.96813*** 0.36658 -2.64 0.0083 -1.68661 -0.24966
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
1393 observations
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)         =        e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                           =         0.061871
            SD.[e]                                  =        0.248738
            Var[u]                                  =        0.005002
            SD.[u]                                  =        0.070725
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                  =       0.074799
            Sum of Squares                             0.265621E+09
            R-squared                                     -0.154731
[1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =       0.000000]
Note: We estimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted. The
dummy variables P07, P08, P09, P10, P11 and P12 represent the year period 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 
2012 respectively. 
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Appendix 10: Determinants of PTE including dummy variables for 4 regions
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
MENA 0.02965 0.1551 0.19 0.8484 -0.27434 0.33364
EASIA_PF 0.21703 0.16031 1.35 0.1758 -0.09718 0.53124
SOUTH_AS 0.17453 0.15447 1.13 0.2585 -0.12822 0.47727
EU_CASIA 0.04872 0.17301 0.28 0.7783 -0.29038 0.38781
NL_TA 0.00128** 0.00052 2.47 0.0137 0.00026 0.0023
LLP_GL -0.47740D-05 0.4432D-04 -0.11 .9142 -0.91645D-04 0.82097D-04
EQ_TA 0.00361*** 0.00076 4.76 0 0.00212 0.0051
SIZERT 0.03057*** 0.0088 3.47 0.0005 0.01333 0.04781
RES_YPC 0.03072** 0.01444 2.13 0.0333 0.00242 0.05901
YGR -0.00116 0.00302 -0.38 0.7019 -0.00707 0.00476
HHI 0.66190** 0.25889 2.56 0.0106 0.15448 1.16932
INFL -0.0004 0.00152 -0.26 0.7924 -0.00337 0.00257
MKTCY 0.76218D-04 0.00024 0.32 0.7490 -0.39072D-03 0.54316D-03
VACC -0.00249** 0.00104 -2.39 0.0168 -0.00452 -0.00045
REGQ 0.00347*** 0.00094 3.69 0.0002 0.00163 0.00532
Constant -0.21696 0.15004 -1.45 0.1482 -0.51103 0.07711
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)       =         e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                          =        0.060312
            SD.[e]                                =         0.245585
            Var[u]                                =         0.003289
            SD.[u]                                =         0.057346
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                =        0.051707
            Sum of Squares                            0.292235E+09
            R-squared                                    -0.310931
[1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =       0.000000]
Note:  We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 11: Determinants of PTE including dummy variables for MENA
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
MENA -.016598*** 0.03078 -5.39 0 -0.22632 -0.10565
NL_TA 0.00126** 0.00052 2.42 0.0156 0.00024 0.00229
LLP_GL .69285D-06 .4466D-04 0.02 .9876 -0.86843D-04 .88228D-04
EQ_TA 0.00346*** 0.00076 4.53 0 0.00196 0.00496
SIZERT 0.02936*** 0.00844 3.48 0.0005 0.01282 0.0459
RES_YPC 0.0183 0.01296 1.41 0.1579 -0.0071 0.04371
YGR -0.00113 0.00302 -0.37 0.7088 -0.00705 0.0048
HHI 0.81074*** 0.25544 3.17 0.0015 0.31009 1.31138
INFL -0.00056 0.00152 -0.37 0.7151 -0.00354 0.00243
MKTCY 0.00025 0.00023 1.12 0.2633 -0.00019 0.0007
VACC -0.00431*** 0.00087 -4.94 0 -0.00601 -0.0026
REGQ 0.00386*** 0.00076 5.09 0 0.00237 0.00534
Constant -0.01242 0.07701 -0.16 0.8719 -0.16336 0.13852
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)        =      e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                          =       0.061404
            SD.[e]                                 =       0.247799
            Var[u]                                 =       0.003367
           SD.[u]                                =       0.058029
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]               =       0.051989
            Sum of Squares                           0.328292E+09
            R-squared                                   -0.497840
[1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =      0.000000]
Note:  We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 12: Determinants of PTE including dummy variables for East Asia and Pacific
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
EASIA_PF 0.14750*** 0.02474 5.96 0 0.09901 0.19598
NL_TA 0.00131** 0.00052 2.52 0.0116 0.00029 0.00233
LLP_GL -0.13561D-04 0.4433D-04 -0.31 0.7597 -0.10045D-03 0.73329D-04
EQ_TA 0.00339*** 0.00076 4.46 0 0.0019 0.00487
SIZERT 0.02621*** 0.00841 3.12 0.0018 0.00972 0.04269
RES_YPC 0.01486 0.01262 1.18 0.2393 -0.00989 0.0396
YGR -0.00163 0.00303 -0.54 0.5903 -0.00758 0.00431
HHI 0.68906*** 0.25193 2.74 0.0062 0.1953 1.18283
INFL -0.20231D-04 0.00154 -0.01 0.9895 -.030290D-02 0.29885D-02
MKTCY 0.99793D-04 0.00023 0.43 0.6701 -0.35938D-03 0.55897D-03
VACC -0.00194*** 0.00071 -2.75 0.006 -0.00333 -0.00056
REGQ 0.00184*** 0.00068 2.69 0.0071 0.0005 0.00318
Constant -0.04100 0.07639 -0.54 0.5914 -0.19071 0.10871
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)        =       e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                          =       0.061404
            SD.[e]                                =      0.247799
            Var[u]                                =       0.003367
            SD.[u]                                =       0.058029
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                =       0.051989
            Sum of Squares                          0.328292E+09
            R-squared                                  -0.497840
[1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =      0.000000]
Note:  We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 13: Determinants of PTE including dummy variables for South Asia
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
SOUTH_A 0.01207 0.04405 0.27 0.784 -0.07427 0.09842
NL_TA .00165*** 0.00053 3.11 0.0018 0.00061 0.00268
LLP_GL -.11659D-04 .4524D-04 -0.26 -0.7966 10032D-03 0.77003D-04
EQ_TA .00307*** 0.00077 3.96 0.0001 0.00155 0.00459
SIZERT .02806*** 0.0087 3.23 0.0013 0.01101 0.04512
RES_YPC -0.00582 0.01293 -0.45 0.6524 -0.03116 0.01951
YGR -0.00201 0.00318 -0.63 0.527 -0.00825 0.00422
HHI .56996** 0.26156 2.18 0.0293 0.05732 1.0826
INFL -0.00073 0.00163 -0.45 0.6554 -0.00393 0.00247
MKTCY .00051** 0.00023 2.18 0.0294 0.00005 0.00097
VACC -.00148** 0.00074 -2 0.045 -0.00292 -0.00003
REGQ .00234*** 0.0009 2.61 0.0091 0.00058 0.00409
Constant -0.08259 0.09236 -0.89 0.3712 -0.26363 0.09844
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)          =         e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                            =         0.060845
                   SD.[e]                            =        0.246669
                   Var[u]                            =        0.006820
                   SD.[u]                            =        0.082583
                   Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]            =        0.100790
                   Sum of Squares                        0.275676E+09
                   R-squared                                -0.216782
   [1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =       0.000000]
Note:  We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 14: Determinants of PTE including dummy variables for Europe and Central Asia
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
EU_CASIA -0.16749*** 0.04823 -3.47 0.0005 -0.26201 -0.07296
NL_TA 0.00168*** 0.00053 3.18 0.0015 0.00064 0.00271
LLP_GL -0.16628D-04 .4497D-04 -0.37 0.7116 -0.10477D-03 0.71518D-04
EQ_TA 0.00319*** 0.00077 4.15 0 0.00168 0.0047
SIZERT 0.03242*** 0.00862 3.76 0.0002 0.01553 0.04931
RES_YPC -0.00316 0.01247 -0.25 0.7997 -0.0276 0.02127
YGR -0.00134 0.00313 -0.43 0.6692 -0.00748 0.0048
HHI 0.39189 0.26226 1.49 0.1351 -0.12213 0.90592
INFL -0.00067 0.00159 -0.42 0.6713 -0.00379 0.00244
MKTCY 0.00033 0.00024 1.41 0.1598 -0.00013 0.0008
VACC 0.0006 0.00094 0.64 0.5206 -0.00124 0.00245
REGQ 0.00240*** 0.00071 3.41 0.0007 0.00102 0.00378
Constant -0.14427* 0.08093 -1.78 0.0746 -0.30289 0.01435
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)          =         e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                            =        0.060984
                  SD.[e]                             =        0.246949
                  Var[u]                             =         0.005654
                  SD.[u]                             =         0.075194
                  Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]            =          0.084848
                  Sum of Squares                          0.253755E+09
                  R-squared                                  -0.073853
   [1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =        0.000000]
Note: We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 15: Sample Distribution by Country and Year: number of observations
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total Ob /country
Arab Emirates 13 13 16 16 16 16 15 105
Bahrain 13 15 15 14 15 15 14 101
Bangladesh 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84
Egypt 0 0 0 2 4 4 4 14
Great Britain 6 7 6 6 6 5 5 41
Indonesia 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 51
Iraq 1 2 4 6 7 8 4 32
Jordan 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 42
Kuwait 6 6 7 7 7 7 6 46
Lebanon 0 3 4 3 3 0 0 13
Malaysia 25 25 31 31 28 29 28 197
Pakistan 11 12 13 14 14 14 14 92
Philippines 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 11
Qatar 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 41
Saudi Arabia 6 7 6 8 7 8 7 49
Singapore 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 12
Sudan 8 12 13 13 12 13 6 77
Syria 2 4 4 4 4 4 1 23
Tunisia 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 12
Turkey 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 46
Yemen 4 4 5 6 6 6 5 36
Total Ob/year 133 153 168 174 173 174 150 1125
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Appendix 16: Determinants of PTE including dummy variables for Conventional banks in 
Muslim (CBINMC) and Non-Muslim (CBINNMC) countries
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
CBINMC -0.01043 0.02184 -0.48 0.6331 -0.05323 0.03238
CBINNMC 0.21215*** 0.05759 3.68 0.0002 0.09928 0.32501
NL_TA 0.00208*** 0.00054 3.84 0.0001 0.00102 0.00314
LLP_GL -0.30337D-05 0.4504D-04 -0.07 0.9463 -0.91313D-04 0.85246D-04
EQ_TA 0.00332*** 0.00077 4.29 0 0.00181 0.00484
SIZERT 0.03532*** 0.00874 4.04 0.0001 0.01819 0.05246
YGR -0.00315 0.00315 -1 0.3177 -0.00931 0.00302
RES_YPC -0.01086 0.01246 -0.87 0.3835 -0.03527 0.01356
HHI 0.58692** 0.25735 2.28 0.0226 0.08252 1.09132
INFL -0.54997D-04 0.0016 -0.03 0.9725 -0.31847D-02 0.30747D-02
MKTCY 0.00067*** 0.00023 2.86 0.0042 0.00021 0.00112
REGQ 0.00163** 0.00071 2.29 0.0221 0.00023 0.00303
VACC -0.00227*** 0.00075 -3.02 0.0025 -0.00375 -0.0008
Constant -0.11355 0.07957 -1.43 0.1536 -0.26951 0.04241
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Random Effects Model: v (i,t)         =       e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                            =       0.061311
            SD.[e]                                  =        0.247611
            Var[u]                                  =        0.005643
            SD.[u]                                  =        0.075117
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                  =       0.084275
            Sum of Squares                             0.265316E+09
            R-squared                                     -0.157996
[ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =      0.005373]
Note: We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted.
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Appendix 17; Determinants of PTE including dummy variables for Islamic banks in Muslim 
(IBINMC) and Non-Muslim (IBINNMC) countries
s
VRS500 Coefficient
Standard 
Error
z
Prob
|z|>Z*
95% Confidence
Interval
IBINMC -0.00158 0.02205 -0.07 0.9429 -0.04479 0.04163
IBINNMC -0.10641 0.0725 -1.47 0.1422 -0.2485 0.03568
NL_TA 0.00160*** 0.00053 3.01 0.0026 0.00056 0.00264
LLP_GL 0.33596D-05 0.4658D-04 0.07 0.9425 -.8 7941D-04 0.94660D-04
EQ_TA 0.00326*** 0.00079 4.14 0 0.00172 0.0048
SIZERT 0.02710*** 0.0086 3.15 0.0016 0.01024 0.04396
YGR -0.00219 0.00317 -0.69 0.4891 -0.0084 0.00402
RES_YPC -0.00553 0.01258 -0.44 0.6605 -0.03019 0.01914
HHI 0.58485** 0.25998 2.25 0.0245 0.07531 1.0944
INFL -0.00065 0.00161 -0.4 0.6863 -0.0038 0.0025
MKTCY 0.00052** 0.00023 2.21 0.0268 0.00006 0.00097
REGQ 0.00234*** 0.00072 3.26 0.0011 0.00093 0.00375
VACC -0.00096 0.00081 -1.18 0.2361 -0.00255 0.00063
Constant -0.08701 0.08049 -1.08 0.2797 -0.24477 0.07074
***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level
Parameters of model:
Random Effects Model: v(i,t)           =       e(i,t) + u(i)
Estimates:  Var[e]                             =      0.061418
            SD.[e]                                   =       0.247826
            Var[u]                                   =       0.006187
            SD.[u]                                   =       0.078659
            Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)]                   =      0.091520
            Sum of Squares                             0.278284E+09
            R-squared                                     -0.231732
  [ 1 degrees of freedom, prob. value =     0.000000]
Note: We stimated the model by using bank random effects; standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted
